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ABSTRACT 
 The Southern Farmers’ Alliance led the largest coalition of late-nineteenth-century 
farmers’ and urban reformers.  The reform movement called for laws opposing speculation on 
agricultural prices, restricting the powers of business trusts, regulating railroad freight rates, and 
increasing the circulation of currency based on silver.  Advocates also strongly opposed the 
proponents of sectionalism who emphasized differences and conflicts between the primary 
sections of the country, the North and the South.  Differences between the North and South 
largely revolved around the issue of slavery and emerged shortly after the founding of the nation.  
Tension accelerated in the years following the Mexican-American War and reached a climax 
during the American Civil War and post-war Reconstruction.  Although the Civil War and 
Reconstruction ceased by 1877, for decades the legacy of sectionalism continued to heavily 
influence regional identities and politics.  Because of its continued prevalence in the late-
nineteenth century, Alliance supporters identified sectionalism as a major barrier to national 
economic and political reform.  Agrarian supporters depicted regional, gender, and racial 
identities as artificial compared to shared interests of the producer class.  Reformers described 
the producer class as the vast majority of Americans who labored in urban and rural settings to 
create tangible goods of value for sale.  The Southern Alliance led this coalition of the producer 
class by 1890.  In its efforts to mobilize a national movement, the Alliance consistently 
emphasized sectional reconciliation.  This work shows that sectionalism ultimately played a 
great role in the destruction of the farmers’ reform crusade by 1896.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1889, the National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union, or Southern 
Alliance, met in St. Louis, Missouri to discuss reforms and mutual issues.  The meeting involved 
the Knights of Labor and a host of agrarian organizations, including the National Farmers’ 
Alliance, or Northern Alliance, the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association and the National 
Colored Farmer’s Alliance.  The meeting represented the culmination of efforts to build a 
national agrarian campaign that would improve the economic and political welfare of American 
farmers and laborers.  Delegates agreed to support laws opposing speculation on agricultural 
prices, restricting the powers of business trusts, regulating railroad freight rates, and increasing 
the circulation of currency based on silver.  The meetings also produced a larger and truly 
national organization when state Alliances from Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota 
formally joined the Southern Alliance.  In another act to broaden its appeal, the Southern 
Alliance elected officers from north and south of the Mason-Dixon line.  As the largest 
organization present, the Southern Alliance celebrated these actions as a victory over a major 
barrier to interregional agrarian unity.   
Charles Macune, editor of the Southern Alliance newspaper, The National Economist, 
celebrated the St. Louis meeting as a victory over sectionalism.  As the major leader of the 
Southern Alliance, Macune had overseen the rapid growth of the Alliance during the previous 
two years.  He now lauded the meeting because prior attempts at uniting laborers’ and farmers’ 
groups fell prey to various divisions, including “sectional prejudice.”  Macune reveled in the 
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ability of the Southern Alliance to unite without “the slightest evidence of sectional prejudice 
shown, not even the least trace of it felt.”  According to the agrarian leader, this victory for 
sectional reconciliation proved that Southerners and Northerners realized “that a union should be 
effected, fully believing that without this there was no hope for economic reform.”1 
Less than three years later, the remnants of the Alliance gathered at Omaha, Nebraska in 
the first meeting of the national People’s, or Populist, Party.  The party nominated candidates for 
national office and issued the Omaha Platform, which advanced many of the same reforms 
advocated by the Alliance at St. Louis.  Upon approval of the platform convention, participants 
celebrated while a band played “Dixie” and “Yankee Doodle.”  Like the Alliance, the Populist 
Party nominated a Southerner and a Northerner to its highest leadership position.  The nominees, 
James B. Weaver and James G. Field, fought on opposing sides during the Civil War and 
delegates chose them with these credentials in mind.  Whether measured by the 1889 Farmers’ 
Alliance meeting or by People’s Party convention, the agrarian movement consistently 
demonstrated that sectionalism was a major foe in the fight to achieve economic and political 
reform.2 
Over a decade later the national agrarian movement had dissolved.  Several previous 
agrarian leaders demonstrated the continuing power of regional identity and sectionalism within 
the United States.  In 1904, former Populist Vice Presidential nominee Tom Watson published 
Bethany: A Story of the Old South as a memoir of his youth in Georgia.  Watson dedicated the 
book to “THE MAGANIMOUS MEN OF THE NORTH WHO ARE WILLING TO LEARN 
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SOUTH.”  In 1905, Thomas Dixon, a former Baptist minister and 
                                                
1 National Economist, December 14, 1889. 
2 Barton C. Shaw, The Wool-Hat Boys: Georgia’s Populist Party (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1984), 56-57; John D Hicks, Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931), 236. 
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supporter of the farmers’ movement, published The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku 
Klux Klan.  Dixon wrote the book because he encountered stiff northern opposition to his views 
of Reconstruction and southern race relations.  The novel later served as the inspiration for the 
film A Birth of a Nation, which helped popularize a white supremacist interpretation of 
Reconstruction and revitalize the Ku Klux Klan.  A few years earlier, in 1900, Kansan Mary 
Elizabeth Lease addressed her former affiliations with the agrarian revolt and contemporary 
campaign efforts on behalf of the Republican Party.  Lease no longer supported Populism 
because she thought that “the issue has resolved itself into the old issue of copperheadism versus 
Republicanism, and as the daughter of an old Union soldier I feel that my place is with the 
Republican party.”  During the next presidential election Lease added “My father and brothers 
died on the field of battle defending the flag and the Union that the Democratic party, 
represented by [William Jennings] Bryan and [Adlai E.] Stevenson, sought to destroy.”3 
                                                
3 Thomas E. Watson, Bethany: A Story of the Old South (New York: D. Appleton, 1904), v; Joe Creech, Righteous 
Indignation: Religion and the Populist Revolution (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 143, 181-82; 
Leavenworth Times, September 22, 1900 in O. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1969), 225 (first Lease quote), newspaper clipping dated September 27, 1904, in Kansas 
Biographical Scrapbook, Kansas State Historical Society in Clanton, Kansas Populism, n.46 282 (second Lease 
quote).  Lease’s father died at Andersonville Prison, while two brothers died at the battles of Fredericksburg and 
Lookout Mountain respectively.  Dixon publicly supported Populists, but voted against them in national elections.  
He later regretted voting for Democrat Grover Cleveland in 1892, but could not support Democrat-Populist William 
Jennings Bryan because of his monetary policy in 1896.  Interestingly, Dixon corresponded with Populist North 
Carolina Senator Marion Butler until 1898, which was four years into a fusion agreement between Populists and 
Republicans in the state.  A former Democrat, Butler helped initiate Populist-Republican fusion in North Carolina, 
which earned him the wrath of prominent Democrats.  Among his Democratic enemies were Josephus Daniels, 
Furnifold Simmons, and Charles Brantley Aycock, who accused Butler of betraying his race.  According to Glenda 
Gilmore, Dixon joined Daniels, Simmons, and Aycock in a cadre of the “New White Man.”  Although Dixon 
viewed African Americans as inferior to whites throughout the 1890s, it is interesting that he continued to write 
Butler well after the advent Republican-Populist fusion.  For his part, Butler did not view blacks as equals to whites 
either.  He embraced, however, a coalition with black leaders and voters, opposed lynching, and tried to stop 
disfranchisement laws.  For the correspondence between Butler and Dixon, see Joe Creech, Righteous Indignation: 
Religion and the Populist Revolution (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), n.8 204. For more on Dixon and 
the “New White Man,” see Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White 
Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 66-70, 135-38; 
for more on Butler, see James L. Hunt, Marion Butler and American Populism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003). 
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Within a decade of its collapse, many former members of the farmers’ crusade affirmed 
their loyalty to regional identities and their retreat from a national identity based on the value of 
laborers and farmers.  How did supporters of the Alliance and Populism switch from advocating 
economic reform through the conquest of sectionalism, to supporting values and attitudes that 
were peculiar to specific regions?  This project seeks to answer that question by showing that 
sectional reconciliation played an essential role in mobilizing the national agrarian movement 
and that sectionalism greatly influenced the destruction of the farmers’ reform crusade.  
Advocates of the agrarian cause consistently described sectionalism as a major barrier to the 
unity of the producer class.  American reformers touted the producer class as those who labored 
to create tangible goods of value for sale.  According to the Alliance and other organizations, this 
group represented a plurality of Americans and with this majority status producers had the right 
to use the U.S. government to reform the country economically and politically.  Agrarian 
supporters argued that to achieve reforms, the American majority needed to eschew artificial 
identities tied to region, gender, and race, and embrace their true interests as members of the 
producer class.   
The agrarian movement concerned itself with sectionalism because of events in the mid-
nineteenth century.  Differences between the North and South caused division within the federal 
government from the founding of the nation, but tension accelerated in the years following the 
Mexican-American War.  A product of these rising hostilities between North and South, the 
American Civil War became the ultimate expression of sectionalism where each section waged 
war against the other.  The Reconstruction era that followed the end of military combat 
witnessed the continuation of sectionalism.  Violence and bitter fights within the federal 
government prolonged strife between the North and South.  Although the Civil War and 
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Reconstruction ceased by 1877, for decades the legacy of sectionalism continued to heavily 
influence regional identities and politics.  When the Southern Alliance spread from its Texas 
base in 1887, sectionalism affected its movement.  The organization first moved into other 
southern states, rather than toward states that fought for the Union.4  
This project seeks to connect the historiography of sectionalism to the farmers’ 
movement.  While scholars of sectionalism after the Civil War have shown the enduring legacy 
of sectional conflict in the memories of Americans, they have not connected their findings to the 
agrarian groups with much depth.  When Civil War memory scholars mention the Southern 
Alliance or Populism they usually depict the Lost Cause as a powerful weapon used against 
agrarian reform.  Few historians in the sub-field look within the farmers’ movement to find 
competing memories of the war and the Reconstruction that followed.5  This absence is 
understandable, given that few scholars of the Alliance and Populism examined the role of 
sectionalism, except as a tool used against the agrarian reform crusade.  Because of a focus on 
the political and economic policies of the farmers’ movement, and due to a tendency to glorify 
                                                
4 Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 
5 David Blight and Gaines Foster are examples of this depiction in post-Civil War historiography.  Blight also 
mentions the 1896 Republican strategy of linking Unionism and McKinley against the “disorder” they associated 
with William Jennings Bryan and his class appeals.  See Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American 
Memory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 294, 346.  Foster notes that some 
members of the agrarian movement tried to appeal to white Southerners with references to the Confederacy.  
Ultimately, he concludes that Conservative Democrats succeeded in using the Lost Cause to promote deference, 
order, and tradition over the rebellion associated with the farmers’ revolt.  I agree with this interpretation and add 
more evidence from other sources to show how northern agrarians responded to southern farmers’ references to the 
Confederacy.  See Foster, Ghosts of Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 
1865 to 1913 (1985, repr., New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 86, 114, 194-95.  For other works that focus 
on sectionalism and Civil War memory, see Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost 
Cause, 1865-1920 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980); Nina Silber, The Romance of Reunion: 
Northerners and the South, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage, ed., Where These Memories Grow: History, Memory, and Southern Identity (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000); William Blair, Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War South, 
1865-1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); David Goldfield, Still Fighting the Civil War: 
The American South and Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2004); John R. Neff, 
Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2005); Barbara Gannon, The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
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its participants, many historians viewed sectionalism as an artificial ploy used by scheming 
politicians and their business supporters.6  In reaching these conclusions, scholars followed the 
arguments of agrarian revolt supporters.    
The general absence of sectionalism in scholarship on the Alliance and Populism 
suggests a false division between the pro-reconciliationist farmers’ crusade and the pro-
sectionalism of moneyed interests in the late-nineteenth-century North and South.  Not only did 
business interests and politicians, like William McKinley, promote sectional reconciliation, but 
agrarian reformers held closer to their regional identity than to their association with the national 
agrarian movement.7  Sectionalism was especially prevalent in the history of the Southern 
Farmers’ Alliance.  Before the advent of People’s Party, the Alliance contained many white 
southern members who celebrated their regional identities through the Democratic Party, white 
supremacy, and the Confederacy.  Some white Southerners failed to make the transition from the 
Alliance into the People’s Party because of their allegiances to their region.8  When some 
Populists in Kansas became convinced that white Southerners did not truly wish to join a 
national third party, they returned to the Republican Party.  Rather than support Democrats and 
policies they associated with the Confederacy, these Kansans retreated to the party of tradition, 
the Grand Old Party.  Sectionalism reduced the ranks of the agrarian revolt prior to the first 
                                                
6 Some older and several recent scholars note the importance of sectionalism within the agrarian rebellion.  See 
Charles Postel The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 173-204; Peter H. Argersinger, 
Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People’s Party (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1974), passim.  Argersinger discussed sectionalism, but since he wrote on Kansas Populism, he did not focus on the 
diversity found in the southern context and the relationship between sectionalism and the larger national agrarian 
movement.  
7 During an 1885 visit to Virginia, McKinley told the audience “the Republicans of the North harbor no 
resentments….They wish you the highest prosperity and greatest development.”  In Vincent P. De Santis, 
Republicans Face the Southern Question: The New Departure Years, 1877-1897 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1959), 219. 
8 Like Robert McMath, I see a break between the Southern Alliance and the Populist Party.  Many Alliance 
members did not join the People’s Party.  While I emphasize the role of sectionalism in the destruction of the 
Southern Alliance, McMath stresses the effects of cooperative failures.  See McMath, The Populist Vanguard: A 
History of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975).  
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national election to feature the People’s Party in 1892.  Even with the onset of Populism, the 
power of sectionalism and regional identities did not die.  As the expressions of Lease, Watson, 
and Dixon demonstrate, the emotional attachment to regional identities remained within most 
Populists and found common expression in the aftermath of the farmers’ revolt.  This study 
demonstrates the strong connections between sectional attitudes and the agrarian movement.  
While the policies of the farmers’ revolt differed from both major parties, Alliance and Populist 
supporters frequently held racial, gender, and sectional attitudes that mirrored those of most late-
nineteenth-century Americans.   
The early historiography of the farmers’ movement largely ignored these similarities.  
Historians initially depicted the agrarian revolt as a progressive democratic movement or as a 
movement of paranoid provincials, who were unable to adapt to change.  John D. Hicks, C. Vann 
Woodward, and Lawrence Goodwyn fit into the first group of scholars.  Hicks published the first 
major scholarly assessment of Populism in 1931 with The Populist Revolt.  Hicks argued that the 
agrarian rebellion arose out of dire economic conditions in former frontier regions of the country.  
Farmers appeared to be “radical” in the 1890s because they argued that the influence of business 
should not trump the power of the American people.  Through Progressivism and the New Deal 
agrarian critiques became mainstream political reforms achieved by the 1930s.  Hicks viewed 
Populism and Progressivism as similar movements because their supporters both believed that 
“the voice of the people was the voice of God.”9 
Woodward followed Hicks with a portrayal of Populism as a movement of common 
people against an economic elite.  In several publications in the 1930s and 1950s, Woodward 
viewed the agrarian movement as a challenge to unequal racial and economic relationships.  
                                                
9 Hicks, Populist Revolt, 406. 
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Woodward celebrated Populism as movement in the American hinterlands of the West and South 
where a biracial coalition of farmers and urban industrial workers challenged the supremacy of 
Northeastern financial interests.  Like Hicks, Woodward noted the role of sectional animosities 
in weakening the Populist coalition.  Both historians identified sectionalism largely with groups 
external to the farmers’ movement.  A just biracial movement of common people, Populism 
could not overcome the influence of oppositional economic groups who wielded the powerful 
instruments of sectionalism and political violence.10 
In the 1970s, Goodwyn continued many of these themes by focusing on the “movement 
culture” of the agrarian revolt.  He argued that farmers organized a cooperative crusade at the 
grassroots level to challenge the power of business elites.  More than Hicks and Woodward, 
Goodwyn focused on the cultural power of sectionalism and noted its destructive effects within 
the movement.  Goodwyn concentrated most of his work, however, to chronicling the 
“movement culture” and its destruction by dishonest false-Populists.  Outside of the classroom, 
Woodward and Goodwyn actively supported mid-twentieth-century liberal multiracial causes, 
which influenced their interpretation of the farmers’ movement.  Both scholars portrayed 
agrarians as representatives of the people who held fairly enlightened racial attitudes for the 
1890s and fought for economic justice.11  
Richard Hofstadter challenged the interpretation of Hicks, Woodward, and Goodwyn.  
Rather than a noble democratic movement, Hoftstadter saw Populism as a frightening crusade of 
provincial farmers who lashed out at Jews and immigrants because of their declining economic 
                                                
10 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson Agrarian Rebel (1938.  2nd ed., Savannah, GA: Behive Press, 1973); 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); 
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
11 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976); Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 350, 507-08; Duke Today, “Duke Flags Lowered: Historian 
Lawrence Goodwyn Dies,” Duke University, https://today.duke.edu/2013/09/goodwyn (accessed March 21, 2014). 
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and social status.  Published in 1955, Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform demonstrated a fear of 
mass politics, which had recently delved into European fascism and McCarthyism in the U.S.  
Influenced by these recent developments, the historian argued that the agrarian movement acted 
irrationally with its over-simplistic remedies and nostalgia for the eras of Jefferson and 
Jackson.12   While he showed that Populism did not fit mid-twentieth-century liberal standards, 
Hofstadter did not discuss the diversity and appeal of agrarian protests.  He also failed to note 
internal divisions within the agrarian movement, including the role of sectionalism.  Unlike 
Hicks and Woodward, however, Hofstadter looked within Populism rather than without to find 
the reasons for its collapse.  Hofstadter also correctly noted the influence of nostalgia within the 
farmers’ movement.13 
The two camps defined much of the scholarly work that came in the 1950s and 1960s.  In 
his That Noble Dream, Peter Novick found that each group of scholars fit interesting patterns. 
Novick noted that critics of the agrarian movement tended to be Jews from the urban 
northeastern United States.  Scholars with a favorable view of the farmers’ revolt came from the 
Protestant Midwest and South, where the movement found its greatest support.  Into the 1960s, 
Alliance and Populist scholars reflected the Northeast versus “West” and South dynamic 
prevalent in the agrarian movement of the 1890s.14 
                                                
12 From William F. Holmes, “Populism: In Search of a Context,” Agricultural History 64 (1990): 26; Richard 
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 60-93.  Victor C. 
Ferkiss also identified Populism with fascism because the party supported immigration restriction in its 1892 
platform.  See Ferkiss, “Populist Influences on American Fascism,” Western Political Quarterly 10 (June 1957): 
350-73. 
13 Charles Postel argues that Hoftstadter overstated the backwards perspective of the farmers’ movement. Postel 
shows that modern business organizational strategies figured prominently in the thinking of many agrarian 
movement leaders; The Populist Moment, especially 45-68, 103-72 
14 Replicating the dominant trend of the profession, all of these scholars were white men.  Novick, That Noble 
Dream, 337-41.  Novick noted one exception in each of the interpretive groups: Norman Pollack in the pro-Populist 
camp and Talcott Parsons in the anti-Populist group. 
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After the 1960s most studies of the agrarian movement focused on a state or region at the 
expense of the national dynamics of the movement.  These scholars concentrated on the agrarian 
movement’s relation to race, Christianity, labor ideology, republican ideology, and encounters 
with a market economy.15  In contrast, this study applies a national perspective to emphasize the 
relationship between events and people in the several states and regions.  It focuses on states 
where the Alliance and Populism experienced the most success in order to determine the true 
prospects for an interregional agrarian movement in the 1890s.  As the home of the Southern 
Alliance, Texas provided much of the early leadership for the Alliance, sent lecturers to spread 
the Alliance message in other states, and experienced the heavy influence of Populism in state 
political contests.  Agrarian organizers in the South and Midwest viewed Georgia as an 
important state for spreading their message.  In 1890, Alliance supporters won an overwhelming 
number of seats in the state legislature, which showed the impressive influence of the farmers’ 
organization in the state.  Georgians also held prominent positions within the Southern Alliance.  
Like Georgia, North Carolina provided significant leaders to the agrarian movement.  The 
                                                
15 Studies that focus on the South include Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969); William F. Holmes, “The Demise of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance,” Journal of 
Southern History 41 (May 1975): 187-200; McMath, Populist Vanguard; Gerald H. Gaither, Blacks and the Populist 
Revolt: Ballots and Bigotry in the “New South” (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1977); Bruce Palmer, 
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Alliance and Populism also influenced North Carolina elections throughout the 1890s.  As the 
home of the People’s Party, Kansas figures prominently in this study.  The Southern Alliance 
rapidly spread throughout the Sunflower state and Kansas agrarians worked hard to turn the 
Alliance into a national political party.  Because of the absence of personal papers from many 
farmers’ activists, newspapers in Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, and Kansas form a crucial 
evidentiary source for the study.     
Chapters in this work focus on the process of forming a national agrarian movement 
amidst an environment that promoted sectionalism.  The chapters, therefore, are primarily 
organized chronologically.  Chapter 1 provides a background to the formation of the farmers’ 
movement.  The chapter also demonstrates that the Southern Alliance avoided controversial 
political and sectional issues during this “honeymoon” phase of early growth.  General economic 
critiques and cooperative efforts allowed the organization to form a powerful base of support 
throughout the South and Midwest by the end of 1889.  Chapter 2 focuses on the first national 
meeting of various agrarian organizations and the Knights of Labor, held in December 1889.  
The Southern Alliance failed to achieve a grand conglomeration of the major farmers’ and 
laborers’ unions at St. Louis, but the organization accomplished its first triumph over 
sectionalism to produce a genuine national agrarian crusade.  Northern state Alliances officially 
joined the Southern Alliance and elections produced an interregional leadership within the 
agrarian order. 
Chapter 3 breaks somewhat from the narrative structure of other chapters to analyze an 
underappreciated facet of the farmers’ crusade.  In the aftermath of the St. Louis convention the 
Southern Alliance worked hard to broaden its appeal throughout the U.S.  Utilizing newspapers 
and public speakers the organization promoted a concept of national identity that vigorously 
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attacked sectionalism, endorsed reconciliation, and emphasized the essential value of the 
producer class to the nation.  The agrarian vision of American identity became just as important 
as policies and cooperative activities in gaining and losing followers of the Alliance and, later, 
Populism.  In Chapter 4, the focus is on the use of this American identity by the farmers’ 
movement during 1890.  Reacting to increased criticism from political opponents, the Alliance 
reinforced group solidarity with references to its national identity concept.  Throughout these 
efforts the Alliance advocates emphasized sectional reconciliation.  Since many of its leaders 
served in the Civil War, the agrarian group utilized the credibility of veterans in its assaults on 
sectionalism. 
Chapter 5 chronicles the rise of friction within the movement at the 1890 meeting of the 
Alliance in Ocala, Florida.  After several years of interregional harmony, politics and 
sectionalism emerged and subsequently became a major threat to the agrarian movement.  
Chapter 6 demonstrates how sectionalism increasingly overwhelmed the Alliance throughout 
1891 and 1892, despite great efforts to dilute its importance.  These years witnessed the birth of 
the Populist Party.  From its origins the People’s Party wrestled with problems that took root in 
the Southern Alliance.  Sectionalism weakened unity in the agrarian rebellion and ultimately 
destroyed the movement in 1896.  
Although Mary Lease, Tom Watson, and Thomas Dixon lost hope in the farmers’ revolt, 
many Southern Alliance reforms ultimately became federal laws.  From business regulation to 
the election of U.S. senators by popular vote, farm loans, and the federal income tax, the agrarian 
crusade achieved many of its goals.  The dream of uniting the producer class and promoting their 
values and interests had to wait another generation.  Most Civil War veterans and supporters of 
the farmers’ revolt did not live to see the implementation of these reforms.  Charles Macune was 
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one former agrarian leader who witnessed the achievement of Alliance goals.  In a 1920 
reflection on the farmers’ movement, Macune contented himself by focusing almost exclusively 
on economic issues, celebrating the achievements of the organization, and nearly ignoring the 
issue of sectional difference.16  If the agrarian rebellion did not defeat sectionalism, its economic 
reforms eventually won popular approval.  This is the story of the rise and fall of the first major 
attempt to achieve national reform for the producer class and its destruction through 
sectionalism. 
 
  
 
 
                                                
16 Charles W. Macune, “The Farmers’ Alliance.”  Unpublished.  Center for American History, University of Texas, 
Austin, 1920.   
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CHAPTER ONE:  
UNIFYING FOR THE CAUSE: THE ALLIANCE HONEYMOON PERIOD, 1877-1889  
 
 
 
J.B. “Buck” Barry was a happy man.  In 1887 the Texas resident returned to his native 
North Carolina to organize farmers.  Sent by the fledgling Southern Farmers’ Alliance as a 
traveling lecturer, Barry successfully organized farmers into local Alliance chapters, called sub-
Alliances.  During his trip, he reported to the Texas-based Alliance that, “in spite of all opposing 
influences that could be brought to bear in Wake County, I met the farmers in public meetings 
twenty-seven times, and twenty-seven times they organized.”  After traveling to Cumberland 
County North Carolina, Barry found additional evidence that farmers longed for help.  In his 
letter to the Texas Alliance newspaper, the Southern Mercury, Barry reported that “I was 
accosted by a crowd of farmers, all strangers to me” who “demanded of me the right to assist in 
the noble and patriotic effort of reform, which I readily granted by going up into the public hall 
above the market and organized them at once.”  The lecturer assessed the state favorably, stating 
that “the farmers seem like unto ripe fruit—you can gather them by a gentle shake of the bush.”1  
Leonidas L. Polk, an agrarian organizer, and future president of the Farmers’ Alliance, also 
celebrated the quick ascent of the farm association in North Carolina.  Polk claimed there was 
“hardly an interval of five miles…that does not have an organization.”2 
                                                
1 W. L. Garvin and S. O. Daws, History of the National Farmers’ Alliance and Co-Operative Union of America 
(Jacksboro, TX: J. N. Rogers & Co., 1887), 49-50. 
2 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 92. 
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Barry and Polk testified to the intense emotions among farmers and dramatic growth of 
the Southern Farmers’ Alliance.  Their statements also reveal a climate where farmers were “ripe 
fruit,” ready to take action to address their financial and social grievances.  Railroads, 
speculators, banks, cotton ginners, millers, even drought and locusts made it increasingly 
difficult to achieve financial prosperity in late nineteenth-century agriculture.  Barry described 
North Carolina farmers as “ripe fruit,” suggesting that someone or some group only needed to 
gently pluck the fruit by sympathizing with their frustration and channeling their discontent to 
achieve relief for struggling farmers.   
Passionate lecturers, like Barry, were ready to heed the call.  Based on the evidence, 
Barry’s description accurately captured the spread of the Farmers’ Alliance.  The organization 
established sub-Alliances throughout the South by 1887 and looked to expand into the Midwest.  
Alliance membership grew rapidly in both regions.  A growing Colored Farmers’ Alliance also 
raised awareness for agrarian discontent and mobilization among African Americans.  Several 
Colored and Southern Alliance newspapers began publication during the same years.  By 1890, 
politicians were aware that the Southern Alliance was a very important group in deciding 
elections.  Alliance organizations grew rapidly from 1886-1890 through a combination of three 
methods.  First, the farmers’ movement made general criticisms against those who earned wealth 
from the labor of another.  Second, agrarians emphasized cooperative efforts to enhance the 
economic position farmers.  Because of cooperative endeavors the Alliances created social bonds 
among isolated rural people.  Third, the farmers’ movement avoided direct political action and 
took a “non-political” stance toward elections and sectional concerns.  Through general 
economic critiques, cooperative efforts, and the avoidance of controversial political and sectional 
issues the Alliances formed a powerful base of support throughout the South and Midwest by 
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1890.  This chapter chronicles the rise of the Southern Alliance as a national force and provides 
background necessary to show how sectionalism was a constant issue in the agrarian movement. 
Agrarian organizers found a changing nation during their travels in 1887.  In the late 
nineteenth century, the United States grappled with various challenges unleashed by four years 
of bloody civil war and dramatic economic growth.  Although Congress ended slavery and 
established the guidelines for citizenship and voting after the Civil War, the country continued to 
ponder the full implications of the laws.  As the nation debated what made one American and 
who truly exemplified American characteristics, the context of the debate shifted.  In the decades 
after Appomattox, urban growth, immigration, and economic development transformed the 
image of the country.  Cities rapidly grew demographically and geographically as foreign and 
domestic migrants searched for new promises and opportunities.  Building upon pre-Civil War 
foundations and stimulated by wartime demands, industrialization and commercial agriculture 
extended their pre-war growth.  In the process, technological advances reduced the need for 
skilled workers.  New production methods stressed efficiency, taking production controls from 
laborers and giving them to employers.  Railroads spawned new settlements and connected 
previously isolated towns to national networks, leading to an influx of financial institutions and 
consumer goods, while the shipment of commercial agricultural products increased.  New credit 
arrangements and falling agricultural prices increased rural debt and farm tenancy.  Economic 
depressions and panics in 1873, 1877, and 1893 showed that an increasing number of Americans 
felt the effects of economic growth and decline.  The nation entered a new and uncertain era. 
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century these economic and social 
transformations spawned various protests across the country.  Industrial workers turned to 
unions, strikes, and more subtle forms of protest to show their objections to increased corporate 
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control.  Many strikes turned violent, whether in company towns or bustling cities.  Over the 
final three decades of the century strikers displayed new levels of interstate coordination, as 
laborers increasingly transgressed state lines to plan and execute work stoppages.  As the 
economy became more national and international in scope, businesses formed corporations to 
coordinate their operations.  Workers joined the nationalization trend in their efforts to protest 
loss of control over production, falling wages, unsafe working conditions, and other complaints.  
Increasingly, Americans became more aware of each other as they looked beyond their “island 
communities” to see commonalities with their fellow countrymen and women.3  
Like the industrial workforce, American farmers also turned to protests, and occasionally 
violence, to combat the social and economic changes.  Shortly after the Civil War agrarian 
organizations, such as the Greenback Party and the Patrons of Husbandry, or Grange, arose to 
address economic grievances.  Neither group succeeded, but their currency reforms, use of 
cooperatives, and anti-monopoly rhetoric remained popular after their decline.  Building on 
Grange and Greenback ideas and tactics, the Farmers’ Alliance and Populist Party produced the 
largest and most successful farm protest movement of the nineteenth century. 
The origins of the Farmers’ Alliance began in New York and in Texas.  In 1877, farmers 
and merchants in western New York felt exploited by high railroad freight rates on lines running 
between the East Coast and the Midwest.  F.P. Root, a wealthy farmer and member of the 
Patrons of Husbandry, called for a meeting of agrarian organizations in Rochester, New York.  
Root suggested the formation of a Farmers’ Alliance to unite members of the Grange, the 
Western New York Farmers Club, and the State Agricultural Society.  The Alliance called for 
the state legislature to lower taxes and address discriminatory freight rates, although the 
                                                
3 See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
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organization considered itself to be “political but non-partisan.”  Plagued by internal differences 
concerning participation in direct political action, the organization soon dissolved in New York.  
Prior to disbanding in New York, Milton George, an Illinois farmer and editor of the Chicago-
based Western Rural, brought the group west.  In 1880 George started a Farmers’ Alliance in 
Illinois and soon formed the National Farmers’ Alliance, commonly known as the Northern 
Alliance.  A supporter of the Grange, George viewed the Alliance as a more effective means of 
combating the power of monopolies over government at all levels.  The editor feared that the 
country would be torn apart by the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of monopolies, 
and he used the Western Rural to defend farmers from injustice.  Although George thought 
farmers were the nation’s best leaders and the true backbone of the country, he also saw them as 
the most exploited group of Americans. To check the power of railroads, and other business 
monopolies, he urged agrarian clubs, such as the Grange and the Alliance, to send petitions to 
Congress requesting the regulation of railroads and other monopolies.  Throughout the Midwest 
and as far south as Texas, Milton George built a following by demanding relief for farmers 
through his Western Rural and the National Farmers’ Alliance.  From 1880 until 1887, the 
offices of the newspaper also served as the headquarters for the National Farmers’ Alliance.4 
Texans formed a similar agrarian organization in 1877.  At a meeting of farmer-stockmen 
in Lampasas County they started a club known as the Knights of Reliance.  Later the association 
changed its name to the Farmers’ Alliance.  Composed of landowners, the members were not 
wealthy.  They formed the organization to helped recoup lost cattle, to capture cattle thieves, and 
oppose monopolies.  Unlike their northern counterparts, the Texas Alliance relied on secret 
oaths, rituals, and passwords.  Similar to the New York Alliance, the Texas Alliance largely 
                                                
4 Robert McMath, American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898 (Hill & Wang: New York, 1992), 4-5 (quote 5); 
Roy V. Scott, “Milton George and the Farmers’ Alliance Movement,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45, 
no. 1 (June 1958): 92, 94-96. 
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dissolved over the issue of political participation.  In 1878, members voted to support the 
Greenback Party in the upcoming Texas election.  Based on the “political” act, many members 
left the Alliance and the organization languished for several years.  Surviving Texas Alliancemen 
gradually increased the size of their club and eventually created the National Farmers’ Alliance 
and Industrial Organization, commonly known as the “Southern” Farmers’ Alliance.  
As Robert McMath notes, the Texas and northern Alliances inherited three common 
themes from labor organizations of the 1830s.  First, both groups emphasized the rights of 
producers to receive ample reward for their labors.  In this formulation, owners and “middlemen” 
stripped profits from the producers of material goods.  Second, the Alliances also jointly opposed 
the power of monopolies, which they viewed as dangerous in democratic society.  Finally, 
members of the farm associations disagreed about how to impress their demands upon a resistant 
political system.  Should the Alliance merely seek to inform the public of their complaints?  Or, 
should they apply pressure to elected officials so that they addressed their grievances when the 
political system failed to acknowledge their problems?  Should the Alliance endorse candidates 
for public office, or should they remain non-partisan?  The relationship between the Alliance and 
political activity served as a divisive force throughout the history of the Alliance.5  
While the National Farmers’ Alliance of Illinois slowly grew, a combination of events led 
to the rapid statewide expansion of the Southern Alliance by 1886.  In 1884 the Texas 
organization appointed S.O. Daws, a lay preacher and farmer, lead lecturer.  Born in Kemper 
County Mississippi in 1848, Daws joined the post-Civil War migration to Texas, settling in Wise 
County in 1868.  He joined the Alliance and by 1881 Daws became an organizer of Wise County 
                                                
5 McMath, American Populism, 6-7. 
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farmers for the agrarian organization.6  Relying on his experiences in the pulpit and field, 
personal charisma, and communication skills, Daws espoused anti-monopolism and producerism 
to connect with struggling farmers.  Through his energetic efforts, sub-Alliances emerged across 
north and central Texas.  A proliferation of railroads, the passage of fence laws, the increased 
presence of the Knights of Labor, and renewed vigor for agrarian clubs in the Great Plains and 
South also established a climate favorable to the expansion of the Southern Alliance.  
Additionally, intense population growth produced more potential members for the Southern 
Alliance.7  Railroads and fence laws brought greater difficulties for farmers who increasingly 
relied on commercial agriculture for their subsistence.  Organizations like the Alliance and the 
Knights of Labor, helped mobilize growing numbers of farmers, agricultural workers, and 
railroad workers against those seen as stripping common Americans of the fruits of their labor.  
During the summer of 1885, both groups held joint rallies, barbecues, and picnics, while also 
making plans for a cooperative store.  The Alliance also supported Knights’ boycotts in 
Galveston and Dallas, and provided food and money to the latter union during a strike against 
Jay Gould’s Southwestern rail lines in 1886.  Growing class-consciousness combined with the 
rise of a more nationally integrated economy to create contests between producers and 
corporations throughout the United States.  Daws and the Farmers’ Alliance provided one outlet 
for the growing frustration.  As a result, the farmers’ organization boasted a membership of 
90,000 and 2,200 sub-Alliances by 1886.8  
                                                
6 Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers’ Alliance, 140-41. 
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From the gains made in the two previous years, the Alliance continued to grow in 1886.  
The year proved to be important to the Southern Alliance three ways.  First, the Alliance 
produced a series of organizational principles that gave the association structure and purpose.  
Second, the agrarian group gained new leadership that oversaw a period of swift expansion.  
Third, the Colored Farmers’ Alliance formed in Houston County, Texas, providing both a partner 
and an independent wing of the Alliance reforming crusade.   
As was the case at its founding, and foreshadowing its later history, Alliance members 
faced the divisive issue of direct political activity in 1886.  In a move that mimicked the 
experience of the Grange, Alliance associates split over how best to pursue advocacy of their 
programs.  Some in the organization wanted to endorse candidates who supported their reforms, 
while other Alliance members wanted to remain neutral from the tricky world of politics.  
Meeting at Cleburne, Texas, the association split over whether the Alliance should unite with the 
Knights of Labor to nominate candidates for political office, or remain neutral.  The meeting also 
produced fifteen principles, known as the Cleburne Demands.  All but four of the planks came 
directly from the Knights of Labor, who in turn received them from prior antimonopoly groups.  
The Knights-inspired policies included an endorsement of cooperativism, issuing greenbacks to 
allow easier debt repayment, equal rights for labor and capital, the elimination of land 
speculation, greater protection of laborers’ wages and liens, and the end of the convict labor 
system.  Original Alliance reforms included the end of agricultural commodities speculation, the 
abolition of illegal fencing, railroad regulation through an Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
the full minting of silver and gold.  While the Cleburne Demands drew heavily from traditional 
anti-monopolism and producerism, they contributed a stronger emphasis on increased 
government powers to protect the rights of farmers and laborers.  Finally, the Demands also 
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established a system of political education that combined fraternal and evangelical appeals, while 
offering a series of farmers’ cooperatives.  A vote of 92-75 carried the Cleburne Demands.  
Although not directly political, the platform pushed the Alliance closer to third-party political 
principles.  Unlike the Grange, the Alliance did not dissolve over the issue of political 
participation, at least not in 1886.9  
At Cleburne, the Southern Alliance also gained a strong leader in Charles Macune.  Born 
in 1851 at Kenosha, Wisconsin, and raised in Freeport, Illinois, Macune lost his father at a young 
age.  As a boy Macune attended a debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas.  He 
met both men afterward and especially cherished the memory of his encounter with Lincoln. 
Macune learned German when he worked on the farm of a German family in Wisconsin.  He 
later became fluent in Czech.  As a young man Macune moved to Chicago to try a career in 
pharmacy.  From 1869 to 1873 he worked with a circus and traveled from Illinois to California.  
These travels also took him through Kansas and Texas, where his fluency in Czech and German 
were useful for interactions with immigrants.  By 1873, he settled in Burnet, Texas, and worked 
as a physician, lay Methodist preacher, and newspaper editor of the Democratic Burnet 
Bulletin.10  
From his post as editor Macune criticized Reconstruction rule in the state, particularly 
singling out what he saw to be the misguided leadership of Northern Republicans.  The editor 
argued, “the vitality of the South rests upon the issue between the carpetbagger and honest 
Democrat.”11  In his assertion that the future of the state depended upon the contest between 
“carpetbagger and honest Democrat” rule, Macune excluded any pretext of black political 
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leadership, and left governance of the state to whites exclusively.  He saw two choices available 
for Texas: ruin or redemption.   
The transplanted Illinoisan described his disdain for Texas carpetbagger rule in several 
editorials.  Macune revealed a stout mistrust of the Grant Administration by comparing the 
President to Julius Caesar and questioning his frequent use of the military to enforce 
Reconstruction in the South.  As turmoil embroiled neighboring Louisiana in 1875, Macune 
portrayed the Grant Administration as “corrupt,” and led by a group of “thieves” and 
“reprobates.”12 
The editor went further to describe the ill effects of carpetbagger rule by juxtaposing the 
favorable condition of Texas with Mississippi and Louisiana.  In a February 1875 piece, he 
claimed that Texas prospered because African Americans did not rule and that “negro mastery is 
everywhere fatal to honesty in office.”  Macune said that African Americans tended to 
congregate in towns where “these are ravaged by thieves elected by negroes co-operating with 
the floating white rabble,” who imposed high taxes that hurt farmers.  The editor called for 
changes to the state constitution so that the “legislature may restrict suffrage, in all town, city and 
county elections, to freeholders,” thus ending high taxation.  He concluded by stating “when 
Northern people ask why Texas prospers, and why the best population of the whole South and 
Middle and Northwestern States seek homes in Texas, we find the answer in the simple fact that 
Texas is a white man’s State, redeemed by courage and sacrifice first from red men, and then 
from saffron faced Mexicans, and never intended by God Almighty to be victimized and 
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desolated at last by Africans.”13  In a contest of the races, Macune clearly saw whites as the 
victorious conquers. 
Macune’s version of Texas history echoed familiar white southern Reconstruction themes 
with a unique Texas flavor.  Like white Southerners, he placed the Redemption of Texas in 
Christian terms by connecting white rule to divine favor.  Macune then used a white Texas 
historical memory that celebrated white mastery over a host of groups deemed less superior 
peoples, including Native Americans, Mexicans, and African Americans.  In identifying a series 
of white conquests of Texas, Macune suggested that Reconstruction and Redemption were not 
unique to the post-Civil War years.  Instead, he identified white struggle and victory over racial 
inferiors as a pattern in Texas history.  In the contemporary context Macune argued that an 
endorsement of Republican rule meant governance by racial inferiors who voted for “thieves” 
and “reprobates.”  Simply put, Texas could not afford to go down this road to ruin, less it end up 
as Louisiana and Mississippi. 
 The editorial ignored a major issue that uniquely affected Texas during Reconstruction.  
Unlike other southern states, Texas Republicans had to fund defense forces to quell Indians.  
Texas rangers and state troops fought against Indian raiders from Mexico and a group of Kiowas, 
southern Cheyenne, and Comanche who left Indian Territory to hunt buffalo.  Combined with 
more traditional southern Reconstruction state expenditures, such as public schools, railroad 
subsidies, and law enforcement, Indian defense spending contributed to high tax rates for 
Texans.  As Macune’s editorials show, Democrats frequently criticized Republicans for 
endorsing black rights and raising taxes.14  
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Williams, Beyond Reconstruction, 1-4. 
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In another editorial Macune returned to the theme of Reconstruction misrule and the 
dangers posed by black political power.  He stated that race war threatened the South because of 
the “unprincipled machinations of a set of villians who, for mercenary purposes, are inciting the 
blacks to disturbances.”  The editor continued by arguing that since whites outnumbered blacks 
around Burnet the races lived “in harmony, peace and good will.”  Macune compared black-
majority areas unfavorably, claiming “that where the blacks are in the majority, they have been 
incited by villians to uprisings in order to control their governments.”  In Macune’s formulation, 
African Americans were not equal to whites, but they did not bear the burden of responsibility 
for their actions.  Like children, Macune held that black Americans were prone to violent 
emotional reactions due to their manipulation by superiors: self-profiting white “villians.”  To 
prove his point, the editor cited cordial race relations in counties where white outnumbered 
blacks.  Left to their own devices, African Americans could not properly lead themselves or the 
general community.  Instead, black-majority areas formed the feeding ground for white parasites 
looking to enrich themselves at the expense of the broader public.15  
In the same newspaper issue Macune reinforced his opinion by republishing an article 
from the Cincinnati Commercial that criticized the future Civil Rights Bill of 1875.  Penned by 
“Redfield,” the letter aimed to reinforce the notion of African American inferiority and attack the 
notion of establishing racial equality in the South.  Redfield began with a warning to the country: 
“THE THREATENED OURAGE A NATIONAL DANGER.”  He continued,  “the history of 
the world presents no instance of a race highest in the scale of intelligence living upon terms of 
equality with the race lowest in the scale; and the attempt in America, as contemplated by the 
authors and supporters of the Civil Rights bill, will be a failure, and we may be thankful if it is 
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not a bloody failure.  The feeling in the South is one of desperation.”  Redfield suggested fears of 
racial warfare and the unstable emotional conditions in the South.  In the next sentence the writer 
drew from John C. Calhoun, the chief southern source on matters relating to nullification and 
secession: “we have been warned by the wisest philosophers and most eminent thinkers that 
when our government fails it will be on account of a majority driving a minority to 
desperation.”16  Less than a decade after the Civil War, the issue of minority versus majority rule 
reappeared as an issue worth consideration.  Redfield’s discussion of majority and minority 
rights served as a veil for discussing the debate over federal versus states’ rights, a disagreement 
that created intense sectional debates and seemed to be settled by the Union victory over the 
Confederacy.  The mostly southern-born readers of the Bulletin probably recognized Redfield’s 
indirect reference. 
Redfield moved to the issue of panic felt by white Southerners.  “We may laugh at their 
prejudices, and say that it is a foolish sentiment; but this sentiment and prejudice against the 
equality contemplated in the Civil Rights bill is of two hundred years growth, it is flesh of the 
flesh and bone of the bone, and you cannot get it out of the heart of a southern born man without 
taking off his head at the same time.”17  While the author did not devote considerable space to 
the moral correctness of racism, he did assert his belief in the foolishness of efforts to enforce 
racial equality in the South.  After “two hundred years growth” in the “heart of the southern born 
man,” it would be impossible to end racism “without taking off his head.”  The writer argued that 
emotional reactions cannot be altered without first changing the mentality of individuals.  In 
1874, the nation did not possess the desire to launch the immense effort needed to transform the 
mind of the white South.   
                                                
16 Burnet (TX) Bulletin, September 26, 1874. 
17 Ibid. 
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When Macune republished the article in the Bulletin without comment, he displayed the 
preservation of white Southern prejudice toward black Southerners.  Although not a white 
Southerner by birth, Macune knew that his audience agreed with Redfield’s statements.  Like 
Redfield, the editor did not believe in the Civil Rights Bill because he did not believe in racial 
equality.  The Cincinnati Commercial letter also communicated an important message to 
Democratic readers in Texas.  By 1874, Northern support of equal rights for African Americans 
in the South was on the decline.  This primary objective of Congressional Reconstruction was no 
longer widely accepted by Northerners.  While Cincinnati was not the heart of the Northern 
opinion, it was nonetheless above the Mason-Dixon line and represented a state that fought with 
the Union during the Civil War.  Ultimately, federal or Northern authority would retreat from the 
South, leaving white Southerners to reestablish its authority over black Southerners.  The article 
also announced that white supremacy was a national belief.  Now that the North acceded to white 
southern racial attitudes and showed signs that it would abandon the social experiment of 
Reconstruction, white reconciliation might be pursued.  For Bulletin readers it was inferred that 
the United States might now move beyond the bitterness caused by the Civil War and enter a 
new more prosperous era led by whites from the North and South.  White Texans could now 
envision a brighter future for their relatively young state in a reformed United States.  
Under Macune’s editorship, the Bulletin continued to stress the theme of white 
reconciliation.  Directly below the anti-Civil Rights Bill letter was an article on the formation of 
“The order of the Blue and Gray” in Vicksburg, Mississippi.  The organization was formed “to 
foster and encourage kindly relations between soldiers of the late war and to form a bond of 
mutual friendship and good feeling.”  Both Union and Confederate veterans apparently 
participated in the meeting in equal numbers.  The Bulletin concluded “The speeches delivered 
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were indicative of the utmost good feeling and relief at this public acknowledgement of a break 
in the dark cloud of prejudice which has been oppressing all alike.”18  
Taken together, the anti-Civil Rights Bill article and the celebration of Confederate-
Union reconciliation showed Macune’s preference for a nation where whites ruled.  Like the hint 
of reconciliation in Redfield’s letter, the reconciliation of white Union veterans with white 
Confederate veterans conveyed hope for the Bulletin and readers of the newspaper.  Macune 
suggested that if white Americans could escape the shackles of bitter Civil War memories, which 
had “been oppressing all alike,” then the country could put itself on the right path.  The Burnet 
editor thought that improvement could only be established with a government free from 
“villians” elected by manipulated black voters and replaced by “honorable Democrats,” who best 
represented the intelligent Anglo-Saxon race. 
During his time as editor of the Burnet Bulletin, Macune showed patterns of thought that 
stayed with him and came to represent major fault lines within the future agrarian movement.  
Macune heavily supported Democrats in Texas, while forcefully criticizing the Republican Party.  
Like other future Alliance leaders, the editor strongly asserted white supremacy and black 
inferiority in his state, the South, and the United States.  Macune asserted the necessity of white 
rule over non-white populations.  In several instances under his editorship, the Bulletin supported 
sectional reconciliation for white northern and southern veterans.  Macune emphasized other 
themes that became prominent to the Farmers’ Alliance and Populism.  The recent Texan 
mentioned the necessity of a West-South allegiance against the high tariff.  He declared his 
loyalty to impartial judgment, a claim often repeated by the Alliance leaders.  In a time when 
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politicians commonly hurled charges of partisanship, Macune and other agrarians tried to stake 
their claim to objectivity and truth. The editor also showed an affinity for the Grange, anti-
monopolism, and his identification with farmers, mechanics and merchants.  The Bulletin reveals 
a record of an editor in favor of agrarian reforms, clean government, and sectional reconciliation.  
Macune editorials also show a deep distrust of the Republican Party and African Americans, 
which cast doubts about their inclusion in any future efforts for agrarian reform, clean 
government, and sectional reconciliation.19   
Overall, Macune could be described as a strong southern Democrat with preferences for 
agrarian reform.  Although he supported greenback ideas, such as printing more cash and curbing 
the abuses of monopolies, Macune remained a strong Democrat throughout his adult life.  As an 
Alliance member, he consistently warned against allowing the organization to participate directly 
in politics.  What this came to mean was that Macune rejected political action through a third 
party and preferred working through the Democratic Party to achieve reform.  At an early point 
in his Alliance participation he blamed non-Democrats for trying to infuse the Alliance with 
political purposes, a charge he repeated continually during the agrarian revolt.  
When it later came to choosing between the Democratic Party and the Populist Party, Macune 
showed extreme reluctance to leave the party identified with southern heritage and tradition.  He 
also demonstrated that he thought African Americans should play a subservient role in the 
Farmers’ Alliance.  In the later history of the Farmers’ Alliance and Populism, Macune’s 
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attitudes caused significant friction with other agrarian reformers as a biracial group of 
Southerners and Midwesterners tried to unite in the Populist Party.20  
Macune ended his editorship of the Burnet Bulletin in late February 1875.  In 1879 he 
purchased a farm outside of Cameron, in Milam County, to supplement his medical practice.  
During the next seven years Macune became a member of the County Democratic Executive 
Committee and joined the Farmers’ Alliance.  He served in the Alliance with little distinction 
until 1886.  At the Alliance meeting in Cleburne, Texas, Macune became the foremost 
spokesman for the organization and he put the farm association on a new path.21 
At the time of the Cleburne meeting, Macune had been a member of the Alliance for only 
four months.  He quickly rose to prominence at Cleburne by mediating between rival factions of 
the association.  Macune left the Alliance gathering as the chairman of the state executive 
committee and became president of the organization the same year.  During the next three years 
he oversaw the rapid expansion of the Southern Alliance across the South and into the Plains 
states.22  
In one of his first moves after the meeting Macune acted to maintain the unity of the 
Alliance.  When many conservative members, including Alliance president Andy Dunlap, 
resigned from the organization Macune summoned Dunlap and radical leader, Evan Jones, for a 
compromise.  The new Alliance president knew that significant numbers were needed to 
continue the prominence of the farm association.  He convinced Dunlap and the conservatives to 
remain in the organization, even though they would have diminished power and numbers.  To 
satisfy radicals, Macune suggested that the Alliance embark on an expansion campaign to 
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increase membership.  Thereafter, Alliance representatives went to Louisiana to seek a merger 
with the struggling Louisiana Farmers Union.  During the next six months other Alliance 
lecturers helped the association spread across the South.  By January 1887 the organization 
claimed 200,000 members and 3,000 sub-Alliances, or local Alliance chapters.23 
The growth of the Southern Alliance in 1886 coincided with the rise of the Colored 
Farmers’ Alliance.  The organization was produced by the same harsh economic climate 
affecting white farmers and by the official policy of racial exclusion in the Southern Alliance.  
Due to the social acceptance of racial segregation and pressure from Texas Democrats, the 
Southern Alliance voted to restrict membership to whites in 1882.  Other organizations of the era 
followed similar policies.  For example, although the Knights of Labor was an interracial 
association, black members met separately from white members.  When the Farmers’ Alliance 
absorbed the Agricultural Wheel in 1888, the latter organization ended its interracial membership 
policy.  In response, black Arkansans formed a Colored State Agricultural Wheel to resume their 
activities.  Some African Americans in Tennessee and Alabama continued to meet in black 
Wheel chapters after the Farmers’ Alliance-Wheel merger.24  
Within four years of the decision to officially prohibit African American membership, 
several Colored Farmers’ Alliances emerged in Texas.  Although associates of the Colored 
Alliance wanted to maximize cooperation with white Alliance members, some also embraced 
racial separation to more effectively advance the organization.  Unlike other Colored Alliances, 
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the largest group voted to form an all-black association.  While African Americans served as 
president and secretary of the Colored Alliance, the organization chose Richard Manning 
Humphrey, a white man, as general superintendent.  Humphrey worked with Texas blacks as a 
lay Baptist minister and through this relationship he hosted the founding meeting of the Houston 
County Colored Alliance on his farm.25  
Humphrey followed an unlikely path to leadership in the Colored Farmers’ Alliance.  
Born in 1834 to Northern Irish immigrants in South Carolina, he graduated from Furman 
University before moving to Alabama prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.  After serving as a 
captain in the Confederate Infantry, Humphrey relocated to Texas where he farmed, taught 
school, and worked with African Americans as an lay itinerant Baptist minister.  In 1888 he ran 
as the second congressional district candidate for the Union Labor Party.  Although Humphrey 
lost the contest by a wide margin, he gained the ire of his Democratic opponent because 
Humphrey, “in slipping around at night with a lantern in his hand to organize the negroes into 
alliances, was doing so for mercenary and political ends.”  For his courtship of black voters, 
Humphrey gained support among African Americans.  After the formation of the Colored 
Farmers’ Alliance he became a logical choice for leading the organization.  As Gerald Gaither 
claims, the Colored Alliance chose Humphrey as superintendent because of his relationship with 
black members and because of his racial status.  As a white man, Humphrey allowed the 
organization to voice more radical beliefs and maintain closer ties to the Southern Alliance than 
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would have occurred with an African American superintendent.  Early on, he developed cordial 
relations with the leaders of the Southern Alliance and earned their trust.26  
The Houston County Colored Alliance quickly spread throughout Texas for several 
reasons.  First, low cotton prices and a two-year drought produced a desperate climate for Texas 
farmers.  To address growing debt during the 1880s, African Americans increasingly turned to 
associations that emphasized economic self-reliance.  Like the Southern Alliance, the Colored 
Alliance taught members farming techniques, established local cooperatives, and sponsored 
prominent cooperative exchanges in Norfolk, Charleston, New Orleans, & Houston.  Through 
these services black farmers could expect to increase farming efficiency, save money, and reduce 
debt.  Black farmers liked the practical economic self-help offered by a group like the Colored 
Alliance.27  
A second cause of the speedy rise of the Colored Alliance was its practice of engaging in 
a variety of activities.  Unlike the more narrowly focused Southern Alliance, some Colored sub-
Alliances criticized wage levels, protested rent prices, and called for better work conditions.  A 
central Georgia sub-Alliance objected to the exclusion of black Americans from juries when an 
African American was a plaintiff or defendant.  Oktibbeha County, Mississippi members started 
a fund for the needy.  The broader outlook of the Colored Alliance contrasted with the Southern 
Alliance, but closely resembled the activities of black churches and the Knights of Labor.  Many 
Colored Alliance members also belonged to the Knights of Labor, church organizations, or 
secular societies.  Because of membership links, communication networks developed among 
various black organizations in the 1880s and 1890s.28  
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The involvement of rural African-American preachers was a third cause of the rapid 
Colored Alliance growth.  When ministers joined the Colored Alliance, they usually brought 
large numbers of church members and social prestige with them.  Preachers assumed special 
importance in nineteenth-century southern society because literacy was not widespread, and, 
therefore, public speakers became especially influential community leaders.  Since black 
churches frequently combined religious, philanthropic, and formal political functions after 
emancipation, churches and preachers occupied a prominent role in African-American society.29 
The use of secrecy and ritual provided a fourth reason why African Americans joined the 
Colored Alliance.  Following the violent years of Civil War and Reconstruction, secret 
organizations, like the Union Leagues, provided blacks with some of the most effective means 
for organizing.  Through secrecy, associations built trust among members and enhanced group 
identity, since information was relegated to members only.  The use of secret rituals served 
similar purposes.  The Colored Alliance maintained their privacy and secrecy in contrast to the 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance.  Whereas the white organization held frequent barbecues, parades, 
and picnics attended by hundreds, Colored Alliances generally avoided public celebrations.  The 
contrasting public practices of the white and black Alliances demonstrated how race produced 
different possibilities for late-nineteenth century American farmers.  A public meeting of white 
farmers did not generate suspicion and hostility comparable to that of a gathering of black 
farmers.  Before emancipation, whites viewed black meetings with great suspicion and forbid 
their occurrence after the Nat Turner rebellion.  When slavery ended, Black Codes served to 
prevent public gatherings of African Americans.  During Congressional Reconstruction African-
American mass public meetings drew the attention of whites, but they were initially met with 
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little white hostility.  By the 1880s and 1890s black Americans had few opportunities to publicly 
demonstrate as white Southerners increasingly seized control of public celebrations to 
commemorate holidays, political rallies marking holidays.  Collective African American action 
had again become taboo and threatening to white Southerners.30  
A final appeal of the Colored Alliance lay in its open standards for membership.  Like 
churches and the Knights of Labor, the Colored Alliance allowed men and women to join.  
According to Steven Hahn, agricultural, railroad, domestic, sawmill, and factory workers all 
belonged to local chapters of the Knights and black Alliances.  Cumulatively, the social and 
economic attractions of the organization caused swift expansion of the Colored Alliance.  In 
1888 the various Texas Colored Alliances met at Lovelady, Texas to apply for a federal charter.  
From the meeting, the Colored Farmers’ National Alliance and Cooperative Union was born.  
Expansion soon followed.  By 1891 The Colored Alliance had sub-Alliances in every state of the 
former Confederacy.  In that year, Superintendent Humphrey claimed that the organization had 
1.2 million members.  Most scholars contend that the number was inflated, but conservative 
estimates still put Colored Alliance membership at 250,000.31  
 Talented recruiters helped the Colored Alliance gain such impressive membership totals. 
Reverend Walter A. Pattillo, of North Carolina, was one African American who helped the 
organization spread.  Pattillo was born to a slave woman in 1850.  His father was a white man, 
which apparently led to better treatment for his enslaved son.  Pattillo taught himself to read and 
                                                
30 Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth, 74; Elsa Barkley Brown, “Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere: African 
American Political Life in the Transition from Slavery to Freedom,” in Black Public Sphere: A Public Culture Book, 
ed. Black Public Sphere Collective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 111-50; Kathleen Clark, 
Defining Moments: African American Commemoration & Political Culture in the South, 1863-1913 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Stephen Kantrowitz, “One Man’s Mob Is Another Man’s Militia: 
Violence, Manhood, and Authority in Reconstruction South Carolina,” in Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics 
From Civil War To Civil Rights, ed. Jane Dailey, Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Bryant Simon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 28-66. 
31 Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 414-17; Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement 1-9; Postel, The Populist 
Vision, 41-42; Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth, 52-53. 
 36 
write, he did not work in the fields, and by the late 1860s he worked as a wagon driver and at a 
sawmill.  As a young man, he studied at seminary, was ordained, and became involved in black 
Baptist churches in Granville County, North Carolina.  From this high-status position, Pattillo 
achieved considerable influence among African Americans in black majority Granville County. 
He ran unsuccessfully as the Republican candidate for registrar of deeds in 1883, but achieved 
success as the school superintendent of Granville County.  The Baptist preacher helped establish 
the first black orphanage in the state and gained a reputation as an advocate for cordial race 
relations.32  
Pattillo brought these considerable experiences to his recruitment of members for the 
Colored Alliance.  As the Knights of Labor declined in the late 1880s, the Colored Alliance 
gained prominence and inherited former Knights members.  Pattillo joined the agrarian 
association amidst the upsurge and was named North Carolina State Lecturer in 1890.  He then 
journeyed throughout the state to organize Colored Farmers’ Alliances and by 1891 membership 
totals reached 55,000.33  
Like the Colored Alliance, the Southern Alliance experienced rapid growth from 1886 to 
1891.  In 1887 the Southern Alliance held its first national convention at Shreveport, Louisiana 
and renamed the organization the National Farmers’ Alliance and Co-Operative Union.  Macune 
won election to the presidency of the organization and the farm group made plans to expand 
beyond Louisiana and Texas.  During the next year, the Alliance experienced impressive growth 
fueled by the poor agrarian economy and the ability of traveling lecturers.  Speakers, such as 
Texans S.O. Daws and J.A. “Buck” Barry, promoted Alliance reforms by speaking to gatherings 
of farmers throughout southern and midwestern states.  In the wake of visits from traveling 
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lecturers, sub-Alliances, or local Alliance branches, were frequently established.  Alliance 
newspapers commonly followed the founding of a sub-Alliance.  Daws and Barry experienced 
great success partially because of their speaking abilities and knowledge of local social networks.  
As a native of Mississippi, Daws successfully recruited farmers in his home state during his 
eight-month stay.  In March 1887, he established the first sub-Alliance in Mississippi and within 
six months, thirty Mississippi counties had a chapter of the Alliance.  Farmers soon organized a 
state Alliance.  Barry accomplished similar results in his place of birth, North Carolina.  Through 
the work of traveling lecturers and newspapers more Americans discovered the Farmers’ 
Alliance.  Membership totals rose rapidly as the movement expanded beyond Texas.34 
While the talents and social relations of lecturers often produced expansion, the Alliance 
also grew thanks to its avoidance of electoral politics and the attractiveness of reforms.  In these 
early years of ascendance the Alliance appealed to a variety of social classes.  Large landholders 
found the anti-monopoly critiques appealing.  As planters saw their profits dwindle in the 1880s, 
they agreed that the blame lay with exorbitant railroad freight rates, Wall Street speculation, and 
foreign investors.  Modest and poor farmers liked the Alliance emphasis on the rights of the 
producer class and the cooperative nature of its agricultural remedies.  While planters wanted to 
protect their political, economic, and social positions, poorer farmers engaged in significant 
biracial alliances and expressed their anger through organizations such as the Knights of Labor 
and the Agricultural Wheel.  Some of these farmers participated in the Union Leagues during 
Reconstruction.  Planters tended to avoid these organizations and worked through more 
traditional agricultural associations like state agricultural societies and farmers’ associations, 
which frequently stressed scientific agricultural methods, crop diversification, and increased 
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industrialization.  The Colored Farmers’ Alliance contained a similar class dynamic.  In the 
upper South the association tended to contain landowners and renters.  Membership in the lower 
South contained more sharecroppers and wage laborers.35 
The anti-monopolism, self-help, and collective rhetorical appeals combined with multiple 
activities to unify a biracial, multi-class movement of farmers, planters, and wage-laborers in 
both Alliances.  During the rise of both Alliances, agricultural cooperatives provided a key point 
of attraction for many members.  As early as 1884 the Texas Alliance engaged in cooperative 
agreements for the benefit of its members.  These included agreements with local merchants, the 
creation of joint-stock stores to provide discounts to members, and buying and marketing 
enterprises.  In 1884, Texas farmers experienced some success by selling their cotton in bulk.  
The largest effort took place in 1887 as the Texas Exchange.  Appointed as business agent, 
Charles Macune undertook plans to purchase supplies and obtain the best cotton price for 
Alliance members throughout the state.  The Texas Exchange hoped to sell farm goods at the 
cheapest price and provide credit to Alliancemen.  Every Alliance member was required to fund 
the Exchange through a two-dollar contribution.  The Exchange also worked to deal directly with 
New England and European buyers and avoid Dallas and New Orleans cotton agents.  When 
farmers paid only $20,000 of the estimated $500,000 in capital, banks refused to offer loans to 
the Exchange.  By 1889 the Exchange had to shut down.36  
Although they experienced several failures, Alliance members continued to promote 
cooperative efforts during the late 1880s.  As the Texas Exchange experienced difficulty, most 
southern Alliances started statewide exchanges or cooperatives with more limited objectives.  
For example, the Georgia Exchange operated from a building provided by the Atlanta 
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Constitution, where it mostly sold fertilizer.  The North Carolina Alliance established a tobacco 
warehouse in Durham.  The Colored Farmers’ Alliance created the Norfolk Exchange where 
black and white farmers sold their cotton.  A Florida Alliance member founded an exchange in 
New York to sell oranges.  Cooperatives provided the most practical benefit to Alliance 
membership and helped the agrarian association spread across the South.37  
While the Colored Alliance and Southern Alliance were separate organizations, more 
than a common name united the groups.  White and black associates publicly acknowledged 
cohesion on numerous occasions.  Reverend John L. Moore, an African American who served as 
superintendent of the Putnam County, Florida Colored Alliance, told white Alliance members, 
“we are aware of the fact that the laboring colored man’s interest and the laboring white man’s 
interest are one in the same.”38  During the 1888 Meridian meeting of Alliances, members of the 
Southern Alliance resolved “That it is detrimental to both white and colored to allow conditions 
to exist that forces our colored farmers to sell their products for less and pay more for supplies 
than the markets justify.”39  At separate meetings during the Meridian convention, white and 
black Alliances agreed to condemn monopolist practices by railroads and banks.40  
At times biracial cooperation went beyond rhetoric.  In Louisiana the white and black 
Alliances combined to oppose the lottery system.  The Alliances argued that farmers borrowed 
money to play the lottery, which increased their indebtedness.  Although the opposition failed to 
eliminate the lottery system, the biracial cooperation showed that white and black Alliances 
would unify when there was mutual interest.  In some states the Southern and Northern alliances 
offered financial assistance to Colored Alliance organizers.  Some scholars suggest that whites 
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offered financial assistance so that they could control the Colored Alliance.  Omar Ali argues 
persuasively, however, that Colored Alliance leaders considered the overall benefits before they 
chose whether or not to accept help from white Alliancemen.41  
Another cooperative effort of the Alliances garnered the attention of black and white 
farmers and brought the white organization to the peak of its popularity.  In 1888, manufacturers 
of jute bags colluded to raise their prices by more than sixty percent.  Cotton farmers used the 
bags to wrap bales and could not long afford the sharp increase.  After suffering through the 
1888 crop season, farmers waged a strike of the jute bags in 1889 through the state Alliance 
cooperatives.  Colored Alliances in Alabama and Georgia joined the Southern Alliance in the 
three-year boycott.  Lecturers and a growing number of Alliance newspapers encouraged farmers 
to use cotton wrapping instead of the jute bags.  The strike proved successful in much of the 
South, especially South Carolina and Georgia, and jute bag manufacturers lowered their prices 
by 1891.  Through its communication networks and group discipline, the Alliances won a 
considerable victory over a monopoly and reached new heights of influence.42  
As the Southern and Colored Alliances reached new heights of popularity the Northern 
Alliance also broadened its influence and membership.  Transferred from Rochester, New York 
to Chicago in 1880, the Northern Alliance maintained a small base of support under the 
leadership of Milton George.  From his Chicago base, George primarily restricted his actions to 
the issuance of charters, including several for Colored Farmers’ sub-alliances in the South.  
George claimed he issued the first Colored Alliance charter in 1882 to African Americans in 
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Prairie County, Arkansas.  George also claimed that he offered to assist in paying the publication 
costs for Colored Alliance newspapers.43  
Renewed economic struggles initiated a transition in the movement in the late 1880s.  In 
1887, George lost control of the Alliance to Ignatius Donnelly, August Post, and Alston Streeter 
who promoted land, transportation, and financial reform through formal politics.  With its more 
aggressive stance, the Northern Alliance moved closer to the position of the Southern Alliance.  
Both organizations vied for new recruits in midwestern and Plains states over the next four 
years.44  
As a state that experienced considerable economic shock in the late 1880s, Kansas proved 
fertile ground for Southern and Northern Alliance recruitment.  The severity of the economic 
downturn in Kansas originated with the grand promotional efforts by railroad and real estate 
companies in the 1870s and 1880s.  Land promotion in Kansas and further West accelerated after 
the Civil War when more people were willing to move westward.  The conquest of Plains 
Indians also opened vast lands to American settlers.  Railroad construction and operation also 
accelerated the movement of Americans to the West.  In 1865, the state had seventy-one miles of 
railways.  Within five years there were 1,234 railway miles.  Kansas ranked second in the nation 
with 8,797 by 1890.  During the 1870s and 1880s, railroad corporations and land speculators 
heavily promoted the abundance of fertile soil in Kansas, leading to railway expansion.  The 
promotions worked for a time as the Kansas population grew steadily thanks to increasing land 
values, healthy crop prices, good weather, and confidence in the future.  Through births and 
                                                
43 Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement, 5; Postel, The Populist Vision, 179. 
44 McMath, American Populism, 99-104; Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement, 5. 
 42 
migration, the state population increased from 100,000 in 1860 to 1,060,000 in 1890.  The 1870s 
saw the largest increase with 630,000 new people in Kansas.45  
In the 1880s Kansas farmers experienced very good economic times, fueled by good 
weather, big crops, high prices, an increase in land value, and confidence in the future.  A 
reversal came in 1887-1888 when low rainfall and drought hit the prairie.  Many Kansans 
suffered when the drought destroyed their wheat and corn crops.  The western and central 
portions of the state particularly bore the brunt of the economic decline.  As grain prices fell, 
more of the crop was required to repay lenders, leaving little to sell for profit.  Debt and 
foreclosed mortgages became commonplace throughout the state.46  
The Northern and Southern Alliances entered the state amidst the debt and drought crisis.  
While other farm organizations, such as the Patrons of Husbandry, had been in Kansas prior to 
the Farmers’ Alliance, they did not advocate reform aggressively.  Tapping into agrarian outrage, 
organizers from both Alliances experienced rapid success in the Sunflower state.  Thomas and 
Cuthbert Vincent formed the first Southern Alliance chapter in 1888.  The brothers heard about 
the Southern Alliance and went to Texas where they became members of the farm association.  
Returning to Cowley County, Kansas the Vincents started a sub-Alliance.  In the years ahead the 
brothers exercised considerable influence over the Alliance and Populism in the state from their 
perch as editors of the Winfield The American Non-Conformist and Kansas Industrial Liberator.  
Leo Vincent joined his brothers as editor, along with William F. Rightmire.  The Vincents, 
however, did not start all of the Kansas Alliances.  In the summer of 1888 the Northern Alliance 
formed a State Farmers’ Alliance in the state.  Over the next two years Kansans founded sub-
Alliances across the state.  The struggling Northern Alliance expanded in the state, founding 
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almost 700 sub-Alliance charters by the end of 1888.  In 1889 the organization claimed 100,000 
members, although many Alliance scholars contend that 60,000 is a more accurate figure.47 
Several factors caused the speedy growth of the Alliance in Kansas.  First, economic 
conditions created a sense of outrage and motivation to seek solace in an agrarian reform 
organization.  Second, cordial social relations proved very influential to the spread of the 
Alliance.  Scott McNall found in Jewell County, Kansas that neighbors tended to join the 
organization.  Members also tended to live near roads that passed by other members’ homes.  
McNall additionally found that Alliancemen and women in Jewell County attended the United 
Brethren Church, where the Alliance held meetings.  Third, as in the South, lecturers proved 
essential to the formation of sub-Alliances.48  Like Dawes and Barry before them, Alliance 
lecturers proved instrumental in the spread of the organization in Kansas.  S.M. Scott was one of 
the lecturers who toured Kansas throughout 1888 and 1889.  He claimed to establish ninety 
alliances in sixty days.  Scott left an account of his travels, which he published in 1890 as a guide 
for other Alliance recruiters.   In his book, The Champion Organizer of the Northwest, Scott 
warned other lecturers to avoid controversy and arguments when they spoke.  He stated that, 
“there is no such thing as convincing a person against his will, for they will be of the same 
opinion still.”  Instead, Scott thought it best “to speak the truth at all times, and have the 
documents to prove what you say.”49  
In another account, again Scott showed his reluctance to offend prospective members.  
As he toured Kansas as a lecturer, Scott wore two outfits to appeal to farmer audiences.  One 
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wardrobe consisted of a work shirt and an old hat, while the other was a white shirt and a bowler.  
Accessing his German audience at a Bloom Valley schoolhouse, Scott donned the work shirt and 
old hat.  Because of his casual attire, the leader of the crowd did not believe that Scott was an 
Alliance organizer.  The German man took offense to Scott’s dress, leaving the lecturer to 
eventually abandon his efforts at Bloom Valley.  The Alliance organizer concluded that it was “a 
mistake to wear the old cap.  This was the first and last meeting I ever called for the purpose of 
organizing which failed.”50  
Scott’s cautious tactics resembled those used by the Southern and Colored Farmers’ 
Alliances during their initial expansion in the 1880s.  In Texas, Charles Macune labored to 
maintain consensus in the Alliance after the divisions produced at the Cleburne meeting of 1886.   
When the Southern Alliance spread beyond the Lone Star state, the group used a broad language 
of anti-monopolism and enticed followers with cooperative efforts to alleviate agrarian 
hardships.  The Colored Alliance followed a similar pattern to achieve a broad base of support.  
Pursuing such tactics, the Colored and Southern Alliances appealed to farmers from a variety of 
social and economic classes.  Scott followed a similar pattern as his lecturers focused on safe 
topics, including unfair interest rates, unjust practices of railroads, and critiques of the 
concentration of wealth in America.  As in the South, the Kansas Alliances pledged to be non-
partisan and apolitical.  The topics had broad appeal among struggling American farmers in the 
late 1880s.  Through general criticisms and cooperative solutions, the Alliance gained 
momentum as a trans-regional force.51 
As the Alliances grew in various states, leaders of the organizations agreed to meet to 
discuss cooperation, loose association, or the possibility of a formal merger of several groups.  In 
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December 1889, officials representing the Knights Of Labor, Northern Farmers’ Alliance, 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance, and Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association met at St. Louis.  
Representatives of the National Colored Alliance met separately in the city, although the white 
and black meetings exchanged speakers and committees.  For the first time white and black 
farmers from the Midwest and South met with labor organizers at a national meeting.  The 
conference would test the durability and feasibility of a national movement of the producer class.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
“UNION IT IS”: THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’ ALLIANCE GOES NATIONAL 
 
As the year 1889 came to a close, The National Economist struck a triumphant tone.  The 
official newspaper of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance celebrated the accomplishments of the 
organization’s annual conference with headlines like, “Union It Is,” “Meeting and 
Consolidation,” and “Working In Parallel Lines.”  The headlines revealed a growing sense of 
success and momentum that inspired the Southern Alliance in the aftermath of its third annual 
national meeting.  Like previous meetings at Shreveport, Louisiana and Meridian, Mississippi, 
the organization met to discuss regular business, including the election of officers, hear reports 
on the condition of the organization, and, most importantly, consolidate with other agrarian 
groups.  Before the convention, the Southern Alliance invited the National Farmers’ Alliance 
(Northern Alliance), the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association, and the Knights of Labor to 
attend the St. Louis meeting.  The Colored Farmers’ Alliance continued its tradition of meeting 
simultaneously, though separately, in the same town.  Although the Southern Alliance wished to 
maintain separation and cooperation with Colored Alliance, its leaders greatly hoped to merge 
with the other groups present.  Since 1886 the Texas-based Southern Alliance had steadily 
broadened its membership throughout the South and the farm association absorbed other agrarian 
organizations like the Louisiana Farmers’ Union, the Florida Farmers’ Union and the North 
Carolina Farmers’ Association.  In the months prior to the St. Louis meeting, the Southern 
Alliance expanded into the Plains states of Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa where drought and debt 
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combined to cripple the agrarian economy.  In these states they competed with Northern Alliance 
for members.1  
Conscious of moving beyond the region of its birth, the Southern Alliance increasingly 
promoted itself as a national association of farmers.  In March 1889 Alliance leader Charles 
Macune launched The National Economist newspaper.  Besides its title, another indication of the 
newspaper’s attempt to legitimize the Southern Alliance as a national organization was the 
location of The National Economist offices in the nation’s capital.  From Washington D.C., 
Macune hoped to pressure Congress to enact Alliance reforms.  He also wanted to receive 
American political news straight from its source and relay it directly to Alliance readers.  When 
The National Economist replaced the Southern Mercury as the official newspaper of the 
Southern Alliance in the summer of 1889, Macune and the Alliance indicated their 
transformation from a southern agrarian movement into a national crusade of farmers.2 
The St. Louis meeting offered the farmers’ organization an opportunity to continue its 
growth.  For the first time the Alliance stood ready to absorb non-southern agrarian societies and 
create a unified movement of farm and labor associations.  Although the annual convention 
revealed divisions between the various groups assembled, positive results suggested prospects 
for a coalition in the near future.  The southern agrarian organization also emerged from the 
meeting with new members.  State Alliances from Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota 
formally joined the southern order.  The St. Louis conference provided the Southern Alliance 
with its first triumph over sectionalism and produced a genuine national agrarian movement.   
In the months before the convention, the first issue of The National Economist clearly 
communicated the new national orientation of the Southern Alliance and set the tone for the 
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newspaper.  Editors of the newspaper expressed joy over the upcoming admittance of Montana, 
Washington, North Dakota and South Dakota into the United States because they were states that 
produced agricultural and craft goods and they would represent these interests in Congress.  Put 
in class and sectional reconciliationist terms, The National Economist proclaimed, “The growing 
sympathy between the producers of the West and South is gradually sweeping away the old 
sectional bitterness, and an alliance between the peoples of these great sections promises to 
create the power which is to bridle the rapacity of the speculative element which is bearing so 
seriously upon them.  Hail to the new born States!”  The passage shows the Alliance opinion that 
sectionalism prevented reform since the Civil War.  Adding new states where producers 
outnumbered speculators, and where sectional memories might be less important, would 
contribute to the agrarian reform cause.3  
In addressing the conquest of sectionalism, the article created visions of a renewed 
alliance between the West and the South.  During the early nineteenth century the West and the 
South united against the Northeast to form a dominant combination within Thomas Jefferson’s 
Republican Party.  In 1800, the West included the states west of the Appalachian Mountains. 
During the 1820s and 1830s the West expanded to include territories and states acquired with the 
Louisiana Purchase.  In these decades the West and the South stood as the backbone of Andrew 
Jackson’s Democratic Party.  Throughout the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian years, common 
frontier characteristics of the West and South included agriculture, small entrepreneurs, forests, 
abundant wildlife, low population density, and to varying degrees, Native Americans.  The 
similarities unified the West and South against the more urban and commercial Northeast during 
the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras.  During the thirty years following the end of the Jacksonian 
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presidency, the bonds of the regions had disintegrated over the issues of slavery and national 
unity as the Northwest partnered with the North and the Southwest joined the South.  With the 
removal of slavery as a point of contention, and the onset of bad economic times, the similarities 
between the West and South reemerged post-Civil War.  After some political partnerships in the 
late 1870s, The National Economist called for the renewal of ties between the West and the 
South in 1889.  The suggestion came from a man who lived in both regions, Charles Macune.  
Although western features had diminished in many of the states since the 1830s, Macune 
believed that the West and South shared a common identity as producing regions in contrast to 
the urban, industrial centers of Northeast that also served as the home of large corporations, 
banks, and speculators.4  
 The combination of regions is significant because an alliance of the West and South did 
not strictly address the key groups involved in the greatest example of American sectional 
animosity, the Civil War.  A truly reconciliationist vision would have to include the combatant 
regions, the North and the South.  Besides evading the primary antagonists, the West-South 
combination allowed southern states to maintain their identity by referring to a South, while 
Northerners shed their Civil War-era affiliation to become Westerners.  As Alliance supporters 
used the term, Westerners broadly included residents in the states from Ohio west to the Pacific 
Ocean.  Specifically the term applied to Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, 
Minnesota, Illinois, and Ohio.  At times the organization noted the involvement of farmers from 
New York or Massachusetts, but overwhelmingly focused on the “West.”5  
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The choice to emphasize a West-South combination over a North-South combination 
accomplished a primary goal of the Southern Alliance: to eradicate sectional lines by failing to 
note their significance.  Although Alliance leaders used the term “North,” primarily they applied 
the term to discussions of the past, especially the Civil War.  In multiple speeches and newspaper 
columns, the Southern Alliance attempted to respect the service of Union veterans in the late 
War of the Rebellion.  The North-South divide, however, was a conflict of the past, which no 
longer contained relevance in the minds of Southern Alliance advocates living in the 1880s and 
1890s.  Sectionalism was now a false source of difference.  Northerners became the ally 
Westerner, or the less friendly, Easterner.  While the West-South combination had historical 
roots, the agrarian reformers of the 1880s and 1890s wished to see themselves as a break from 
the recent Civil War past.  The Southern Alliance viewed itself as a contemporary movement 
with new solutions to problems that had emerged since the end of the war.   
 The Western label was not solely a southern creation applied to those who lived outside 
of the South.  During 1889 several Southern Alliance allies in Kansas used the term as well.  
Benjamin Clover referred to “farmers of the West” and “Western farmers” during his 
denunciation of twine manufacturers and as he addressed a negative depiction of the Southern 
Alliance by the New York Sunday Courier.  William Peffer, an ally to both Alliances in Kansas, 
used similar language to describe “the universal protest of the farmers of the West against the 
extortions of the binder twine trust has reached New York and other large manufacturing cities, 
and the visitor from the West is frequently interrogated about the movement of the Alliance in 
that respect.”  Peffer concluded, “This farmers’ fight is being watched throughout the East with 
eagerness and interest.”  Again, it is significant that “West” is used instead of North.  In the 
above examples, Kansans viewed themselves and other farmers from the Sunflower state as 
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residents of the West rather than the North.  Agriculture was associated with the “West,” while 
the East is associated with “manufacturing.”  A couple of decades after the Civil War, some 
Kansans now identified themselves and their region with the West, rather than the North.  
Differences rooted in the economy and the societies that the economies helped create, now split 
the North into the East and the West.6  
Besides their emphasis on reconciliation and the emergence of a Western regional 
identification, various Alliance leaders and allies paid increased attention to a national movement 
of farmers in other ways during 1889.  In Peffer’s Kansas Farmer readers found reports of the 
battle between the Alabama Alliance and jute bagging manufacturers.  John H. McDowell of 
Tennessee published news from state and local Alliances in Kansas and Missouri in his 
Nashville-based Weekly Toiler.  The National Economist reported on various stories throughout 
the nation.  Prior to the meetings at St. Louis Southern Alliance supporters devoted more 
attention to agrarian struggles beyond their local communities and displayed increasing signs of 
nationalizing the farm reform movement.  Based on this expansionist momentum, it appeared 
that Southern Farmers’ Alliance had reasons to hope for consolidation with non-southern farm 
and labor groups as it gathered for its December meetings in St. Louis.7  
As the Southern Alliance descended upon St. Louis, the farmers’ organization conveyed 
its expansionist impulse in two other ways.  First, unlike the two prior meetings, the 1889 
Southern Alliance convention took place in a border state.  After sweeping the South, the 
Southern Alliance looked to spread into other regions of the country.  Specifically, the southern 
organization sought to broaden its support in Midwestern and Plains states, where farmers were 
already organizing with the National (Northern) Farmers’ Alliance and the Farmers’ Mutual 
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Benefit Association.  St. Louis served as a logical place to hold a meeting between competing, 
though not hostile, agricultural clubs.  The city lay in between the South and Midwest, in a 
border state that had old economic and social ties to both regions.  As a metropolis on the 
Mississippi River and near the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, St. Louis was a 
major site of commerce prior to the arrival of the railroad.  Southern cotton and midwestern 
grains poured into the city during the nineteenth century and the city took on a mixed identity as 
Civil War began.  Missouri and parts of Illinois and Kentucky near St. Louis served as contested 
ground during the Civil War as the area supplied Union and Confederate armies.  After the Civil 
War railroads and the expansion of grain and cotton cultivation in the Midwest and South helped 
the city continue to thrive economically and maintain its regional borderland character.  The 
choice of St. Louis as the site of its annual meeting showed that the Texas-based Southern 
Alliance wished to become a national organization for the promotion of the interests of the 
American, producing, majority.   
A second gesture by the Southern Alliance revealed the expansionist impulse of the farm 
group.  Prior to the St. Louis convention, the Southern Alliance changed its name to enhance its 
ties with industrial labor unions.  In September 1889, the Farmers’ Alliance and Co-Operative 
Union renamed itself the Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union after its merger with the Agricultural 
Wheel.  Throughout its seven-year existence, the Wheel promoted an outlook similar to the 
Southern Alliance by emphasizing a producerism and cooperativism among struggling farmers.  
Founded in Prairie County Arkansas in 1882, the organization spread to Tennessee, Alabama, 
and Mississippi.  Compared with the Southern Alliance, the Wheel was more adamant about its 
involvement in politics, its biracial membership, and its association with the Knights of Labor.  
The incorporation of the Wheel into the Southern Alliance helped push the Alliance closer 
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toward industrial labor unions.  The new title Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union made it clear that 
the agrarian organization wanted to broaden its appeal to urban industrial workers and truly 
become an association for the producing classes of America.8  
While the St. Louis meeting primarily served as the annual Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union 
conference, other agrarian and labor associations also came to St. Louis to discuss consolidation, 
cooperation, and mutual points of interest.  The other organizations present at St. Louis included 
the National Farmers’ Alliance (Northern Alliance), the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, the Farmers’ 
Mutual Benefit Association, and the Knights of Labor.  While none of the groups rivaled the 
Southern Alliance in terms of numbers, each association offered to broaden the appeal and 
influence of the agrarian movement.   
Since the National Farmers’ Alliance and the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association had 
strong followings in the Midwest, the Southern Alliance sought consolidation with both groups 
to create a truly national agrarian reform movement.  The Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association 
started in southern Illinois in 1883 and had 50,000 members by the St. Louis meeting.  The 
organization attracted farmers primarily through its sponsorship of cooperatives, though it also 
served as a social club and dabbled in politics.  After several years of little activity, the National 
Farmers’ Alliance experienced resurgence after 1887 when control of the organization moved 
from Milton George to a collection of more active organizers including Ignatius Donnelly, 
August Post, and Jay Burrows.  Under the new leadership the Northern Alliance promoted land, 
transportation, and financial reforms more vigorously.  Since the Northern and Southern 
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Alliances advanced several common reforms, and because they competed for new recruits in 
midwestern and Plains states, Southerners pursued consolidation at St. Louis.9  
The Northern Farmers’ Alliance sent seventy-five delegates to St. Louis from Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, and Washington.  In 
at least one of these states, agrarian reformers began to support consolidation between the 
Northern and Southern Alliances.  Although not a member of either Alliance since he was not a 
farmer, William Peffer enthusiastically greeted the Southern Alliance upon its 1888 entry into 
Kansas.  Through his newspaper, the Kansas Farmer, the official organ of the Northern Alliance 
in Kansas, Peffer called for a consolidation of the Alliances on multiple occasions.  The Kansas 
editor explained his opinion writing that, “Their objects are identical, and it is only a matter of 
time when they will both merge into one grand organization.”  Besides supporting the Southern 
Alliance in print, Peffer announced that Southern Alliance Vice President John H. McDowell of 
Tennessee would speak in Meriden, Kansas.  Peffer also announced that McDowell stopped by 
the offices of the Farmer and expressed his belief that the Northern and Southern Alliances 
would soon merge.  As the St. Louis convention approached, it thus appeared there was 
significant support for an Alliance merger in at least one midwestern state.10  
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While the Southern Alliance desired official merger with several midwestern farm 
groups, they also sought to expand their influence among industrial laborers.  The presence of 
the Knights of Labor at St. Louis offered the Southern Alliance this opportunity.  Prior to the St. 
Louis meeting the Knights and Southern Alliance shared a cordial relationship in Texas and 
Arkansas.  During the summer of 1885 the groups held joint rallies, barbecues, and picnics, 
while they also made plans for a cooperative store.  The Alliance also supported Knights’ 
boycotts in Galveston and Dallas and provided food and money to the latter union during strikes 
against Jay Gould’s Southwestern rail lines in 1885 and 1886.  Several prominent members of 
the Southern Alliance also belonged to the Knights, including J.B. “Buck” Barry, William R. 
Lamb, and H.S.P. “Stump” Ashby.11  
During and after the strikes the Knights experienced a surge in southern membership.  
Through a combination of various factors, however, the Knights southern and national 
prominence proved short-lived.  In the wake of the Haymarket Square bombing, anti-union 
newspapers branded the Knights as a violently radical organization.  The labor union also 
suffered from three major self-inflicted wounds.  Since the Knights excluded few potential 
members, the organization contained a wide variety of workers from various gender, racial, and 
class categories.  One scholar has suggested that the diverse membership made it extremely 
difficult to identify common goals and unify to accomplish common goals.12  
A second major problem within the Knights lay within the ranks of its leadership.  Most 
southern Knights leaders were not natives to the region and most leaders placed personal 
political ambition above the interests of the organization.  As a result, they frequently clashed 
with one another, causing harm to the Knights.  Many members objected to the pursuit of 
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political activities within the union.  A majority of leaders also lacked experience working as 
laborers.  Instead, they came from the ranks of the professional classes where they served as 
teachers, small businessmen, printers, and contractors.13  
A third internal difficulty centered on racial divisions.  Although a biracial organization, 
few local assemblies contained white and black participants.  When white and black union 
members met collectively, disharmony frequently arose.  African American members 
complained of white efforts to prevent black leadership within the organization.  Whites 
complained that loose racial policies might hurt the union’s success in the South.  Southern 
blacks and whites also disagreed on cooperating with local Republican or Democratic parties 
with blacks favoring the former and whites supporting the latter.14 
The combination of internal weaknesses and outward hostility from southern politicians 
and press members spelled trouble for the Knights of Labor.  By 1888, the union contained fewer 
members than in the peak years of 1885-86.  Many skilled white workers left the Knights in 
favor of more exclusive unions such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  Remaining 
southern members included the most economically and socially vulnerable workers: renters, 
sharecroppers, African American day laborers and domestic workers from the southern 
countryside.  In an effort to revive the struggling union, Knights delegates accepted the invitation 
to attend the 1889 Alliance meeting in St. Louis.  The invitation stemmed from efforts made by 
national and state Alliance leaders.  The National Economist editors Charles Macune and Reuben 
Gray wrote to Grand Master Terrence Powderly throughout 1889 to encourage a closer 
partnership between the two organizations, noting their similar membership requirements and 
shared principles.  Gray also spoke at the Knights’ November 1889 national meeting held in 
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Atlanta.  There, Gray and Leonidas F. Livingston, the Georgia State Farmers’ Alliance president, 
addressed the convention and struck a chord with union members.  The Alliance asked the union 
to send delegates to its upcoming meeting in St. Louis and the labor organization obliged.  From 
the Alliance perspective, the Knights’ diminished numbers and influence still surpassed those of 
the next largest industrial union, the American Federation of Labor.15  
As the various groups converged in St. Louis, public and private meetings were held to 
discuss the possibilities for consolidation and cooperation.  About two hundred delegates from 
the Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union met in the Entertainment Hall of the Exposition Building.  
Around seventy-five Northern Alliance delegates met at the Planters’ House.  Representatives 
from the Northern Alliance, the Farmers Mutual Benefit Association, and the Knights of Labor 
attended some of the sessions of the Farmers’ and Laborers’ conference.  As was the practice at 
the previous Southern Alliance national convention, the Colored Farmers’ Alliance met 
separately from the main gathering.  Although black delegates did not participate directly in the 
Southern Alliance meeting, the Colored Farmers’ Alliance representatives maintained 
communication with the former group through the attendance of Superintendent Richard 
Humphrey at the Southern Alliance convention.  Delegates from various organizations attended 
and sometimes spoke at each other’s conventions.  For instance, Humphrey and John H. 
McDowell spoke to the Northern Alliance convention.  Humphrey also spoke to the Southern 
Alliance convention, which included a Northern Alliance delegation in the audience.  When 
official proceedings ended for the day, informal meetings continued in private.  Charles 
Macune’s hotel room was a major hub of after-hours gatherings.16  
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During the week of the Southern Alliance meeting, there were signs that consolidation 
and camaraderie would prevail at St. Louis.  Speeches delivered at the convention indicated that 
sectionalism and regional differences formed an obstacle to unification.  During the first day of 
the convention John H. McDowell, stressed anti-sectionalism and class solidarity in his speech.  
McDowell spoke to the general rights and superior morality of the middle class and working 
poor when compared to those of the wealthy, claiming, “It is an acknowledged fact, proved by 
all history, that purification always comes from the poorer and middle classes, while corruption 
comes from the rich.”  The Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union leader urged the majority of 
Americans, from the middle and working classes, to unite to check the growing influence of the 
upper class over American laws.  Unification was possible because  
The sectional animosities of the past are rapidly dying out, and we can form a 
united brotherhood that will extend from Maine to California, and sweep the 
whole country; a union of States bound together by the ties of common interest, 
non-partisan in spirit, but recognizing the fact that political prejudices in the past 
have blinded men against us, and seeking only such legislation as will relieve us 
from the evils under which we now suffer.17 
 
McDowell pointed to sectionalism and its divisive manifestations in the two-party system as the 
primary barrier to the unification of poor and middle class Americans who formed the majority 
of citizens and the true Americans.  As editor of the Weekly Toiler in Nashville, Tennessee, 
McDowell had a history of promoting sectional reconciliation, which was especially important in 
a state with significant numbers of Union Army veterans.  Connie Lester notes that although the 
Lost Cause proved enticing to many Tennessee farmers in the 1880s, a statewide agrarian 
movement could not afford to alienate those farmers in middle and eastern Tennessee who 
fought against the Confederacy.  McDowell reinforced appeals to sectional reconciliation in the 
Toiler by also publishing news from state and local Alliances in Kansas and Missouri.  A 
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Confederate veteran who served under Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest, McDowell 
possessed the necessary authority to emphasize reconciliation.  As the first public expression 
from the Farmers’ and Laborers Union at the convention, his words carried significance for 
setting a conciliatory tone for the St. Louis meeting.18  
Other speakers expressed a positive and pacifying tone in their speeches.  Leaders from 
the Southern Alliance and the Knights of Labor showed particular interest in establishing closer 
relations between their organizations.  Upon arrival in St. Louis, national lecturer and chairman 
of the national legislative committee of the Knights, Ralph Beaumont, spoke about the great 
similarities between his union and the Farmers’ Alliances, stating, “There is very little actual 
difference between what we are striving for and what the farmer is endeavoring to secure.  We 
came to find out just how far we are apart.”  He stressed the common identity found in the 
organizations as they both tried to unite “the people who labor.  We are aiming at the same goal, 
though traveling different roads.  The farmer has just realized that he is not the possessor of his 
own farm.”19  
Like Beaumont, Terrence Powderly also spoke about the similarities between the Knight 
and the Southern Alliance.  As Grand Master Workman of the Knights, he asserted that both 
organizations “are of one mind” concerning the regulation of railroads, the free coinage of silver, 
and mortgage relief.  Unlike Beaumont, Powderly acknowledged the differences between the 
Knights and the Farmers’ Alliance, citing the former’s support for workshop regulations and 
safety inspections of factories.  He, therefore, supported cooperation with the Alliance, but not 
“amalgamation.”  During his speech delivered to the Southern Alliance convention, Powderly 
emphasized likenesses between the associations.  Since a bomb was hurled at Chicago police 
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during the Knights’ Haymarket Square demonstration in1886, the union had been branded as an 
extreme group bent on violence to achieve greater rights for workers.  Perhaps to eliminate these 
fears in the minds of Alliance members, Powderly claimed that the Knights purged all radicals 
from the union.  In distancing his organization from extremism and by emphasizing points of 
mutual agreement, the Knights official hoped to make cooperation with the Alliance a greater 
possibility.20  
Powderly addressed the topic of race relations in the South where some observers 
charged that the union was “too free with the negro.”  The Knights’ leader insisted that the South 
was best left alone to deal with its race relations, but he stated “where THE BLACK MAN’S 
CONDITION is taken advantage of to oppress the white laborer that you protect him, and that no 
man, black or white, shall be oppressed.”  The audience applauded his comments.  It is unclear 
whether Powderly alluded to the use of African Americans as strike breakers or whether he 
meant to draw attention to the general economic plight of white and black Southerners.  
Powderly, however, clearly favored the triumph of color-blind justice and cordial race relations 
in the South.  In the years ahead, Populist leaders from Tom Watson to Ignatius Donnelly 
advocated a similar sense of racial cooperation and justice in the South.21  
Powderly emphasized another point of agreement with the Alliance when he discussed 
the un-American practice of owners controlling the votes of their employees.  He supported the 
Australian or secret ballot as a remedy to purify politics and prevent the passage of damaging 
“class legislation” that worked against farmers.  In subsequent years the Southern Alliance 
continually emphasized the virtues of a secret ballot to clean up politics.  During his speech, the 
Knights’ Grandmaster concentrated on a variety of measures including racial justice, free and 
                                                
20 St. Louis Republic, December 5 (quotes), December 6, 1889. 
21 Ibid., December 6, 1889.  “THE BLACK MAN’S CONDITION” is found in the original quote. 
 61 
fair elections, that showed the similarities between the Southern Alliance and the Knights of 
Labor.  Like McDowell, Powderly established a conciliatory tone that suggested a logical 
coalition between national organizations of farmers and industrial workers.22  
Despite the similarities between the groups, the appeasing tone of speeches, and several 
days of negotiations, consolidation did not occur at St. Louis.  Each organization contained 
members opposed to unification with other associations.  Not all members of the Southern 
Farmers’ Alliance supported a merger with the Knights.  Alliance delegates from Alabama 
objected to a merger between the two organizations, while Tennessee delegates refused to 
participate in any discussion of consolidation between the Knights and the Alliance.  Although 
not present at the St. Louis meeting, several Knights of Labor members objected to the Farmers’ 
Alliance.  North Carolina Knights complained about the oppressive nature of the Alliance on 
several occasions.  In an article in the official newspaper of the union, a Knights member 
charged that Alliance members refused to pay farm workers in cash and would only pay with 
store credit.  The writer concluded that, “We fear that this so-called Farmers’ Alliance in our 
State means nothing more nor less than oppression and death to the laborer.”  Another member 
wrote to a national Knights official claiming that Alliance members refused to hire day laborers 
or lend money to those who belonged to the labor union.  Several scholars claim that these 
tensions reveal the class conflict between members the respective organizations.  Melton Alonza 
McLaurin states that the Alliance contained more landowners and planters, while rural members 
of the Knights of Labor tended to work for planters and landowners as renters, sharecroppers and 
farm hands.  He further states that it was in the financial interest of landowners to have a cheap 
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and unorganized workforce, therefore, creating contradictory motivates for members of the 
Knights and the Alliance.23  
Relations between the Northern Alliance, Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association, and the 
Southern Alliance took a similar path.  No formal agreement was reached with the Southern 
Alliance.  The Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association opposed the Southern Alliance’s subtreasury 
plan because it wanted farmers to gain access to credit based on their land holdings rather than 
the value of their crops stored in government warehouses.  Several causes prevented the 
consolidation of Northern and Southern Alliances.  First, Northerners did not like the title of the 
southern group, the Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union.  They wanted “Alliance” to be included in 
the title of the organization.  In response, Southerners consented to adopt the name National 
Farmers’ Alliance & Industrial Union.24  
A second Northern objection was that the Southern Alliance excluded African Americans 
from membership.  Southern Alliance leaders responded by allowing states to determine who to 
admit, abolishing their constitutional requirement that only “white” persons could qualify as 
members.  The rule changes did nothing to alter the racial segregation of the Southern Alliance 
since state Alliances could, and did, still choose to exclude blacks from membership.  
Additionally, black Americans could not serve as delegates to the National Southern Alliance 
convention.  Other factors prevented the racial integration Southern Alliance.  Many African 
Americans preferred to join the Colored Alliance because it was a mostly segregated 
organization that emphasized self-help and cooperative economic action for its members.  
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Simply put, many blacks wanted to act independent from white control.  Secondly, although 
other protest organizations such as the Knights of Labor and the Agricultural Wheel officially 
did not enforce the separation of the races, in practice white and black Southerners belonged to 
segregated local assemblies.  In contrast, the Northern Alliance remained open to whites and 
blacks.  Despite its nonexclusive racial policy and the positive relations between African-
American farmers and Northern Alliance, black representation in the northern farm organization 
remained miniscule largely because of demographic realities.  Roughly ten percent of African 
Americans lived outside of the South, with most of the population concentrated in cities where 
farm associations had little appeal.  Interracial agrarian and labor organizations were extremely 
rare in the late nineteenth century.  The Southern Alliance and Colored Alliance did not 
contradict this general social trend.25  
A third issue that prevented Northern merger with the Southern Alliance was secrecy.  
Since the Southern Alliance (and Colored Farmers’ Alliance) made secrecy mandatory, the 
consolidation of the white Alliances would have forced Northerners to adopt the practice.  
Northerners wanted secrecy to be determined by each state Alliance and not compulsory for all 
Alliances.  The Southern Alliance contended that its attractiveness, discipline, and unity came 
partially from the use of secret handshakes and rituals.  Southerners, therefore, refused to yield 
on the point.  In practice, Nebraska Alliances associated with the Northern Alliance already 
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utilized secrecy and within a year the Northern Alliance adopted secrecy.  At St. Louis the issue 
proved another insurmountable goal to Alliance consolidation.26  
A fourth contributing factor was the sheer size of the organizations.  Northern Alliance 
leaders feared that they would lose their leadership positions if they consolidated with the much 
larger Southern Alliance.  Since the Southern Alliance contained a greater number of members, it 
was also feared that Northern Alliance members would have little influence within a joint 
Alliance.  Northern Alliance writers acknowledged many of these points two years later when 
they published a history of their organization.  Besides noting the role of segregation and 
secrecy, the Northern organization cited the greater power of Southern officials within the 
Southern Alliance, “natural” factors emanating from living in different regions, and differences 
over the most important reforms.  The Northern Alliance preferred to emphasize legislation for 
the additional coinage of silver, a prohibition on speculation in agricultural futures, and an anti-
trust law, while the Southern Alliance promoted the subtreasury plan as the most crucial reform.  
In this summary of events, basic differences separated the Alliances and prevented 
consolidation.27  
While the Northern Alliance politely emphasized the differences between the agrarian 
associations as justification for maintaining separation, leaders of the Southern Alliance 
interpreted the differences in a more optimistic tone.  In the first edition published after the St. 
Louis convention, The National Economist reported that the National Farmers’ Alliance, or 
Northern Alliance, did not join the Southern Alliance for justifiable reasons.  The paper claimed 
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that the Northern Alliance “fully indorsed the consolidation, but returned home to lay the matter 
before their people, convinced that when the next annual meeting shall occur at Jacksonville next 
December all will be represented, and a complete amalgamation result, to comprise nearly or 
quite forty States and Territories.”  Cast in this glowing light, The National Economist editors 
portrayed the leaders of the Northern Farmers’ Alliance as cautious democrats who wished to 
confer with their members before accepting consolidation of the two associations.  Despite 
evidence to the contrary, the Southern Alliance newspaper also suggested that the assimilation of 
Northern and Southern Alliances seemed inevitable.  According to this narrative, minor 
differences between the Northern and Southern Alliances would be resolved within a year.  The 
National Economist reaffirmed this version events a week later when it pronounced, “The 
disposition and sentiment expressed on the part of all the delegates in both bodies, without a 
single exception, were heartily in favor of consolidation into an organic union.”  The newspaper 
claimed that both organizations agreed to basic principles that would form a constitution for the 
merged Alliance.28  
The National Economist took a similarly confident tone as it reported that the Colored 
Alliance would not combine its membership with the Southern Alliance.  Although the Colored 
Alliance was “anxious for co-operation and confederation” its members did not support 
“consolidation.”  The newspaper concluded that the “fact that this order is strongest in States 
well organized by the whites suggests a mutual dependence credible to both races.”  Like its 
statement on the failure of merger with the Northern Alliance, the absence of consolidation 
between the Colored and Southern Farmers’ Alliances was not dire news in the eyes of The 
National Economist.  White Alliance leaders thought that cooperation between the mutually 
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dependent organizations would continue in accordance with the wishes of both organizations.  
The newspaper expected “a system of close co-operation,” in the years ahead “to include both 
business and political action.”  Verification of the positive relations came from the St. Louis 
speech of Colored Alliance Superintendent Richard Humphrey.  The Superintendent praised the 
association of the Colored and Southern Alliances and encouraged the Northern Alliance to 
cooperate with “your white brethren” of the Southern Alliance.  During the next two years, 
members of the Colored and Southern Farmers’ Alliances seriously tested the durability of their 
collaboration.  At the conclusion of the St. Louis conference, however, the Southern Alliance 
reassured its readers that relations between the black and white Alliances were cordial, 
cooperative, and sympathetic.29  
Continuing its triumphant narrative of the convention, The National Economist reported 
that the “most notable feature of the meeting was the presence of the Master Workman and 
executive committee of the Knights of Labor, and the complete harmony prevailing between the 
two great orders.”  The newspaper expected the partnership of the Knights of Labor and 
Farmers’ Alliance to form a powerful coalition.  In reality, the Knights did not carry the 
membership totals and status that once made it the most powerful labor union in the country.  
Additionally, Grand Master Workman Terrence Powderly privately expressed unease with the 
prospect of aligning with the Southern Alliance.  Powderly feared that the Alliance wanted the 
Knights of Labor to endorse a third party so that the latter union would dissolve and leave the 
Alliance as the sole national organization available to farmers and industrial workers.  In short, 
Powderly worried that the Alliance wanted to eliminate a competing union.  Despite his worries, 
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Powderly continued to cooperate with the Alliance, although Ralph Beaumont increasingly took 
the lead in relations with the agrarian group.30  
Although the Southern Alliance cast the failures of consolidation in an overly positive 
manner, there were reasons to believe that the agrarian and labor groups could consolidate or at 
least cooperate in the future.  Foremost, significant points of accord existed between the agrarian 
and labor groups.  The publication of several agreements in the final days of the national 
convention by the Northern Alliance, Southern Alliance, and Knights of Labor showed the 
nearly identical principles shared by the various groups.  On the final day of the convention the 
Knights of Labor and Southern Alliance produced a joint statement outlining their common goals 
and designs to cooperate in the future.  The accord supported the abolition of the national bank, 
the end of speculation on agricultural and mechanical goods, the coinage of silver, the abolition 
of alien land ownership, limits to the property of railroad corporations, the end of tax dollars to 
favor one “class at the expense of the other,” and government ownership of the “means of 
communication and transportation.”  Both organizations agreed to support legislation promoting 
common points of interest and “only” the representatives who supported said legislation, which 
suggested a firm political stance by the groups.  Although the Northern Alliance did not sign the 
document, they supported anti-trust, anti-speculation, railroad regulation, and silver coinage 
laws.  The degree of emphasis on particular reforms might vary, but generally, the groups 
endorsed similar policies to improve the condition of Americans who worked in physical labor.31  
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In the aftermath of the St. Louis meeting, Southern Alliance leaders could find additional 
hope for unification when they examined other principles that they shared with the Northern 
Alliance and Knights of Labor.  Each group espoused identical positions on the role of their 
organizations in politics and on the central role played by farmers and laborers in American 
politics, society, and economy.  Concerning politics, the vast majority of leaders of both 
Alliances and the Knights of Labor opposed the formation of a political party as the best means 
to advance reforms.  As Terrence Powderly expressed in his letter mentioned above, many 
reformers of the era viewed third parties as a sure path to discord and extinction.  Seen as far 
back as the abolition movement, American reformers divided over the role of politics in 
advancing their cause.  Most famously the supporters of William Lloyd Garrison viewed politics 
with great suspicion, while Frederick Douglass and his compatriots pursued political activity as a 
method to achieve the abolition of slavery.  After the Civil War the debate continued among 
financial and political reformers.  The Greenback Party, Readjusters Party, Union Labor Party, 
and countless independent local parties attempted unsuccessfully to challenge the Democrats and 
Republicans.  External attacks combined with internal divisions to cripple the energy and 
momentum of third parties.  Political violence, political corruption, and cries of racial and 
sectional betrayal seriously weakened third party efforts after the Civil War.  After each defeat, 
reform forces fell into disarray and their demands went largely ignored by government at all 
levels.  As witnesses to these defeats, most labor and agrarian leaders of the late nineteenth 
century urged their members to stay out of politics.32  
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Besides Terrence Powderly, Charles Macune was another veteran of political activity 
who warned against third party political involvement.  In his speech before the St. Louis 
convention, Macune claimed that participation in electoral politics nearly destroyed the Alliance 
in earlier years.  Instead of creating a third party to enact reforms, Macune suggested that 
Alliance members use their considerable numbers to influence the two major political parties.  
He claimed that farmers composed at least half of the members of the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  With such large representation and influence, Macune urged farmers to 
pressure the parties to enact reforms.33  
The editor put further distance between the Alliance and political parties when he 
associated the latter with partisanism and acrimony.  Whereas “partisanism is the life of party,” 
in the Alliance “We dissolve prejudices, neutralize partisanism, and appeal to reason and justice 
for our rights, and are willing to grant to all other classes the same.”  Unlike political parties that 
wrote platforms to address a variety of controversial issues and created an oppositional stance 
toward another group, Macune stated that the Alliance should concentrate on a single issue.  He 
told the St. Louis crowd, “it must be plain that we would only weaken our cause were we to 
attempt to construct a platform after the custom of political parties.  Our strength lies in an 
entirely different and opposite direction.  We should unite every effort on the accomplishment of 
the one reform first necessary, and the most important, and rest assured that the accomplishment 
of that will insure as a development of strength sufficient to then carry other necessary reforms in 
their turn.”  Once the reform was enacted, he believed the Alliance would gain momentum, 
making it easier to pass additional policies.  Using military language found so often in the 
Southern Alliance, the editor suggested “let us carefully consider which is the most urgent, most 
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important and necessary reform to be dignified as the battle cry of the order temporarily till 
accomplished.”34  
Northern Alliance president, Jay Burrows, shared Macune’s reservations about starting a 
third party.  At a January 1889 meeting Burrows cited previous failures of independent 
movements in his home state of Nebraska.  He called a third party a “fatal mistake” and 
proclaimed that the Alliance would not become “a political party, until the time comes when a 
new party is organized based on living issues.”  The comments suggest that Burrows felt that 
loyalty to the Democratic and Republican parties was strong and that the parties held voter 
loyalty by appealing to dead or old emotional issues.  The emotional issue forging party loyalty 
in 1889 was still the Civil War.  Burrows understood that party bonds would not be broken until 
a stronger set of concerns replaced those made during the 1860s.  He believed that bitter Civil 
War memories trumped concerns with the economic plight of average Americans.35  
Like Jay Burrows and Charles Macune, influential Kansas editor William Peffer thought 
third party activity unwise in 1889.  As some Kansans in the Southern Alliance began to 
advocate third-party politics in the late 1880s, Peffer wrote editorials in favor of trying reform 
through the Republican Party, a successful tactic in the 1870s and early 1880s.  He stated that 
politicians would “turn their attention to matters in which their constituents are most directly and 
most vitally interested.”  Peffer further said that reforms could be enacted “without any breaking 
of old party lines,” because farmers could agree on reform policies, “while as to some matters of 
political policy there is and will be divisions and they insuperable.  Men of all parties are in the 
                                                
34 National Economist, December 14, 1889. 
35 Des Moines Homestead, January 18 1889, in Jeffrey Ostler, Prairie Populism: The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism 
in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa, 1880-1892 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 101.  In 1890 Burrows 
changed his opinion and supported the formation of the People’s Party in Nebraska.  He justified switching parties 
because he felt that railroad corporations exorbitantly influenced the Republican Party in his home state.  See Ostler, 
Prairie Populism, 113-15, 120, 123-24. 
 71 
grange, in the alliance, in the wheel, in the Knights of Labor, in every similar association of 
people, and there they talk as citizens, not as partisans, about matters of immediate concern to 
them.”  In short, Peffer thought that farmers should keep divisive political issues out of the labor 
and agrarian organizations.  Contrarily, he urged members of the Knights of Labor, Alliances, 
and Wheel to bring their reforms to political party meetings, saying “let them talk the same 
things there and thus carry good influences into the parties and bring the party machine into 
action.”  When a reader wrote the editor to ask if he supported the formation of a third party, 
Peffer responded that his newspaper supported Alliance principles that required no political 
party.   While it is clear from the letter, other newspapers, and reports from St. Louis that some 
Alliance members favored the formation of a new political organization, it is also apparent that at 
the end of the 1889 St. Louis convention, a majority of those assembled preferred to take 
political action through the two major American political parties.  The convention had not 
changed this attitude among the majority of members from the Knights of Labor, Northern 
Alliance, Colored Alliance, and Southern Alliance.36  
Besides their consensus opposition to a third party, several of the major farm associations 
shared a strong faith in the importance of farmers to the American political system.  Following 
the Jeffersonian tradition, agrarian leaders portrayed the farmer as the purest form of American 
identity.  N.B. Ashby, an officer in the Northern Alliance conveyed these ideas in The Riddle of 
Sphinx, his book on the agrarian crisis.  In the dedication of the book Ashby wrote, “THE 
AUTHOR RESPECTFULLY DEDICATES THIS BOOK TO THE AMERICAN FARMER, 
WITH WHOM RESTS THE WELFARE OF THE REPUBLIC.”  Ashby clearly communicated 
the idea that the core and heart of America could be found in the countryside.  In his view 
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farmers also possessed unique capabilities to solve the major economic issues of the late-
nineteenth century because “as both laborer and capitalist,” the farmer “occupies the position of 
natural arbitrator between capital and labor, but that the farmer can reach the solution only by 
well-directed farm organization.  It lies in the power of the farmer to give new industrial 
conditions to the world.  This cannot be done without the concentration of the powers of an 
educated farm yeomanry.”  Ashby wrote The Riddle of the Sphinx to educate farmers, suggest 
some remedies for their economic hardships, and show that farmers were essential to solving the 
problems.37  
Charles Macune wrote about a nearly identical theme.  In the inaugural issue of the The 
National Economist, Macune communicated the purpose of the newspaper.  Rather than report 
all the daily news, the Economist aimed “to appeal to the reason and judgment of its readers and 
to educate in the principles of society, finance, and government.”   The newspaper further 
declared that, “the agriculturalist is the great conservative and thinking element of the nation—
the ballast, as it were.  He it is who holds the volatile elements of society from running into 
extremes, and he it is who must step forward and insist upon reforms.”  Macune assigned farmers 
an extremely important place in the American republic.  In a time of a growing wealth disparity, 
rising debt for farmers, increasing hostility between producers and non-producers, farmers stood 
as the voice of moderation and reason.  Because of their unique position in the nation, Macune 
asserted that farmers should direct reform efforts.  Since self-government lay at the foundation of 
the United States government, the editor believed citizens must stay informed of the evolving 
nature of American “principles of society, finance, and government.”  He wished for his 
newspaper to serve as a source of knowledge for agrarians in their development into local, state, 
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and national leaders of reform.  Like Ashby, Macune emphasized the importance of farmers to 
America and the need to educate rural Americans in order to bolster reform efforts.38  
In North Carolina and Kansas, Leonidas Polk and William Peffer also stressed the 
importance of farmers to the nation and the need to promote knowledge among agrarians.  Polk 
acted in numerous ways to improve the social and economic standing of farmers.  In his home 
state he partook in efforts to establish a Department of Agriculture, a university devoted to 
teaching progressive agricultural practices, and he established The Progressive Farmer 
newspaper to further educate and praise farmers.  Like many agrarian reformers, Peffer argued 
that farmers were the largest and most important group of Americans.  Because of their numbers 
and importance, Peffer thought they should have a major voice in the political system of the 
United States.  He stated that farmers needed to organize and “purify politics, and then the way 
would be clear for permanent reform.”  Peffer, like Polk, praised farmers, and viewed his 
newspaper as an impetus to agrarian organization and education in the ways of economic and 
political affairs.  The Progressive Farmer and Kansas Farmer joined a growing number of 
successful agrarian newspapers, scattered across the country.  These journals echoed common 
themes of pride, education, and reform.  Increasingly agrarian newspapers cited each other in the 
late 1880s and editors developed closer relations with one another.39  
Together, the growing number of agrarian reform newspapers, their support of farmers 
and workers, their common opposition to a third party, and their shared set reform ideas, created 
a basis for cooperation between the Knights of Labor and farmers’ groups.  Even if they did not 
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merge into a single association significant points of agreement allowed the organizations that 
met at St. Louis to work with each other after the meeting.  As the largest and best-coordinated 
association, the Southern Alliance led consolidation efforts at the meeting. Although it failed to 
absorb the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association, Northern Alliance, and Knights of Labor, three 
events at the convention bolstered the position of the Southern Alliance.  The election of a new 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance president, a proposal for the creation of a National Press Reform 
Association, and the incorporation of non-southern agrarian organizations led to the peak of the 
Southern Alliance influence.  As a result, the Southern Alliance became a truly nationwide 
movement and the most effective vehicle for achieving national reform.  
Although the Southern Alliance failed to absorb any new organizations at St. Louis, it 
succeeded in becoming a national organization.  Frustrated with the passivity of the Northern 
Alliance and attracted to the active nature of the Southern Alliance, the state Alliances of 
Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota voted to secede from the Northern Alliance and join 
the Southern Alliance.  The National Economist also stated that state chapters of the Farmers’ 
Mutual Benefit Association from Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio joined the Southern 
Alliance.  The newspaper confidently stated that the state Alliances of Minnesota, Nebraska, and 
Iowa, “simply wait for ratification by their respective State bodies” before formally joining the 
Southern Alliance.  Although the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association refuted the claims of 
consolidation, the Illinois organization did acknowledge cooperation with the Southern Alliance 
on future matters.40 
Upon the absorption of the Plains states and with hopes to increase organizing among 
industrial laborers, the Southern Alliance renamed itself the National Farmers’ Alliance and 
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Industrial Union.  The election of officers to the newly named group at St. Louis reflected the 
influence of the new members.  In a departure from the past, the Southern Alliance leadership 
now consisted of a mixture of Southerners and Midwesterners.  At the Shreveport and Meridian 
meetings of the Southern Alliance national officers came solely from southern states, reflecting 
the overall membership.41  
The presence of Midwesterners and Southerners at the highest leadership levels gave 
credibility to the Southern Alliance as a national organization that represented farmers across 
America.  Such an assertion carried significance in an era where Civil War memories led to 
political arguments and animosity among the general public.  Conscious of the lingering distrust 
between regions, The National Economist chose to describe consolidation as a union “between 
the great grain-growing States of the North and the cotton-growing States of the South.”  The 
newspaper further noted, “In the deliberations of the united body there was not the slightest 
evidence of sectional prejudice shown, not even the least trace of it felt.  No such spirit will be 
tolerated in the ranks of the Farmers Alliance and Industrial Union, and it is the duty of every 
member to discountenance that selfish, cowardly, and unmanly feeling wherever or in whatever 
form expressed.”  Such expressions show that the Southern Alliance viewed sectionalism as a 
barrier to their objectives.  The National Economist editors did not choose to portray the union as 
a merger of “Western and Southern states.”  Instead, they felt that it was necessary to stress the 
consolidation of “States of the North” and “States of the South” to prove the Alliance’s ability to 
                                                
41 Officers in 1887 included President Charles Macune of Texas, Leonidas Polk of North Carolina as 1st Vice 
President, eleven other vice presidents from Kentucky and former Confederate states, Secretary E. B. Warren of 
Texas, and Treasurer Alfred E. Gardner of Tennessee.  Officers elected in 1888 were President Evan Jones of Texas, 
Vice President Isaac McCracken of Arkansas, Secretary A.E. Gardner of Tennessee, and Treasurer Linn Tanner of 
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Leonidas Polk of North Carolina, Vice President Benjamin Clover of Kansas, Treasurer H. W. Hickman of 
Missouri, and Secretary J. H. Turner of Georgia.  Ben Terrell of Texas won reelection as National Lecturer.  See 
National Economist, March 14, December 14, 1889; Nelson A. Dunning, The Farmers’ Alliance History and 
Agricultural Digest (Washington, D.C.: Alliance Publishing Company, 1891), 71-75, 90. 
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overcome sectional bitterness.  The newspaper announced the significance of northern 
incorporation into the southern farmers’ association: without the defeat of sectionalism and the 
existence of interregional cooperation at St. Louis, many Americans believed that “there was no 
hope for economic reform.”42  
The results of the St. Louis meeting created greater possibilities for the Southern 
Alliance.  From its new broader foundation, the Alliance could recruit additional non-southern 
members.  With justification, the group could also tell skeptical white Southerners that their 
former northern enemies now sought partnership with the South in a national agrarian 
movement.  Incorporating northern and southern states into the farmers’ movement validated the 
rhetoric of unity espoused by farmers’ leaders.  The Southern Alliance promised not only to 
solve national economic problems, but also to demonstrate through words and actions that it 
could heal the lingering scars of sectional disunion.  
After the 1889 meeting, the Southern Alliance also had a leader who would bolster the 
expansionist and reconciliationist impulses of the order.  As president, Leonidas Polk initiated a 
vigorous national recruiting effort that sought to broaden Alliance membership geographically 
and numerically.  During his two and a half years in office, Polk constantly traveled across the 
country on railroad lines from his native North Carolina to California, and to many points in 
between.  Discussed in the next chapter, Polk’s message to American farmers contained a 
mixture of outrage and hope.  He consistently stressed the immorality of agrarian exploitation by 
the wealthy, the virtues of a rural Christian life, and the need to end the bitterness caused by the 
Civil War in order to enact needed reforms. 
                                                
42 National Economist, December 14 (second and third quotes), 21 (first quote), 1889. 
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Polk’s election as Alliance president came at the expense of Charles Macune.  Although 
Polk ran against Isaac McCracken and Macune, the contest was particularly close between Polk 
and Macune.  When deadlock threatened, Macune’s supporters agreed to withdraw his name 
from consideration.  His allies expressed “satisfaction” with the election of Polk, while the new 
president’s supporters claimed to vote against Macune “only because of his great usefulness as 
editor of the official organ, The National Economist of Washington, D.C.”  These voters claimed 
that Macune could not hold both positions at once.  Although a rivalry would later emerge 
between Polk and Macune, in the two years after the St. Louis convention Macune helped the 
Alliance further bolster its expansion efforts through his editorial and executive committee 
responsibilities.43  
Defeated as president, Macune now devoted more time to two tasks that helped centralize 
the Southern Alliance and strengthen its national influence.  Based in Washington D.C., Macune 
and his allies led congressional lobbying efforts on behalf of the Alliance.  In another sign of the 
close relationship between the Knights of Labor and the Southern Alliance, the Knights’ Ralph 
Beaumont helped Macune learn how to lobby congressmen.  Besides lobbying, the Alliance 
leader also continued to heavily shape the Southern Alliance from his editorial position at The 
National Economist.  As the official newspaper of the Southern Alliance, Macune used The 
National Economist to shape the overall narrative of reform.  The weekly newspaper gained a 
circulation of 100,000 in the years following the St. Louis meeting.  Macune communicated 
Alliance reforms to his audience while continuing earlier themes of sectional reconciliation and 
republishing stories from agrarian and reform newspapers throughout the nation.  The newspaper 
                                                
43 St. Louis Republic, December 7, 1889. 
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served to unify the agrarian organization and it gave readers a sense that the movement was 
actively working in their interest.44  
Macune acted to further tighten the unity of the Southern Alliance and maintain his 
leadership position within a growing organization at the St. Louis convention.  On the second 
day of the convention he spoke to the Alliance gathering and proposed the confederation of The 
National Economist with state Alliance newspapers to form a National Reform Press 
Association.  He further recommended that the Southern Alliance president chair a committee of 
three that would officially endorse editorials written in support of Alliance doctrine.  The 
committee would then ensure that all Southern Alliance newspapers would publish the editorial.  
Macune supported his plan by claiming that it would lessen publication expenses, create “a 
uniformity of sentiment”, and increase the “usefulness and efficiency” of the agrarian 
organization’s newspapers through the formation of a “central editorial bureau”.  He thought that 
tighter relations between Southern Alliance newspapers could serve to bolster the organization 
nationally: “This will be by far the most potent agent at our command in the impending struggle, 
since by it we can keep our own ranks thoroughly posted and unified, and at the same time we 
can meet the opposition at no disadvantage in an effort to secure the influence of the great class 
that now stands comparatively neutral but will sympathize with and assist us when convinced 
that our objects are right and our methods fair.”  Although they did not officially adopt the 
National Reform Press Association until a year later, Macune’s suggestion moved the Southern 
Alliance to broaden its thinking and aspirations for national reform.  A centralized newspaper 
association would encourage a more national outlook, increase Southern Alliance membership, 
spread its goals, enhance its national influence, and, ultimately, enact its improvements.  Further 
                                                
44 Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists, 128; Postel, The Populist Vision, 37. 
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evidence of greater centralization of the Alliance emerged at St. Louis when the president and 
executive committee received enhanced powers.  Macune served as leader of the executive 
committee.  Additionally, the primary officers of the agrarian order now were required to have 
their chief office in Washington D.C.45 
Despite the failures of consolidation at St. Louis, future prospects appeared bright for the 
growth of the Southern Alliance movement.  The incorporation of non-Southerners into a 
southern association made the Alliance a national union.  Additionally, a new leader took over 
the organization and began an aggressive recruitment campaign of farmers outside of the South.  
The past president of the agrarian group, freed from the responsibilities of the office, 
concentrated on the proliferation of the Alliance by lobbying U.S. Congress and publishing a 
weekly national newspaper.  The Alliance was ready to reach its apex.  
Together, leaders of the agrarian group faced the new challenges of a national 
organization, including expanding the membership and increasing the organization’s influence 
across America.  Collective memories of national disunity served as a major obstacle to these 
tasks.  Less than thirty years after Appomattox, the ghosts of the Civil War continued to plague 
national organizations and movements.46  The farmers’ crusade did not avoid the acrimony 
                                                
45 National Economist, December 14, 1889; Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 213.  The proposal served to 
centralize the Southern Alliance and further consolidated authority with Macune.  At the time of his suggestion on 
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46 For example, Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians continued to organize along sectional lines; neither major 
political party had nominated a Southerner as president or vice president since before the Civil War; and veterans 
organizations competed over how the war should be remembered and commemorated.  Started in 1866, the Grand 
Army of the Republic was the first major Civil War veterans’ association.  Confederate veterans and their supporters  
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caused by these divisive memories.  As it grew to become a national organization opponents 
hurled charges of sectionalism at the Southern Alliance.  Many members and potential members 
of the Alliance fought in the Civil War.  Conscious of the barrier sectionalism formed to 
expansion, the agrarian organization responded by increasing discussions of sectional 
reconciliation in the months and years after the St. Louis convention.  Alliance leaders also more 
frequently celebrated the common values associated with rural life and occupations that 
produced wealth.  Through an emphasis on reconciliation and shared rural experiences, the 
Southern Alliance sought to build trust and convince non-Southerners to join their cause.  In the 
months and years after the St. Louis convention, sectional reconciliation proved a daunting 
challenge and a constant issue to consider as the Southern Alliance built a national movement. 
                                                                                                                                                       
formed the United Confederate Veterans in 1889, the Daughters of the Confederacy in 1894, and the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans in 1896.  For more on the growth of southern identity in the late-nineteenth century, see 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE SOUTHERN ALLIANCE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 
After four years of expansion in Texas and the South, the Southern Farmers’ Alliance 
met in St. Louis for its annual national convention.  Among the most notable achievements of the 
December 1889 meeting was the incorporation of state Alliances from above the Mason-Dixon 
line.  At St. Louis, state Alliances from Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota chose to leave 
the Northern Farmers’ Alliance and join the Southern Alliance.  Although it continued to be 
known as the Southern Alliance, the agrarian organization adopted a new name to become the 
National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union.  The Southern Alliance could now legitimately 
claim status as a national union.  Hoping to maintain unity among members and increase the size 
of the organization, the Alliance utilized speakers and newspapers to advance its vision of 
American identity during the three years after the 1889 St. Louis convention.  Through this 
concept of national identity the Alliance vigorously attacked sectionalism, endorsed 
reconciliation, and emphasized the essential value of the producer class to the nation.  This 
American identity became just as important as policies and cooperative activities in gaining and 
losing followers of the Alliance and, later, Populism.    
Confident that they offered an attractive vision for improving the nation and encouraged 
by its membership growth and geographical expansion, the Southern Alliance flexed its political 
muscle soon after the St. Louis convention.  In April 1890 Alliance President Leonidas Polk and 
Charles Macune appeared before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to support 
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passage of a law to enact the subtreasury plan.  Macune proposed the subtreasury system at the 
1889 St. Louis national Alliance meeting.  The subtreasury system called for the construction of 
government-owned warehouse located near railroad lines.  Farmers could store their crops in 
these warehouses until they received an adequate price for their product.  As crops sat in the 
warehouse, Macune proposed that the federal government advance one percent interest loans to 
farmers, enabling them to pay for necessities and debts.  Instead of flooding the market with the 
entire crop’s harvest, Macune hoped the subtreasury plan would limit supply and maintain 
demand over a longer period of time.  The proposal represented the Alliance’s central effort to 
stem the tide of escalating agrarian debt and poverty.  At the urging of Macune and other 
Alliance leaders, the subtreasury became the main reform advanced by the agrarian organization 
from 1890-1892.1  
Southern Alliance members also began directly requesting support from political 
candidates in 1890.  Alliancemen across the country began applying the “Alliance yardstick” to 
politicians by publicly and directly asking them whether they supported or opposed the 
subtreasury plan and other reform principles.  When many politicians responded with lukewarm 
or dismissive replies, support for a national third party grew within the agrarian organization.  
Debate over third-party formation created a small measure of tension within the national 
movement, however, as many Alliancemen also balked at supporting all agrarian reforms and 
abandoning the two dominant political parties.  Since most Alliance leaders did not endorse a 
third party, but wished to maintain the growth and harmony of their order, they emphasized an 
American identity based on producer values and sectional reconciliation.  Most leaders, 
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1949), 219-20. 
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including Polk and Macune, chose to encourage Alliance members to participate in the political 
process as American citizens, but they avoided endorsing any particular political party.2   
Agrarian organizers faced something of a dilemma as they spread the order across the 
country.  Most Alliance national officers wished to encourage a national movement of farmers 
and other workers, without creating a national political party.  Agrarian leaders, however, 
endorsed approaching politicians with demands for application of Alliance reforms into law.  In 
the wake of the 1889 national convention, Alliancemen showed an eagerness to agitate for 
Alliance policies in state and national governments.  In Kansas, these activities eventually 
resulted in a third party during the summer of 1890.  Alliance supporters in most other states 
worked through the Republican or Democratic parties.  While the formation of a political party 
lingered in the background, it was not the primary problem confronting the Southern Alliance. 
At the start of 1890 the Southern Alliance was less concerned with creating a political 
party and more focused on continuing its growth as an organization.  Throughout 1890, the 
farmer association intensified its national recruiting campaign.  Alliance leaders primarily relied 
on two methods crucial to the fulfillment of their goals.  First, they used the pages of The 
National Economist to centralize information about their organization.  Based in Washington 
D.C., the newspaper had access to the latest news from Capitol Hill.  Through the Economist 
agrarian reformers could read political news written by an “unbiased” advocate of the 
organization, Charles Macune.  Thanks to his work as a major leader and thinker within the 
Southern Alliance, Macune possessed great authority as a source of information and he knew 
how to keep a large association unified and organized.  These talents became useful as Macune 
edited the Economist to include articles written by Alliance-friendly newspapers from the 
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Midwest, Plains, South, Northwest, and Northeast.  As editor of the official newspaper of the 
Southern Alliance, this was an important task.  Macune, and his assistants, decided what was 
published and was not published.  In effect, Macune defined what the Alliance stood for and 
stood against in the pages of The National Economist.  The newspaper, with a weekly circulation 
of 100,000, provided readers with news from Washington D.C., while also publishing Alliance 
information from various American locales.  Through this exchange of local and national news, 
the editor hoped readers would recognize the similar problems that plagued working Americans.  
From this realization, Macune hoped farmers and laborers would come together to solve their 
problems.  He promoted the Alliance as the vehicle to achieve results.  Essentially, Macune 
wanted to serve as the director at a crossroads of information, who helped unite workers who 
lived across the country.  The pages of The National Economist served as the primary source of 
information for Alliance followers, and, therefore, the newspaper became a major instrument in 
promoting expansion to members and potential members of the agrarian group.3  
A second tool in the Alliance arsenal came in a more personal form.  In an era when 
many Americans experienced rural isolation, when books and newspapers might be sparse, and 
oratory was a highly valued talent, public speakers possessed the great potential to excite and 
inspire rural and small town people.  From its origins the Alliances relied on recruiters and 
lecturers to establish local chapters.  These efforts continued and multiplied as the farm 
organization continued to grow in the years after the 1889 national convention.  When members 
chose Leonidas Polk over Charles Macune as president of the order, the Alliance gained a very 
able orator.  As Raleigh News and Observer editor Josephus Daniels later recalled, “It was the 
day of the personal equation, and when farmers were thrilled by Colonel Polk’s eloquence they 
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wished to read his paper.  The spoken word was more effective than the printed page.”  Polk was 
free from the constraints imposed on Macune, who served as editor of the official newspaper of 
the Southern Alliance and one of its chief Congressional lobbyists.  In short, unlike Macune, 
Polk was a capable orator who could devote more time to traveling the country, speaking with 
audiences, recruiting members, and building the bonds necessary to achieve a truly national farm 
association.4  
Macune and Polk became the two major advocates of the national expansion of the 
Southern Alliance.  Under their direction the Alliance sought to gain new members with an 
emphasis on reform policies and the promotion of a common identity that they hoped would 
unify the majority of Americans.  While historians have written extensively about Alliance and 
Populist policies, the Alliance and Populist vision of American national identity has been 
underappreciated and underestimated.5  The contours and content of that identity are crucial to 
any understanding of who agrarian reformers thought they were and what they believed America 
was all about.  Any understanding of the agrarian movement is incomplete without an 
exploration of all agrarian appeals to the American public.  During the three years after the 1889 
St. Louis convention the agrarian organization aggressively spread its message across the 
country through the use of speakers and a growing newspaper network.  This chapter will focus 
on Polk and his efforts to promote the Southern Alliance and its conception of an American 
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national identity.  Chapter 4 will touch on the application of the Alliance American identity 
during the political campaigns of 1890. 
Sectional reconciliation became a major theme in Southern Alliance newspapers and 
speeches during the national expansion of the agrarian order.  The Alliance viewed sectional 
animosity as a real impediment to their success.  Polk was particularly well disposed to promote 
reconciliation as he traveled throughout the nation as Farmers’ Alliance president.  Through his 
pre-war politics, his combat experience, and his editing of a Reconstruction-era newspaper, Polk 
demonstrated moderation and a desire to work for the good of the nation.  During his speaking 
tours of the 1890s, the agrarian leader drew upon these experiences as he promoted the Alliance 
national identity.   
Before the Civil War, Polk was active in North Carolina politics as a member of the 
Whig Party.  Despite the decline of the national party, Whigs experienced a revival in the Old 
North State where they promoted internal improvements and Unionism against secession and 
wasteful spending in the late 1850s.  Polk attended an 1859 Whig rally that criticized the 
Democratic Party for promoting sectionalism and unnecessarily encouraging confrontation.  
They urged “every conservative man in the Union” to reject partisanship to “defeat this sectional 
and slavery agitating party, and to unite himself to the great national party—the National Whig 
party.”  In contrast, the Whigs favored the “good of the whole people,” to “restore peace” and 
“cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to the Union.”  The Whigs resolved to 
oppose “any attempt to alienate any portion of country from the rest” and stated that they were 
“tired and sick of the useless agitation of the slavery question.”  Borrowing from Henry Clay 
during an earlier era of sectional discord, North Carolina Whigs summarized their position 
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proclaiming, “we are determined to know no geographical parties, no sectional distinctions, no 
North, no South, no East, no West—but our country—our whole country.”6  
Such political rhetoric could be dismissed as campaign posturing, yet the words had 
resonance for Polk.  The North Carolinian used nearly identical language as a leader in the 
agrarian movement of the 1880s and 1890s.  Particular echoes could be found in his rejection of 
sectionalism as an enemy to the American people, his use of the phrase “No North, No South,” 
and his promotion of Union and nation over any regional identity.  Polk’s involvement in the 
Whig Party also demonstrates that he was not an avid Democrat throughout his life.  In his 
younger years he admired Henry Clay far more than Andrew Jackson.  Although he became an 
active supporter of the Democratic Party during and after Reconstruction, he was not a lifetime 
loyalist.  As members of the Farmers’ Alliance flirted with the formation of a third party in the 
early 1890s, Polk could consider breaking ties with the Democrats more easily than many white 
Southerners.  He also did not emphasis his Southern identity at the expense of his American 
identity and he demonstrated a willingness to work with regional outsiders.7 
Polk put his Unionist and unifying political beliefs into practice in 1860.  When secession 
increasingly became the major political issue in the 1860 elections, he continued to support 
Union and made the position his central campaign piece.  At the age of twenty-three, he won 
election to the North Carolina House of Commons where he served from 1860-1861.  Polk 
joined other Whigs in asking voters to oppose secession during the state’s secession convention, 
which they did in February 1861.  When Confederates fired on Fort Sumter and President 
Lincoln called for troops from all states, Polk and most Whigs felt there was no further room for 
compromise.  Throughout the secession crisis of 1860-61, he claimed to consistently oppose 
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 88 
“Lincoln’s fanatical horde.”  Polk described himself as a compromiser stating, “I was then a 
Union man, exerting all my power to aid in averting civil war, and continued to labor untiringly 
until the last hope was extinguished.”  He said “I am now for resistance to the bitter end.”8  
As North Carolina organized for war, Polk won election as colonel in his home county 
militia.  Friends and supporters commonly referred to him as Colonel Polk the rest of his life.  
Although he never reached the position of colonel in the Confederate Army, Polk’s combat 
experience in the Civil War further solidified his military credentials and gave his 
reconciliationist testimonials added authority in the 1890s.  Rising to the rank of lieutenant, he 
fought in several small battles in North Carolina and Virginia, and in bigger clashes such as 
Seven Days’, Malvern Hill, and Gettysburg.   
Polk’s wartime service was not without controversy.  He was twice court-martialed for 
relatively minor offenses that seemed to involve personal disagreements with his commanding 
officers.  He was acquitted at both trials and received ample support from his fellow soldiers.  
Throughout the war Polk’s wife, Sallie, reported rumors circulating in Anson County that Polk 
fled from combat.  Using his court martials as proof over two decades later, Farmers’ Alliance 
opponents repeatedly accused the North Carolinian of cowardice during battle.  As he told his 
wife at the time and as Alliance president, Polk claimed that the reports came from “parlor 
warriors” who employed substitutes and stayed behind to seek military contracts during the war.  
In his speeches as Alliance president, Polk consistently associated “parlor warriors” with 
provoking feelings of sectional hatred.  Overall, Polk did not relish his time as soldier, which 
may have limited the amount of nostalgia in his later recollections of the war.9  
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9 Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 49-72, quote on 68. 
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After the Civil War Polk returned home to a farm that was devastated.  Most crops were 
seized and slaves departed, or were “taken,” with Union troops as Sherman March’s tore through 
North Carolina in March 1865.  Over the next eight years Polk worked with his family to restore 
the farm to prosperity.  He was elected to represent his home county at the state constitutional 
convention called by President Andrew Johnson during 1865-1866.  At the convention delegates 
took an oath to the United States, unanimously repealed the secession ordinance, 
overwhelmingly abolished slavery, and repudiated the Confederate state debt.  Although he 
would become a harsh critic of Radical Reconstruction, Polk’s participation in the 1865-1866 
convention showed his consistent moderation in the politics of his times.  As an opponent of 
secession until April 1861, a war-weary soldier, and an advocate of restoring North Carolina to 
the Union as quickly as possible, he avoided taking positions of the “unreconstructed rebel.”  
While others fled the country, mourned the passing of the Confederacy, celebrated the Lost 
Cause, or took up arms against Reconstruction supporters, Polk struck a more moderate path that 
resembled his later stance as an agrarian leader.  He promoted his dissatisfaction with 
government policies in newspaper editorials and public speeches.  Polk contrasted his views, 
which he associated with honesty, justice, reconciliation, and nationalism, with the bitter divisive 
tactics of sectionalism and dishonesty. 10  
Despite his post-war moderation, the Colonel made his opposition to Congressional 
Reconstruction clear.  Polk thought many laws contained an unhealthy amount of malice that 
made reunion of the North and South more difficult.11  He also made distinctions between the 
two major political parties during the election of 1876.  Polk used his North Carolina newspaper, 
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the Ansonian, to criticize the state Republican Party’s campaign for “pandering to the worst 
passions of the ignorant, and by an unceasing effort to keep alive the bitter memories of the war.  
No means were spared to inflame the jealousies, bitterness, and hatred between races and 
sections.”  Repeating the contrast made between North Carolina Whigs and Democrats in 1859, 
Polk asserted that Democrats in 1876 nobly “plead for reconciliation, peace, and a fraternal 
Union.”  He concluded, claiming, “Let us hope that the ‘bloody shirt’ is furled forever.”  The 
North Carolinian juxtaposed those who stood for “ignorance,” “corruption,” and the “‘bloody 
shirt’” with those who stood for “reconciliation” and clean government based on “the higher and 
nobler instincts of true manhood.”  Alliance President Polk used similar language and 
comparisons during his national speaking tours of 1890-1892.  Although his criticisms in later 
years failed to single out the Republican Party, reconciliation, reform, nobility and manhood 
remained cherished ideals for Polk.12  
Polk remained calm when the nation stood on the brink of civil war during the 
controversial presidential election of 1876.  While Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular 
vote, the electoral votes from Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina were disputed thanks to 
widespread intimidation and fraud.  What appeared to Polk and many other white Southerners as 
a clear Democratic victory now became an intense dispute.  As Congress debated a resolution to 
the election results, many southern and northern newspapers discussed the formation of armed 
militias to support their candidate.  Amidst this atmosphere, Polk chose a tone of moderation.  
Rather than stoke the burning fires of sectional animosity, he advised readers to “Keep Cool.”  
He suggested everyone remain calm and refrain from rash speech or action.  The Ansonian editor 
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believed that Tilden was fairly elected and he would become president, declaring “keep cool and 
await with patience and confidence, that vindication of right, which is in store for us.”13  
When an independent committee decided that Republican Rutherford B. Hayes was the 
victor Polk maintained a moderate and nationalist stance, although it was peppered with 
frustration.  The Colonel called the events leading to Hayes’ election, “the most palpable and 
outrageous fraud, ever perpetrated on a free people.”  He also declared if Hayes ignored the 
“fanatical demagogues of his party,” and embraced policies “with a coloring of patriotic 
manliness, the South should be the first to recognize it.”  The editor elaborated on the point by 
stating “should his course prove, that he is desirous of restoring peace, fraternity and prosperity 
to the country, the Democratic party,” should support the new president.  Distancing himself 
from Southern nationalism, Polk said, “This country, whether wisely or wickedly ruled, is OUR 
country—this government whether good or bad, is OUR government.”  Although over a million 
white men voted against Hayes, Polk said that they should share their opinions with the President 
to create a better country, “if he really desires to see the wounds of the past healed.”14   
In Polk’s account white Southerners could keep Hayes accountable and ensure that the 
country forgot the divisiveness of sectionalism and the Civil War.  He assumed that southern 
whites stood for fairness and supported forgetting the bitterness of the Civil War, despite the 
abundance of violence in the South.  The Colonel hoped that Hayes would buck Republican 
patterns of vindictiveness and authoritarianism to move closer to the position of fairness and 
justice embodied in the majority of the nation’s white population.  Together he hoped white 
Americans and Hayes could achieve peace and prosperity.  Although condemnatory, Polk 
favored a conditional reconciliation with the Republican administration in the promotion of 
                                                
13 Ibid, November 29, 1876.  For more on the 1876 electoral crisis see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: 
The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1951). 
14 Polkton, (NC) Ansonian, March 14, 1877. 
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peace and prosperity.  At no time during the electoral dispute did Polk advocate armed 
resistance, secession, or the outright rejection of federal authority.  
In the 1870s and 1880s North Carolina politics moved away from the intense competition 
of Reconstruction.  Polk worked to promote economic diversification, agricultural knowledge, 
and prosperity for his home state.  As he rose to the highest levels of leadership in the Southern 
Alliance a decade later, Polk returned to the theme of reconciliation.  His prior experiences 
showed that he sought out a moderate and reconciling position.  As an opponent to secession 
until April 1861 and as a soldier who did not relish his wartime years, he did not extensively 
celebrate the Lost Cause after 1865.15  He was elected to the 1865 North Carolina Constitutional 
Convention where he took the loyalty oath to the United States.  There, the delegates ratified the 
Thirteenth Amendment and repealed the secession ordinance.  Polk did not leave the country 
after the war, nor did he renounce the U.S. government.  Amidst the Reconstruction era, he 
opposed the Republican Party and Reconstruction laws, but he did not advocate violence to 
oppose the state or federal governments.  During the tense election of 1876, he urged readers to 
stay calm and respect the outcome, unlike many northern and southern newspaper editors.  
Cumulatively, Polk established a moderate record favoring unity and nationalism, which gave his 
reconciliation efforts authenticity in the 1890s. 
Polk demonstrated his commitment to reconciliation and other aspects of the Alliance 
agenda during a speech delivered in 1890.  On July 4, he arrived in Winfield, Kansas, tired from 
travel and ill with a cold.  The North Carolinian came to the Cowley County town with a raspy 
voice worn from multiple speaking engagements throughout the Midwest.  Halfway through his 
                                                
15 As his speech in Winfield, Kansas demonstrates, Polk did not completely ignore recollections of the Confederacy.  
While serving as editor of the Ansonian in the 1870s he published reminisces of his regiment and discussed the sad 
neglect of Confederate graves.  See the April 5, 1876 edition.  Polk also appeared at monument unveiling to honor 
North Carolina Confederate soldiers.  See Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 76. 
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first year as president of the National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union, he worked hard to 
maintain the steady growth of the organization.  A crowd of six thousand assembled to hear what 
the Alliance president offered to struggling farmers.  After several years of abnormally high 
rainfall and healthy grain prices, many Kansans fell on hard times after a series of droughts. 
Cowley County was located in the part of the state that experienced the most extreme effects of 
the drought.  Falling grain prices also hit Kansans very hard during 1889 and 1890.  Many 
farmers were lured to the state during the previous decade by land speculators and railroad 
companies who strenuously promoted the fertile and available land.  After several years of high 
profits during the mid-1880s, thousands of farmers now sank deep into debt.  High railroad 
freight rates and an unresponsive state government further contributed to the frustration felt 
throughout the state.  In response, thousands of Kansas farmers rapidly flocked to the Southern 
Alliance, and other agrarian organizations.  On the day commemorating the independence and 
birth of the United States the inhabitants of Cowley County, Kansas sought remedies to their 
increasing problems.  Polk obliged his audience and conveyed a message of hope for the birth of 
an improved nation.16  
Standing before the assembled crowd at Winfield, Kansas, Polk was outsider in many 
ways.  The Confederate veteran and North Carolinian spoke in the state that was created out of 
the conflict over the expansion of slavery and where Union veterans had held the highest 
political offices.  He also led a Farmers’ Alliance, dominated by Southerners that absorbed 
Kansans into its organization.  Working with these differences in mind, Polk tried to put the 
audience at ease by surrounding himself with allies and complementing Kansans.   
                                                
16 Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 3; Gene O. Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1969), 19-20, 28-32. 
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Before speaking to the crowd, Polk conveyed his stance as a unifier and reconciliationist.  
The southern-born Alliance president joined Northerners in a celebration of U.S. independence 
on the Fourth of July.  Ralph Beaumont, a leader of the Knights of Labor, and Benjamin Clover, 
Southern Alliance leader in Kansas and vice president of the national organization, greeted Polk 
as he arrived at the rail station.  The presence of Beaumont communicated the growing unity 
between the largest agrarian organization in the nation and the largest industrial labor union.  
Clover acted as a host for Polk.  As vice president in the Southern Alliance, he acted as living 
example of the non-sectional nature of the growing farmers’ association.  Like Polk, Clover was 
a vocal critic of sectionalism.  In his speech Polk aimed to convince Kansans of his earnest 
allegiance to reconciliation and promoting economic improvements for farmers.17  
Polk began his speech by complementing the people of Kansas for the physical beauty of 
their state and “Your indomitable pluck and invincible manhood and love for the equal rights of 
men.”  The Alliance leader said he traveled all over the country and he felt that “on my first trip 
to the great West I see many evidences of skill, industry, and enterprise.”  Polk saw no reason 
why Kansans should not be prosperous.  He referenced the “opulence and wealth” associated 
with cities, but claimed they did not compare to the superiority of rural life.  At the heart of what 
was most admirable in the American countryside, the speaker identified the “Christian family, -- 
the patriotic father, the godly mother surrounded by their helpful, bright and happy boys and 
girls.”  Polk relished to “listen to their words of wisdom gained by their conservative course in 
life; and look at that type of Christian manhood and womanhood illustrated in that home.”  Upon 
observation of farm families he came to realize “it is then that I forget for the time being, all this 
magnificence of wealth and show of power I say in my heart, after all, the great power and 
                                                
17 Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 3-5. 
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strength of this country rests upon the perpetuity of this humble Christian home of its farmers.’ 
(Great Applause.)”18  
With his statements Polk described the characteristics of the ideal American family.  
First, they lived away from the “opulence and wealth” of cities in a “humble Christian home.”  
While he acknowledged some positive aspects of city life, the speaker suggested that urban areas 
were more prone than the countryside to lead humans away from Christian might and simplicity.  
Second, the “patriotic father” led the family and served as the public representative of his family.  
When the nation called, the father volunteered.  In this role fathers should defend the wife and 
children from outside threats, relying upon “Christian manhood.”  Third, the “godly mother” 
stood as the moral force in the family, setting the tone for the household.  Mothers taught 
children right from wrong and served as models of behavior.  Fourth, children showed obedience 
to solid parental instruction as active participants in farm labor who acquired work and 
educational skills through diligent study of their mother and father.  The result was “happy boys 
and girls” who perpetuated the virtues of farm life to the next generation.  In the eyes of the 
Alliance president these cumulative characteristics made family farms the bedrock American 
institution and the backbone of the nation.  If farmers were the middle-class “bulwark” of 
America, agrarian families represented the source of middle-class strength.  Essentially, farm 
families were real Americans, and, therefore, they deserved the utmost respect and attention from 
the nation.  For the good of the nation, farmers needed to organize and vocalize their concerns. 
Polk launched into autobiography to further persuade his audience of the merits of 
friendship with the Alliance and the South.  Through the communication of personal tales, the 
North Carolinian hoped to build trust with Kansans.  Although he did not shy from noting 
                                                
18 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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aspects of his life that would have been foreign to most of the audience, Polk stressed many 
stories that were common to farm life to show that he could personally relate to them.  If 
Kansans could recognize these connections with Polk, they could see that he was similar to them 
and trustworthy.  Since Polk presented his story within the context of the South, he suggested 
that he was a typical Southerner.  The Alliance president inferred that if Kansans could trust a 
Southerner like Polk, they could trust others from his native region.  More generally, he hoped to 
prove that Southerners and Northerners could reconcile whatever differences remained from the 
divisive past by focusing on their shared experiences.  
The Alliance speaker began his autobiographical account by stating that he was raised on 
an average farm where a tough but fair father taught the value of hard work.  He then noted “my 
only associates of my childhood hours, and they were the sweetest of my life, was the old black 
mammy and my little colored playmates.  I did have good society.  I had the best mother God 
ever gave to any man, except your mother.’ (Laughter).”  The North Carolinian noted his 
Confederate service and quickly moved onto describing the difficulties he confronted after the 
Civil War.  He returned home to find destruction on his farmstead. 
Through this autobiographical story Polk hoped to endear himself to the audience.  He 
discussed aspects of his life that were similar to the experiences of the crowd.  First, as a child on 
a “plain farm,” Polk suggested he was not the product of a privileged upbringing.  Second, like 
most of his audience he grew up on a farm rather than in a city.  A third similarity lay in the 
depiction of his father as “an old fogy.”  While stern and old fashioned, Polk’s father taught him 
hard work and honesty.  The Alliance leader expressed gratitude to his father for these lessons, 
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for they greatly assisted him in times of tribulation.  When faced with rebuilding his farm after 
the Civil War Polk felt that he possessed the necessary values and mindset to be successful.19 
The Alliance speaker’s post-Civil War experiences provided a fourth example he used to 
develop bonds with the Kansas audience.  Polk told the crowd that his wife, Sarah, bravely 
confronted the hardships of life after the Civil War.  Reared in the “true southern style,” Sarah 
knew little of manual labor before the war.  Instead, she enjoyed a leisurely life of playing 
musical instruments.  The Civil War altered the circumstances for Sarah Polk.  When faced with 
the reality of a ruined farm, Sarah forfeited her standing as a privileged southern belle and 
engaged in manual labor to help the family.  Colonel Polk claimed that she “rolled up her sleeves 
and slapped those little hands into the face of the world and said ‘I for one will accept the 
situation.’ (Applause).” 
In the process of transforming from a prewar dainty southern belle into a hardworking 
woman, Leonidas depicted Sarah as a model American laborer.  At least temporarily, she 
forfeited the privileges of a white southern lady and transformed into a woman ready to do 
whatever necessary to ensure the survival of her family.  Sarah’s actions represented a 
hardworking spirit and sense of self-sacrifice that many Americans cherished in the late 
nineteenth century and today.  Polk placed himself into this narrative when he informed the 
Kansas crowd that if he did not join his wife in hard work “I would not have been worthy of the 
name of man.”  Like his wife, Leonidas also depicted himself as a hard worker.  Unlike his wife, 
he placed his story into a gendered context rather than a class context.  Raised on a “plain farm,” 
Polk already knew hard work, unlike Sarah.  Since he did not avoid hard work, and the daunting 
task of reconstructing the Polk homestead in the aftermath of Confederate defeat, the Colonel 
                                                
19 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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portrayed his actions as masculine and morally just.  The Alliance leader finished his personal 
revelations noting that he “refused to hold any political office since the war.”  Polk suggested 
that he preferred to work hard on improving life for farmers, rather than practice politics.20  
Kansans could relate to this image of struggle and self-sacrifice.  The founding of the 
state coincided with the violence and social disruption of Bleeding Kansas.  During the Civil 
War parts of Kansas experienced brutal guerilla warfare.  Both periods overlapped to create great 
ruin and uncertainty for settlers of the Sunflower state.  For those who moved to Kansas after the 
Civil War, other memories could be recalled.  While the postwar years brought improved 
economic times, four straight years of declining agricultural prices and drought devastated the 
land in 1890.  Kansans also faced harsh weather and the occasional grasshopper plague.  Polk’s 
tale of hardship after the Civil War, therefore, sounded familiar to male and female Kansans who 
struggled to profit and subsist from their farms.  A description of the whole family working hard 
together to rebuild and thrive made sense to the crowd.  The audience could also admire the 
transformation of Sarah Polk from privileged lady to female worker.  Many Kansas women 
participated thoroughly in farm labor.  They were not used to leisure.  More respect would be 
assigned to a woman who gave up niceties for the benefit of the family.   
The story also served to distance the Polks from antebellum stereotypes of lazy white 
Southerners and from the image of elite white southern planters who relied solely on African-
American labor for their wealth.  Since Polk and the Alliance blamed Wall Street speculators and 
middlemen for taking money from those who worked to make products of wealth, he wished to 
reject association with slothfulness and exploitation.  Instead the Alliance leader suggested that 
                                                
20 Margaret Mitchell wrote about a similar transformation of white southern ladies into members of the American 
middle class in Gone With the Wind.  For more on the connections between Mitchell and the acceptance of southern 
values in America, see Anne Firor Scott, The Southern Lady: From the Pedestal to Politics, 1830-1930.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970; Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the 
South, 1890-1940 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 258-68. 
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idleness and the avoidance of hardship were marks of cowardice and un-American.  He 
identified his family with courage in the face of a challenge, pride in hard work, and the 
production of tangible objects of value for sale.  The North Carolinian assumed that Kansas 
farmers agreed with the Polks’ conduct.21  
Although the crowd could identify with much of Polk’s autobiography, his story 
contained at least one foreign element.  He spoke fondly of his early years spent exclusively with 
African Americans as the “only associates of my childhood hours.”  The speaker did not mention 
that “the old black mammy and my little colored playmates” were slaves, but the audience may 
have deduced the point.  As a middle-aged Southerner, thirty-five years removed from slavery, 
telling tales of a childhood spent with slaves would not surprise the Kansas listeners.  Unknown 
to the crowd, Polk inherited seven slaves from his parents upon their deaths in 1852 valued at 
$3,100.  He also inherited 353 acres valued at $1,600.  In 1860 he owned thirteen slaves valued 
at $17,000.  Lest the crowd grow uncomfortable with the allusion to African-American slavery, 
the North Carolinian labeled his early years with black slaves “the sweetest of my life.”  
Speaking on the Fourth of July holiday and in a state that had a bloody history because of the 
issue of slavery, Polk carefully chose his words.  When the Alliance president said, “I did have 
good society.  I had the best mother God ever gave to any man, except your mother.’ 
(Laughter),” he distanced himself from any taint brought about by frequent association with 
slaves.  He received proper “society” from his mother, not his “old black mammy” or “little 
black playmates.”  The association of mammy and African-American friends with his early years 
suggested that they were symbols of a youth full of carefree times and childish fun.  He asserted 
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that African Americans did not have a lasting impact on the development of hiss personality.  
Motherly “society” and fatherly tough love endured beyond youth to make Polk into the man he 
became.22  
Despite efforts to note similarities between his early years and those of the Kansas 
audience, Polk’s life experiences stood in distinction from that of most Kansans.  Most Kansans 
in 1890 did not grow up with slaves and Sunflower state defined its history in opposition to the 
“peculiar institution.”  During the years of Bleeding Kansas pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions 
engaged in fierce violence to determine the presence of slavery in the territory.  When the state 
virtually outlawed slavery by rejecting the Lecompton Constitution in 1858, Kansas became 
identified with free states.  As Brent Campney contends, the violence surrounding slavery led 
Kansans to identify the state as a land that “had been born of the struggle for freedom for all 
people and baptized with the blood of abolitionists dedicated to the destruction of slavery.”  
During the Civil War Kansas contributed large numbers of soldiers to the Union, including the 
first African-American regiment.  The state also had the highest proportion of Union casualties 
in the nation.  In the years after the Civil War, Kansans used this history to promote an image of 
the state as staunchly loyal to racial equality, freedom, and Union.  As the Topeka Daily Capital 
wrote, “Kansas fought, bled and died for the negro.”23  
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Largely because of this image Kansas became the destination for at least ten thousand 
southern African Americans during the late 1870s and early 1880s.  These migrants, or 
Exodusters, came to the sunflower state to escape southern oppression and to pursue economic 
prosperity and freedom.  Although some Kansas towns prohibited African-American settlement 
through the passage of ordinance or threatened use of violence, several towns provided 
assistance to the migrants.  Overall the migrations served to reinforce the association of the state 
with racial equality and pride in American freedom.  The migration years and subsequent 
decades revealed some ugly truths about racial attitudes in Kansas.  According to Brent 
Campney, Kansas experienced at least 603 separate incidents of racial violence between 1865 
and 1915.  These events ranged from brawls to lynchings, burnings, and body mutilations.  
Although attitudes varied throughout the state, Kansas, like the rest of the nation, and especially 
the South, wrestled with racial strife in the late nineteenth century.  Polk’s passing reference to 
African Americans and black slavery, therefore, may not have caused much alarm among the 
Cowley County crowd.24  
While some Kansans realized that Polk alluded to African-American slaves, others in the 
audience may not have made the connection.  Since Polk wanted to build trust with Kansans by 
showing what they had in common with white Southerners, he did not directly identify 
“mammy” and his “little colored playmates” as family slaves.  Through the avoidance of 
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explicitly speaking about slavery Polk reduced the potential for alienating his midwestern 
audience. 
 Rather than focus on these differences, Polk stressed what he shared in common with 
Kansans.  He launched into the poor state of American agriculture in 1890.  Despite the 
availability of fertile land, the means to ship a crop to market, and the desire to succeed, 
American agriculture was in a period of decline that started in 1865.  In contrast, Polk said the 
farmer “sees that everything else is prosperous while he alone is at a standstill, and he would not 
be worthy his heritage if he did not seek to know the reason for this great discrimination.”  The 
Alliance president feared the widening disparity of wealth and the decline of the middle class.  
He considered farmers part of the “middle class,” which “has been the great source of strength; 
they have been the bulwark of this country.”  Polk said, “They have fought the battles, and have 
preserved our free institutions.  I want to see the middle class rise up.”  He thought 
improvements possible with encouragement from the Alliance.  The agrarian leader dismissed 
ideas that overproduction was the source of farmer difficulties, since he encountered hungry 
citizens on the streets of Washington D.C.  Instead, he blamed Wall Street and other opponents 
of reform for agrarian struggles.  
Polk elaborated on the opponents of agrarian reform by criticizing Wall Street servants 
and partisan politicians.  He claimed that these dishonest politicians used issues such as the tariff 
and sectionalism to keep Americans divided, while the rich grew richer and the common 
American grew poorer.  The Alliance president encouraged all Americans to look beyond 
partisan emotions where they would find “arrayed on the one side the great magnates of the 
country, and Wall street brokers, and the Plutocratic power, and on the other you will see the 
people.”  He criticized Congress for failing to act to help find a remedy for struggling farmers 
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because they feared Wall Street instead of “the people.”  He suggested that Kansans replace their 
congressional representatives if they failed to act on the farmer’s behalf. 
Polk knew an ideal substitute for partisan politicians and Wall Street pawns.  The 
agrarian spokesman called for men of honesty to cleanse the American government.  He asked 
the audience, “tell me who has a better right in America to go into politics than the farmers?”  
Polk confessed his sin of following partisanship in the past, but he pledged never to vote for a 
candidate who “is not a true and loyal friend of my people.  (Applause.)  And if that be political 
treason, make the most of it, and turn up your noses.”  Here, Polk suggested that Americans 
should vote their consciences, not their party.  While the rhetoric of such a claim was not radical, 
in 1890 the reality of voting against the Democrats in the South and the Republicans in the North 
was fairly radical.  As the Populist Party soon discovered in Kansas, opposing the regionally 
dominant political party drew stiff criticism from many politicians and journalists.  Southerners 
experienced identical opposition when they moved toward the Populists in 1892.  He then cited 
George Washington who had warned the nation about the crippling effects of “party spirit.”  The 
reference to a Founding Father of the United States served to reinforce Polk’s emphasis on 
commonality in an effort to build a national agrarian movement. 
Since Polk considered farmers to be better public servants than partisan politicians and 
because they represented the “strength” and “bulwark” of the nation, he encouraged them to 
unify and reform the political system and economy.  He told the crowd that every group of 
economic actors organized, except agrarians.  Without unity, Polk stated that the farmer “was an 
open prey to every other interest.”  Too many agrarians avoided collective action because they 
operated under the assumption that “‘I have been brought up under that law of God which says I 
must earn my bread by the sweat of my face,’” Polk rejected excessive individualism by 
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paraphrased another Biblical verse claiming “No man liveth to himself alone.”  The agrarian 
leader utilized the Bible as an authoritative source to appeal to Kansas farmers who may have 
been skeptical of the Southern Alliance and agrarian organizing in general.  
The Alliance president was also careful to show his respect for individualism, a 
traditional value important to Americans and farmers.  He emphasized that there were limits to 
Alliance support for collective action.  Prior to initiation, Polk stated that all Alliance members 
were told that membership in the farm group would not “‘interfere with your freedom of political 
or religious views.’”  Rather than force Alliance members to follow all organizational views Polk 
said “No, Sir, we take him by the hand and say you are a freeman.”  Polk carefully navigated a 
middle ground between collective action and independence.  Contrary to partisan politicians, he 
described Alliance leaders as respectful of individual autonomy and independence.  
The Alliance leader continued to juxtapose his organization with those Americans who 
economically and emotionally exploited the average citizen.  Polk next described the use of 
sectionalism as a barricade to relief for struggling American farmers.  He noted  
Some people have stirred up sectional feeling and have kept us apart for twenty-
five years. I tell you that I believe in my heart of hearts that the man, north or 
south, who urged on the war, I care not what his name may be, or what position 
he may hold; that man who helped to light the flame of war and when it was 
ablaze all around the horizon, fired your minds and sent you to the front and then 
skulked out of it himself. And who in 1865 found out that we had a war, got mad 
and has been mad ever since.  That man who was invisible in war and invincible 
in peace. The man who never smelt gun powder or heard a minnie ball.  The man 
who has to use the sacred dust of the grave and has scattered it to the winds, and 
tried to work upon our passions.  The man who has waived the bloody shirt.  The 
man who has taught his children the poisonous doctrine of hate, I say, and I have 
declared it before, I believe him to be the worst of our enemies on the face of the 
earth.  (Applause.)25  
 
                                                
25 The Polk quotes in the six paragraphs above come from the Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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The Alliance president indicated that the Southerners and Northerners most in favor of war 
pushed others into conflict by appealing to “sectional feeling,” “passions,” and “fired your 
minds.”  Polk suggested that these war fanatics appealed to emotion and angry rhetoric rather 
than logic and reason.  Once the supporters of war “helped to light the flame of war,” they 
“skulked out” of service, like cowards.  The Confederate veteran attacked the legitimacy of those 
who promoted sectionalism, declaring that they “never smelt gun powder or heard a minnie 
ball.”  Although they did not know what it was like to fight or to see their comrades perish in 
battle, the advocates of sectionalism used the dead to perpetrate division by waving the “bloody 
shirt.”  Instead of allowing the dead to lie in peace, the perpetrators of bitterness “used the sacred 
dust of the grave” carelessly and taught anger to the next generation.  Polk clearly disliked Civil 
War memories that conveyed resentment and lingering divisiveness.  He connected the 
continuation of these memories to repulsive individuals who promoted sectionalism and anti-
patriotism.  The Alliance president preferred to forget the controversies of the war and convey 
the redemptive aspects of forgiveness between former enemies.  
While Polk said that Northerners and Southerners encouraged sectionalism, his reference 
to the term “waving the bloody shirt,” reveals a subtext of blame.  The slogan originated in the 
divisive Reconstruction years during Massachusetts Republican Senator Benjamin Butler’s anti-
Ku Klux Klan speech made before Congress.  During the address Butler supposedly held up a 
bloody shirt to demonstrate the terror of the Ku Klux Klan against democratically elected and 
Republican-controlled southern state governments.  Although there is no record of Butler 
showing any bloody shirt during his speech, opponents of Reconstruction used the fictional event 
to discredit Republican references to violence in the South.  “Waving the bloody shirt” came to 
mean overly dramatic, and probably fabricated, stories concocted by Republicans that were told 
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for political gain.  Through this association the term also inferred that those who “waved the 
bloody shirt,” encouraged continued bitterness and hatred between the North and South.  
Whether Polk meant to blame Republicans or not, the “bloody shirt” phrase was a direct attack 
on the sincerity of the Grand Old Party and its primarily Northern supporters.  In effect, he also 
dismissed bitterness as an authentic emotion felt by Northerners those who lost friends and 
family on Civil War battlefields.26 
“Waving the bloody shirt” also became a slogan to encourage Americans to reconcile 
after the Civil War.  Reconstruction opponents associated the “bloody shirt” with bitterness, 
anger, and hatred.  They also assumed that animosity toward the South was artificial and merely 
a political ploy used by Republicans who brought up old and painful memories.  Under this line 
of criticism, Republicans wanted voters to remember which major party supported the Union and 
opposed secession and which party continued to harbor those who showed disloyalty to the U.S. 
government.  Reconciliationists, such as newspaperman Horace Greeley, offered an alternative 
of forgiveness, mutual respect, and unity.  After all, they contended, most Northern soldiers 
fought to save the Union by preventing southern secession and destruction of the republic.  
During the 1870s, reconciliationists argued that the best way to honor soldiers who gave their 
lives for the Union cause was to reunite with the formerly rebellious South.  The dead wanted 
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phrase.  Among the facts found in the myth are the beating of a white northern school superintendent, Allen P. 
Huggins, in 1871.  Because he oversaw the biracial public school system in Monroe County, Mississippi, Klansmen 
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the South and the Congressman called for the use of federal troops to destroy the Klan.  Federal troops were 
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Terror After Appomattox (New York: Viking, 2008), 2-5.  John R. Neff describes many Northerners who chose not 
to forgive the Confederate South in Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of 
Reconciliation (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2005). 
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peace and they wanted Southerners and Northerners to come together to “clasp hands across the 
bloody chasm,” as Greeley stated.  Without reconciliation and reunion the Union dead would 
have given their lives to a failed cause.27  
Polk invoked the “bloody shirt” slogan for nearly identical purposes.  He suggested that 
sectionalism was a sham issue used merely to distract the American people from more immediate 
and pressing problems.  Where the reconciliationists of the 1870s encouraged reunion primarily 
for the sake of the Union, Polk identified reconciliation with Christian forgiveness.  
Reconciliationists generally disregarded that bitterness was a legitimate emotion felt by those 
who lost friends and family on the battlefields of the Civil War.  Polk and the reconciliationists 
also ignored the evidence that supported a continued pursuit of wartime goals, namely, violence 
against Reconstruction governments and their supporters.  Although Polk did not directly attack 
the Republican Party, he inferred that Republicans were the prime perpetrators of sectionalism.  
Since the base of the Republican Party was in the northern states, the North Carolinian suggested 
that Northerners were responsible for “waving the bloody shirt.”  As seen in his 1870s editorials 
and in his 1890 speech, the Alliance president portrayed the South as a victim who bore little 
responsibility for continued sectional hostility.  While not as aggressive as a growing number of 
former Confederates who defended the South against northern interpretations of the Civil War 
                                                
27 For more on the role of the Union as a motivation for Northern troops and the Northern war cause, see Gary 
Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).  Gallagher writes that the destruction of 
slavery served to bolster the primary war aim of restoration of the Union.  John R. Neff writes about the effects of 
the Union cause on Northern memories of the war in Honoring the Civil War Dead.  Like Gallagher, Neff places 
restoration of the Union as the primary goal of postwar Northern memories.  Gallagher and Neff note the persistence 
of white American racial prejudices against African Americans during and after the Civil War.  Neff describes 
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of reunion the Cause Victorious.  Focusing on war casualties, Neff also argues that many black and white veterans 
did not accept reconciliation on the grounds proposed by many former Confederates and some Northerners.  Other 
scholars contend that emancipation became a war aim that was equal to restoration of the Union.  Protecting 
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Reconstruction.  For this view see David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001); James Oakes, Freedom National: The 
Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013). 
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and Reconstruction, Polk’s description of sectionalism resembled other white southern accounts 
written in the 1880s and 1890s.28  
In his Winfield, Kansas speech, the agrarian leader was careful not to assign average 
Americans with blame for continuing sectional animosities.  Polk indicated that those who 
“waved the bloody shirt” to the detriment of the nation held positions of political and economic 
power.  Unlike the reconciliationist Alliance, these proponents of division, used sectionalism to 
enslave voters against their interests.  He said “The politician would keep you and me apart, and 
by so doing they have chained us hand and foot.  They have placed upon us manacles that are 
worse than those that have fallen from the African slaves.”29  
Nineteenth-century Americans commonly used references to slavery as motivation for 
whites who defined their personal freedom in juxtaposition to the non-free or enslaved.  Invoking 
John Locke, a republican ideology emerged after the American Revolution to define freedom, 
independence, and liberty as the characteristics of an American citizen.  Slavery, in contrast, 
suggested dependence and subservience.  As the country industrialized in the mid-nineteenth 
century, labor advocates consistently used this comparison to inspire workers to demand rights as 
American citizens.  Agrarian reformers continued this class theme in their calls for greater 
farmer rights against exploitative banks and corporations.  Although the comparison between 
slaves and free wage laborers contained a strong dose of class protest, it also contained appeals 
to racial identity.  As scholars such as David Roediger and Alexander Saxton have shown, 
                                                
28 For more on the rise of white southern interpretations of the war and their acceptance by white Northerners, see 
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 72-85; Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost 
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29 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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nineteenth-century Americans from all regions came to associate freedom with whiteness while 
slavery was linked to blackness.  Polk suggested both class and racial identities when he called 
partisan “manacles…worse than those that have fallen from the African slaves.”  While 
dismissive of the horrible experiences of African-American slaves, the agrarian leader used 
slavery rhetoric to inspire Kansans to act as free men, not as subservient slaves incapable of 
making decisions independent from politicians.30 
The Alliance leader continued his verbal assault on dishonorable politicians by 
comparing unfavorably to morally sound farmers.  He stated, “I know how the parties are run in 
my section of the country.  They are run by bosses who sprang up while we were trying to get 
something to eat after the war, and they have managed things so long that they have come to the 
conclusion that all the farmers ought to do is to vote as they tell them, and pay taxes.”  Polk 
associated politicians with laziness and emotional exploitation.  Farmers were identified with 
work, struggle, and honesty.  A clear parallel could be drawn from this description of the 1870s 
to 1890.  Farmers and other laborers worked to produce items of value for the economy, while 
another class of Americans sat idle and took wealth from the producer classes.   Instead of 
respecting the producers of wealth, the agrarian leader said that politicians took them for granted 
and expected subservience from farmers.  Polk urged farmers to act independently to free 
themselves from the mental slavery of dishonest politicians.   
Because he emphasized the falseness of sectionalism, the Alliance leader also pointed to 
the Civil War as the start of farmer troubles.  Polk denied the continued relevance of the ideas 
                                                
30 See Eric Foner.  Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War.  
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that started the Civil War.  Slavery, states’ rights, and southern rebellion mattered little to the 
economic and social livelihood of nation in 1890.  New issues arose that had a greater impact on 
average Americans.  Rather than face these new problems, Polk believed that politicians 
manipulated the past for personal gain.  For the Alliance president and much agrarian reform 
movement the Civil War led to economic exploitation and produced a startling deluge of 
dishonest politicians.  If farmers could break free from the spell of partisan politicians, better 
times lay ahead.  He concluded, “They know that if we get together and shake hands and look 
each other in the face and feel the touch of kinship, their doom is sealed.  (Applause.)”   Polk 
suggested that without the influence of politicians farmers were naturally inclined to reconcile 
and work together.31  
Supporting his claims that the Southern Alliance wanted to work with farmers from 
across the country, Polk utilized additional stories that buttressed his autobiography and 
emphasized reconciliation.  He assured Kansans that other Southerners wanted to work with 
them in a national farmers’ movement.  The Alliance president leader also cited the desire for 
reconciliation among Confederate and Union veterans.  Collectively the stories suggested that 
reconciliation was authentic and that veterans approved.  He implied that sectionalism should no 
longer prevent the unification of American farmers in efforts to improve the national economy 
and politics.  Polk supported his claims when he told the crowd that “I stand here to-day, 
commissioned by hundreds of thousands of southern farmers, to beg the farmers of Kansas to 
stand by them, and they assure you that they will never, no never, never, no never give 
prominence to any man who stirs up this question which was settled by Lee and Grant at 
Appomattox.”  In response to men who did not serve in Civil War combat, yet encouraged 
                                                
31 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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continued bitterness between North and South, Polk cited better model of emulation, “a man who 
did not fear to fight.  I point these men to a man whose name will last when their’s have been 
forgotten.  None other than Ulysses S. Grant.  He was a great general, and as true to his flag as 
ever a man was.”  In contrast to the patriotic Grant, Polk said “I want to take these men, when 
they are flaunting the bloody shirt, to the bedside at Mt. McGregor, and let them hear his last 
parting word.”32  
Like his multiple references to God, Polk utilized a familiar example to communicate the 
nobility of reconciliation to Kansans.  The reference to the Union commander by a Confederate 
veteran suggested that Polk was not bitter about the Civil War and that he respected General 
Grant for his military skills and patriotism.  Rather than use an older symbol of American 
national unity or Robert E. Lee, Polk used a Northern example to communicate reconciliation to 
an audience perceived to be Northern.   
U.S. Grant was a useful symbol of reconciliation for Colonel Polk.  In his 1885 Personal 
Memoirs, written at Mount MacGregor, New York during the final year of his life, Grant 
described the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, Virginia in sympathetic terms.  The General 
described his orders for Union troops to avoid celebrations upon the conclusion of Lee’s 
surrender.  Grant also noted in his Memoirs that he felt sad at the sight of Lee whom he regarded 
as a “foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though 
that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which 
there was the least excuse.”  The Union commander concluded, “I do not question, however, the 
sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.”  Although Grant led the combat 
forces that destroyed the Confederacy, slavery, and restored the Union, his memoirs cast him in 
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reconciliationist terms.  As David Blight notes, Grant’s writing promoted a “shared grief at war’s 
costs coupled with Northern respect for the sincerity of Southern devotion to their cause, even 
when that cause was judged repugnant.”  Blight also states that Grant devoted little space to the 
ideological conflict of slavery, which stood as the cause of the war.  Instead, the General chose to 
discuss military matters.  In a fitting tribute to reunion, the pallbearers at Grant’s funeral 
included Union and Confederate veterans.33 
In his statements to Kansans, Polk mirrored Grant’s description of Confederate surrender.  
Like the Union General, Polk chose to avoid references to the ideological divisions that caused 
the Civil War.  He selected, rather, to focus on the common bravery shown by Union and 
Confederate soldiers.  Since Polk wished to express reconciliation he did not discuss Grant’s role 
in Reconstruction.  The Alliance spokesman also failed to mention his personal opinions 
concerning Reconstruction under President Grant.  Instead, the Alliance president also suggested 
that all veterans truly wanted to forget the bitterness of the war.  Polk demonstrated that he 
wanted peace and reconciliation between the sections of the nation and he used Grant as another 
example of these sympathies.  
Polk informed the audience that Grant was not the only veteran who shared these feelings 
of reunion between North and South.  Upon his return from the national Alliance convention of 
1889 he told his family, Raleigh residents, and “ex-rebel soldiers,” how Northern Alliancemen 
“had received us, and there was not a dry eye in the house when I got through.”  He claimed that 
a “strong Democratic” Kentucky audience welcomed the news with “shouts of applause.”  
According to Polk, Union veterans reacted the same way.  The North Carolinian contended, “The 
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spirit of love and fraternity is growing.”  Using rural Christian terms he addressed Alliance Vice 
President Ben Clover, exclaiming,  “Thank God, Brother Clover, the day has come when a man 
from the south and a man from Kansas, Kentucky or the eastern states are permitted to stand on 
the same platform.  (Applause)  So long as they can contrive to keep us apart, they will succeed 
in keeping us down.”  Polk repeated his description of sectionalism as an artificial feeling and he 
presented northern and southern farmers as natural allies in a “spirit of love and fraternity.”  The 
Alliance leader said that feelings of animosity caused by the Civil War were now dead.  He 
thought it was time for common Northerners and Southerners to come together to achieve change 
for the collective good.34  
The Alliance spokesman continued to assure the crowd that the predominantly southern 
organization stood with them.  He claimed “Brothers of Kansas, sisters of Kansas, whether you 
believe it or not, whether you will aid each other or not, whether you join in this fraternal spirit 
in which God intended you should join, whether you believe it or not, I want to tell you people of 
Kansas here today that the farmers of North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, South Carolina is your 
brother, whether you want it so or not. (Applause.).”   Polk again sought to appeal to Kansans 
using a common rural Christian language.  He described Southerners in Christ-like and Godly 
terms when he asserted their loyalty for Kansans “whether you want it so or not.”  Like a passage 
from the Lord’s Prayer, he promised that Southerners would forgive any trespasses from 
Kansans and be their “brother.”  Although not a preacher, the Alliance president used common 
Christian rhetoric and fiery emotion to speak like an evangelical preacher.35  
                                                
34 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
35 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890.  Polk was a devout Baptist who served as a state delegate to the Southern 
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 In a stirring climax of the speech Polk combined the themes of Christianity, sectional 
reconciliation, trust and mutual interest.  The North Carolinian stated: 
Thank God, that I can stand on this platform this afternoon without being 
interfered with any sectional feeling, and tell you that your destiny. (Applause.)  
Tell you that you are my brother.  Tell you that there is a common interest 
between us.  Tell you that we are bound by common peril.  Tell you that we have 
a common interest and must make common cause in spite of all that sectional 
feeling.  Tell you that we must acknowledge but one name and one flag.  
(Applause)  And one common country, and the struggle is not between the North 
and the South.  Thank God, no! (Applause.)  And so long as we live there will 
never be a north and south.36  
 
The Alliance president pointedly praised the end of sectionalism.  A white Southerner 
publicly lectured to what he considered a Northern audience and did not receive their ire in 
contrast to the divisive years surrounding the Civil War.  To encourage the crowd and reinforce 
Christian bonds Polk referred to them as “brother” and “sister.”  He also reassured Kansans that 
other Americans felt their pain, leading him to identify a second indication that sectionalism had 
waned.  Polk stated that Americans in other regions experienced similar economic troubles to 
those found in Kansans, making the problems national in scope.  He suggested that unlike 
previous decades, the Americans who sympathized the most with Kansans lived below the 
Mason-Dixon line.  Southerners also suffered under the current state of the agricultural economy 
and they received little sympathy from their political leaders.  Due to the similarities, the 
Alliance leader stated that regional variations mattered no more.  Problems created by railroads, 
currency circulation, and high interest rates were now more important than the disagreements of 
three decades before.  Polk argued that the bloodshed of the Civil War should no longer prevent 
                                                
36 Ibid.  Quote in Winfield (KS) Courier.  Noblin has the first sentence of this quote as “Thank God that I can stand 
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my destiny!”  Another difference between the Courier and Noblin’s transcription of the speech are in the placement 
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cooperation between people who shared hard times.  The past should now be forgotten to 
preserve the future of the agrarian republic.  
Beyond the ties created by tangible economic realities, Polk claimed that God wanted 
cooperation among American farmers.  He suggested that humans might fail to recognize God’s 
work in the bonds created by their common situation.  Polk did not cast the goals and efforts of 
the Alliance in strictly economic terms, but also as the work of God’s children.  Members of the 
Alliance were not the selfish materialists of Gilded Age cities.  The Alliance drew inspiration 
from more respectable and holy sources to suggest that their mission had a higher purpose.  Polk 
finished the speech by reinforcing cordiality and reconciliation when he invited Kansans to 
North Carolina and promised, “you will receive a hearty welcome.  There shall be no Mason and 
Dixon line on the Alliance maps of the future.  It shall be one nation and one flag. (Applause.).” 
Polk mainly used the Kansas speech as an opportunity to stress the commonalities 
between late nineteenth-century American farmers, which served three main purposes.  First, by 
emphasizing the shared culture of Northern and Southern farmers, Polk hoped to attract 
additional supporters to the agrarian movement.  Speaking as a recruiter the Alliance leader 
highlighted the values of American farm life.  He assumed that these values formed the basis of 
traditional agrarian culture and that his endorsement of these beliefs struck a common chord with 
farmers across the country.  The agrarian leader argued that farmers were noble and true 
Americans who placed importance on home life, hard work, Christian beliefs, and did not hold 
sectional grudges.  He asserted that his image of American farmers matched the identity of the 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance.  Kansans could trust the Southern Alliance because the organization 
shared the same American agrarian attitudes.  
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Through an emphasis on mutual values Polk also wanted to fulfill a second objective by 
countering charges that the Alliance was a group of “‘old hayseed socialists--demagogues.’”  
The Alliance president connected the agrarian organization with traditional values to eliminate 
association with radicalism.  Polk used the Bible, the typical farm family, allegiance to a strong 
work ethic, and Christian reconciliation to demonstrate that the Alliance wanted nothing more 
than justice for Americans who produced goods for a living.  He worried about the great 
economic changes that swept the country within his lifetime.  The agrarian leader referred to his 
childhood when there were only two millionaires in the United States and farmers owned 
“seventy per cent of the wealth.”  Now there were “millionaires by the thousands” and farmers 
possessed “less than twenty-three percent” of the wealth, yet they paid the same percentage of 
the nation’s taxes.  Polk hoped that Kansans would share his concern for the dangerous 
imbalance of wealth distribution and associate Alliance remedies with traditional American 
values.  The farmers’ group did not want to destroy the country in a bloody socialist revolution.  
They called for government action to restore fairness to the American economy so the nation 
could be great again.37  
A third goal that Polk hoped to achieve with his emphasis on mutual values was to 
persuade Kansans that he and the South no longer felt antagonistic toward Northerners.  The 
North Carolinian used autobiography to convince the audience that the South was not a threat to 
national unity.  Through his personal tales, Polk tried to endear himself to the audience and 
provide them with a model for identifying with someone from the South.  If he described himself 
as a typical Southerner, then Kansans could imagine themselves relating to other Southerners.  If 
Kansans could relate to and trust Southerners, effective bonds could be created, and a strong 
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farm organization could form.  Through a united front, Alliance reforms could be enacted.  Seen 
from this view Polk resembled an ambassador who helped non-Southerners assimilate with 
Southerners into a national group based on common values and shared economic interests 
against the forces of economic exploitation. 
Despite his efforts at appeasement, not everyone believed that Polk and the Southern 
Alliance truly stood for sectional reconciliation and the true America.  The Topeka Capital ran a 
series of articles that accused Polk of passionately advocating secession, demonstrating 
cowardice in combat during the Civil War, stealing state money while Secretary of Agriculture, 
leaving business partners to pay debt after failing at business ventures, and becoming president 
of the Alliance so he could take money from farmers.  The newspaper also referred to Polk and 
Ralph Beaumont as “worthless schemers,” “tramps,” “enemies of God and man,” and “would-be 
revolutionists.”  When Kansas Alliancemen ran as Populists in the fall 1890 elections, the 
Capital intensified its attacks by accusing Polk of executing Union prisoners at Gettysburg.   The 
newspaper used eyewitness accounts to charge that Polk ran cruel Union prisoner camps at 
Salisbury and Morgantown in North Carolina.  Although Polk’s biographer finds that these 
stories were made up to keep voters loyal to the Republican Party, it would not be the last time 
that journalists accused the Alliance of disloyalty.38  
Polk received ample criticism from a rival North Carolina newspaper.  The Raleigh News 
and Observer accused the Colonel of using the Alliance as a political organization against the 
Democratic Party.  After his Kansas trip, Polk became convinced that the News and Observer 
supplied the Topeka Capital with the false stories published in the latter newspaper.  The 
Alliance leader and editor of The Progressive Farmer published this opinion and received a 
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response from Samuel A. Ashe, editor of the News and Observer.  Ashe accused Polk of stirring 
up trouble by “appealing to prejudice and by inflaming the passions of the people.”  The News 
and Observer editor then called the Alliance president a failure as a “soldier,” “farmer,” 
“Commissioner of Agriculture,” in “journalism,” and in “medicine.”  Ashe predicted failure in 
Polk’s Alliance endeavors, stating “He was born to failure as his lot and inheritance in life, and it 
will be so to the end.  The good people will not let him have his will in this matter.”39  
While some Kansas and North Carolina newspapers responded with extremely personal 
attacks against Polk, many Alliancemen rallied around the agrarian leader.  As he toured the 
nation supporters frequently wrote into Alliance newspapers to thank Polk and endorse his 
reconciliationist efforts.  Alliance newspapers also reprinted articles from other regions to show 
national support for the Alliance President.  In Texas, the Southern Mercury reprinted the Free 
Press who said, “Pres. L.L. Polk’s short visit in Kansas has done more to blot out sectional hate 
and cement more firmly the ties of brotherly love in the Alliance, than any other one man could 
have done.”  The newspaper continued, “Being a southerner he fully understands the situation 
between the north and the south and no man, woman or child after hearing Bro. Polk talk for an 
hour, could go away with out having their hearts melted, unless sectional hate had become 
second nature by being bred and born in them.”  The Free Press contrasted Polk’s opposition to 
“sectional hate” with his kinship to other farmers and his ability to touch their “hearts.”  Through 
this juxtaposition the Alliance was portrayed as a positive and forgiving force, while those who 
opposed the farm organization stood for bitterness and hatred.  The republication of the story in 
the Dallas-based Southern Mercury served to convince readers that Midwesterners embraced 
partnership with the Southern Alliance.  Polk and other Alliance leaders chipped away at an 
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artificial barrier to collective agrarian action.  True reconciliation of the North and South 
appeared to be a reality.  The day of a truly national agrarian crusade was at hand.  Tales of 
success from the Midwest tour served to bolster the confidence of southern agrarians and build 
hope in Alliance reform efforts.40  
Readers of Polk’s Progressive Farmer found similar evidence of the decline of 
sectionalism and the success of a growing national farmers’ movement.  Kansan P.B. Maxson 
wrote the Progressive Farmer about the enthusiastic crowd of 20,000 who assembled at 
Emporia, Kansas to see “the well advertised Rebel Brigadier.”  Appearing on July 5, 1890, the 
day after the Winfield rally, Polk and Ralph Beaumont spoke to a “spellbound” audience.  
Maxson said that after the speech many in the crowd approached Polk “to press the hand of their 
Southern brother and friend of humanity.”  Maxson concluded, “Let me add there was no 
Mason’s & Dixon’s line here, and may God grant that there may never be heard more of that or 
any other line to separate the people possessed of one common interest and a common humanity.  
United we must stand if divided we must fall a prey of organized capital.”  Again, an Alliance 
newspaper in the South published statements from a midwestern writer who characterized Polk 
and the Alliance as a positive force for destroying sectionalism and promoting cordial relations 
among American farmers.41 
Southerners returned the favor by expressing their thanks for the generous treatment 
shown to Polk during his midwestern tours.  When Polk returned to North Carolina from his 
summer midwestern trip he told Alliance members that he was received well during his journey 
and found much support for the agrarian order.  After listening to Polk the Greensboro, North 
Carolina sub-Alliance passed resolutions to thank “our brethren of the North and West in their 
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efforts to eradicate sectionalism as manifested in our honorable president and reported faithfully 
and touchingly to us, and that we will join hearts and hands with them in this undertaking, and 
ask the blessing of God upon our endeavor.”  The sub-Alliance requested that copies of their 
resolutions be sent to Kansans Benjamin Clover and Alonzo Wardall.  The North Carolinians 
further asked that the resolutions “be published in all our organs in the West and Northwest.”42 
Letters from the Midwest continued to pour into the Progressive Farmer during the 
Alliance president’s tour.  After Polk visited Ohio, Alliance member John Hall also wrote to the 
Progressive Farmer.  Hall claimed that for many years he advocated “non-partisan politics” and 
“regretted the sectional animosities that have occurred on the eve of each election, promoted by 
professional politicians, who had no other interest but a selfish one to obtain office or aid others 
to do so.”  Through manipulation by these “professional politicians,” Hall argued that the nation 
suffered as Americans continued “fighting the war over and over for twenty years.”  The Ohioan 
claimed, “The farmer in particular,” now “realizes what a fool he has been.”  Nearly repeating 
Polk’s words from the Winfield, Kansas speech, Hall blamed politicians for stirring up the bitter 
emotions of a sectional and divisive past.  According to both men the majority of Americans did 
not harness such bitter feelings and they were not responsible for advocating sectionalism.  The 
Midwesterner noted specifically that farmers viewed sectionalism as an artificial barrier to 
national unity and reform.43  
Like Hall, C.W. Stevenson, wrote the Progressive Farmer in the wake of Polk’s 
appearance in his home state.  Stevenson served as lecturer for the Southern Farmers’ Alliance in 
Illinois and was a Union Army veteran.  Like Polk, he drew on his military service to attack 
those who opposed agrarian reform and reconciliation.  The Union veteran described Northern 
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sectional agitators as “some politician who was too cowardly to go down and fight you, and 
therefore have no idea of your bravery, or else they are so blinded by party that they cannot be 
honest.” Stevenson chose not to address any lingering differences between Northerners and 
Southerners leftover from the Civil War era.  The Alliance lecturer preferred to draw attention to 
the mutual courage of Confederate and Union soldiers and its role in the agrarian organization. 
Stevenson continued to use memories of the Civil War to describe his support for a 
national coalition of farmers.  Similar to General Grant, he said that Union soldiers thought that 
the Confederate cause was wrong.  Also like Grant, Stevenson respected Confederate “honesty” 
and “bravery,” despite their defeat in battle.  The Union veteran continued, “But the war is 
passed and its memories should be buried with the heroes upon both sides.  We have no North or 
South, but one common country, one common flag, and in this fight between the producers and 
the man who steals his reward from him, we have a common cause, but put them down for the 
sake of our children, and in the name of Almighty god, for the good of humanity, wipe out that 
imaginary line that politicians have tried to divide us with.”  He referred to Polk as “Bro. Polk” 
who “has touched the hand and he has touched the hearts of the great common people of the 
North and West,” which inspired similar speeches and good feelings in the regions.  Echoing 
Polk’s message of Christian forgiveness, Stevenson portrayed reconciliation as a morally just act.  
At the next national Alliance meeting Stevenson wanted agrarians to “form a soldiers’ 
Alliance, composed of the blue and the gray.”  “Let us clasp hands;” he urged, “let us dig a grave 
across the Mason and Dixon line.  In the grave let us put the bloody shirt with all its bitter 
remembrances; let us bury that shirt and its bitterness deep from human eyes and damned be the 
man that ever resurrects it to divide the people of this government.”  Like Polk, Stevenson 
wanted to bury sectionalism forever and forget the resentments of the past.  Echoing the Alliance 
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leader, Stevenson harshly condemned politicians who used memories of sectionalism for 
political gain and he strongly ridiculed sectional agitators as cowards.  The Union veteran told 
veterans to ignore sectional pleas from “the cowardly curs, both North and South, who got under 
the bed, lurked on the river or conveniently got into the hospital or run a suttlers’ camp or stayed 
at home and robbed our wives and children.”  He challenged the masculinity and bravery of 
these cowards who not only avoided the battlefield, but also stole from women and children who 
lacked patriarchal protection.  
Unlike sectional cowards, Stevenson asserted that most Northerners stood ready to 
cooperate with Southerners to address current economic and political problems.  The Illinoisan 
claimed to be “pretty well acquainted with the sentiment of the working people of the North,” 
and said that any man or newspaper that claimed that the North was still bitter about the Civil 
War was a “liar.”  He urged farmers, “Let us refuse to vote for any man who attempts to make a 
campaign on the bitterness of the past or calls up the memories that we wish to bury.”  Stevenson 
concluded with a note of reconciliation, “We are brothers of the same household; we may 
disagree and even fight, but that is no reason we should always be divided.”  Again, a supporter 
of the Alliance used rural Christian language to promote a brotherhood of farmers.  The Union 
veteran suggested that it was natural for farmers to unite and overcome past “household” 
squabbles.  After reconciling, American farmers could collectively confront the issues of the 
present.44 
Although Polk, Hall, and Stevenson clearly found sectional agitators to be repulsive, the 
three Alliancemen stressed the importance of the common people.  As Hall argued, “Take the 
farmer out of our social and economic affairs and this country wouldn’t be ‘worth a shuck.’  
                                                
44 Progressive Farmer, August 12, 1890. 
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When he is counted out the country is gone.”  Hall claimed that farmers historically served to 
create order in all societies stating, “When the well to do, independent, educated, industrious 
farmer becomes a renter, a tenant and a serf, then we may look for the vandals.”  The Ohioan 
relied on Jeffersonian and Lockean notions of property as a guarantor of liberty and freedom.  He 
associated the loss of farm property with an erosion of independence and the ascent of thieves.  
The identification of farmers with essential American values of independence, education, and 
hard work led Hall to the conclusion that farmers stood as the guardians of liberty, justice, and 
the true American way of life.  Agrarians formed the backbone of the nation and their decline 
meant the downfall of America.45  
Besides their role as producers, Alliance supporters admired the unity that the 
organization inspired in its members.  Frequently agrarian reformers expressed this approval in 
masculine military language.  Stevenson wrote about the need to create a “soldiers Alliance,” 
while William Peffer spoke of  “the constant and rapid increase of recruits in the People’s army.” 
Polk told a Kansas audience “I believe that when we shall all come together, Kansas will stand in 
the front rank and will own the post of honor.”  The Southern Mercury reprinted the Alliance 
Sentinel, which celebrated the growth of the Michigan Alliance by associating it with the 
military, non-partisanship, anti-monopoly attitudes, and patriotism.  The Sentinel wrote “There is 
something magic about the touch of the Alliance, when you get into this army, now three million 
strong, you feel that you are shoulder to shoulder with the ‘patriotic liberty-loving people’ of the 
country.  A people who live above partisanship and love their country better than any political 
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party, and who would not haggle about the methods or names so long as the people are freed 
from the grasp of monopoly.”46  
J.E. Bryan, an Alliance lecturer in Arkansas, used similar language to describe the 
agrarian organization.  Referring to the 1889 national convention, Bryan reported that various 
groups came together representing a multitude of political parties, from various states of the 
Union, and “old soldiers, there from both armies of the late conflict.”  Bryan summarized the 
mission of the St. Louis meeting: “thirty-five States respond to the call, and are ranged in line 
against sectionalism and favoritism in our government.”  He emphasized the dual mission of the 
Alliance.  Sectionalism and the influence of large businesses perverted the federal government 
and prevented it from serving the needs of the majority of Americans.  The lecturer concluded 
that the gathering of groups at St. Louis showed that “partisanism was sunk in patriotism.”  
Bryan appealed to the Alliance narrative that characterized the farmers’ organization as a true 
protector of the people in the face of selfish minority with exorbitant control over the country.47  
The use of military terminology reinforced the image of the Alliance as a patriotic, 
courageous, and honorable organization devoted to an active defense of righteous morals. 
Memories of combat celebrated the bravery of veterans and provided Alliance supporters with a 
model for proper behavior and conduct.  Military combat served as a useful way to express the 
extraordinary acts of courage needed to solve the ills of the country.  Using military language 
also appealed to the masculinity of potential Alliancemen by calling for a vigorous defense of 
farmers and their families.  The Alliance suggested that true men fought to correct wrongs and 
recognized bravery in others.  Since a rejection of sectionalism and reconciliation stood as 
primary Alliance goals, references to the shared experience of soldiers helped create bonds 
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47 J.E. Bryan, The Farmers’ Alliance: Its Origin, Progress and Purposes (Fayetteville, AR: 1891), 31-32. 
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between Civil War veterans.  Because the agrarian group wanted to unite American farmers from 
different regions and heal the divisive wounds of the Civil War, Alliance members avoided 
discussing the causes of the war and instead emphasized the common bravery Confederate and 
Union troops.   
Polk took time to reflect on his positive reception in the Midwest.  The Colonel wrote 
The National Economist to share “One thing I note with great pleasure, any and all expressions 
from me against sectionalism are hailed with genuine and enthusiastic approval.”  On another 
occasion Polk summarized his trip through Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, and Ohio.  He wrote the 
Progressive Farmer to tell readers that “The masses of the people are rebelling against boss rule 
and the fight there, as in localities South, is between the people who make and constitute the 
parties and the leaders who have hitherto ruled the parties.”  The farmer advocate further 
exclaimed that “The members of our order in the great West feel deeply the absolute necessity of 
locking hands with the people of the South in this effort to break the shackles of corrupt money 
power and henceforth the ‘bloody shirt’ will be powerless in arraying them on sectional lines.  
They sincerely and honestly desire unity and fraternity between the people of the sections.  This 
is the first and grand work to be accomplished through this great organization.”  Clearly Polk 
placed great emphasis on reconciliation and he believed that it was truly happening among 
American farmers. 48   
The agrarian leader also drew attention to the resumption of a cross-regional alliance.  
Kansas, Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio contributed troops to the Union, yet Polk referred to the 
states as “the great West” rather than the North.  He noted the presence of the “bloody shirt” in 
these states, but identified the embrace of reconciliation as well.  Like other Alliance advocates, 
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Polk used the North-South relationship to describe past sectional differences and the need for 
reconciliation in the 1890s.  Alliance leaders used the West-South relationship to address a 
coalition of the 1890s, particularly the unification of the producing class.  References to West-
South unity were not usually pared with discussions of the divisive sectional past, nor, 
specifically, the Civil War.49  
The experiences of Alliancemen during the Polk tours of 1890 show that while the 
agrarian group mainly promoted economic and political reforms, the organization also stressed 
that true change could only take place if the producing classes of the United States unified.  
Lingering memories of the Civil War still divided producers and the rest of the nation.  Through 
the promotion of reconciliation in newspaper articles, speeches, and personal interactions, 
Alliance leaders like Polk hoped to serve as models of progress and healing.  The consistent 
publication of messages of reconciliation in speeches and newspaper articles shows that the 
Alliance wanted these tales to be read by farmers across the nation.  Newspapers in the Midwest 
and South printed reconciliation stories to reassure readers that regional differences did not 
matter while railroads, banks, and speculators exploited the producers of wealth.  Alliance 
leaders and members wanted to convince their audiences that friendship and national bonds 
could and did exist between the North, South, and West.  The Civil War was over and a new war 
had begun.  As Polk explained to the Winfield crowd, it was “A revolution of honest, earnest 
thought.  And it will go forward until it shall accomplish the glorious mission for which it is 
inaugurated.”  In the years ahead the Alliance worked hard to build upon the momentum created 
by lecturers like Polk.  During the next two years, the Southern Alliance relied on its newspapers 
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and a steady wave of speakers to spread a message of economic reform, sectional reconciliation, 
and American identity throughout country.  A promising and bumpy road lay ahead.50  
                                                
50 Winfield (KS) Courier, July 10, 1890. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
“PATRIOTIC DEVOTION” OR “SECTIONAL BITTERNESS”: RECONCILIATION, 
PRODUCERISM, AND POLITICS 
 
 
During the year between the Alliance conventions in St. Louis and Ocala, Florida the 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance accelerated its influence and asserted its newfound strength as a 
national reform organization.1  The organization lobbied U.S. Congress to pass a subtreasury bill 
and the Alliance supported successful candidates throughout the South and Kansas during the 
1890 elections.  When delegates arrived at the Ocala convention a month after the elections, 
Floridian William Rogers welcomed them and reflected on the successes of the previous year.  
Rogers told the assembly “‘The Alliance has revolutionized American politics and filled the 
bloody chasm.  Let the solid west lead off, and the south in solid phalanx will join with it, to 
tame and chain the lion of the east.’”2  
Rogers’s quote demonstrates that Kansans joined Charles Macune, Leonidas Polk, and 
other Southern Alliance leaders in assertive action to spread the agrarian movement.  Kansans 
took the first steps toward forming a political party that encompassed Southern Alliance 
demands.  When Sunflower state residents gathered in June 1890 to form the People’s Party at 
Topeka, they transformed the agrarian cause.  A nominally political farmers’ crusade now 
directly entered the electoral process and threatened the power of the two major political parties 
of the country.  Previously the Alliance seized the offensive by criticizing politics and 
                                                
1 The title of the chapter comes from the Kansas Farmer, August 27, 1890 and the National Economist, March 14, 
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2 Southern Alliance Farmer, December 9, 1890.  
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exploitative economic practices.  The introduction of a third party that espoused Alliance reforms 
put the farmers’ movement on the defensive and required Northerners and Southerners to support 
their policies and their group from a rising number of Republican and Democratic attacks.  
Amidst these attacks, the national agrarian campaign maintained solidarity in 1890 by promoting 
sectional reconciliation and producer class identity.  
Critics of the Alliance multiplied after Kansans started a new political party.  Prior to 
widespread southern support for a third party, Kansas farmers initiated the People’s Party 
because they confronted different circumstances from those found in the South.  First, the quick 
pace of agrarian indebtedness brought a unique intensity to the Kansas Alliance.  Whereas 
Southerners experienced mounting debt over two decades, an agricultural depression hit Kansans 
over the course of two growing seasons.  When wheat and corn crops failed in the harsh winters 
of 1887 and 1888, many mortgages proved unbearable.  Central Kansas, from Chautauqua to 
Comanche and from Marshall to Phillips counties, felt the worst of the agrarian collapse.  The 
western third of Kansas also suffered, although the region had the lowest population density and 
worst soil for profitable agriculture.  Eastern Kansas felt the effects of the agricultural depression 
least.  Political power and Republican Party strength were also highest in the eastern region of 
the state.  Additionally most prominent Republican leaders usually participated in non-
agricultural business enterprises in eastern Kansas, rather than farming.  As a result, the extreme 
southeast, central and western Kansas became the site of most Alliance growth in the state.  Calls 
for reform came loudest and most frequently from central and western Kansas.  Alternatively, the 
Republican Party, based away from the worst of the agricultural depression, was very slow to 
listen to Alliance calls for reform.  The apathetic response of the dominant political party in 
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Kansas to Alliance demands formed a second major difference between Kansas and southern 
states.3   
 A third difference between agrarians in the South and in Kansas was the near absence of 
farmers’ cooperatives in Kansas and the quick turn to political action.  Unlike Alliances in 
southern states, the organization grew so quickly in Kansas that members did not have time to 
establish farmers’ cooperatives as the focal point of the association.  In the absence of 
cooperatives and because of the more immediate intensity of agricultural ruin, politics became an 
early focus of the Alliance.  Prior to similar action by Southerners the Kansas Alliance issued a 
statement in November 1889 that all sub-Alliances should write and urge their congressmen to 
endorse Alliance reforms including the replacement of the national banking system with treasury 
notes, a graduated income tax, the use of private voting ballots, no alien land ownership, and 
government ownership of transportation and communication.  The political history of Alliance 
leaders partially explained the vigorous communication with elected officials in Kansas 
Alliance.4   
A fourth distinction from southern states was the presence of many third-party veterans in 
leadership positions of the Southern Alliance in Kansas.  Henry Vincent, Dr. Stephen McLallin, 
John Davis, Percy Daniels, John Willits, and John Grant Otis had supported Greenback and 
Union Labor Party efforts in the 1870s and 1880s.  Earlier than their southern brethren in the 
Alliance, these third party men spoke openly about breaking from the Republican and 
Democratic parties in order to enact reforms.  Because they had already left the dominant 
                                                
3 O. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1969), 21, 28-29. 
4 Ibid., 54.  On the role of cooperatives see Robert C. McMath, Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern 
Farmers’ Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975). 
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political party of their region, McLallin, Davis, and Otis were less concerned with the 
consequences of supporting a third party in opposition to the party of their fathers.5  
A series of mergers in 1889 bolstered the confidence of the Kansas movement.  The state 
Northern Alliance merged with the state Southern Alliance in August.  At the December meeting 
in St. Louis the state Alliances of Kansas, South Dakota, and North Dakota formally left the 
Northern Alliance for the Southern Alliance.  In another indication of Alliance growth, the 
Knights of Labor, Colored Farmers’ Alliance, and Northern Alliance issued proclamations of 
their cooperation with the Southern Alliance.  Convinced that agrarian and industrial 
organizations stood united in pursuit of economic and political reform, Kansans continued their 
organized action.   
In 1890 the disproportionate effects of the drought, a detached dominant political party, 
the rapid increase of Alliance activity, and the momentum produced by the St. Louis principles 
combined to create a political crisis in Kansas.  Responding to sub-Alliance letters calling for the 
endorsement of the St. Louis principles, most Kansas congressmen wrote back with vague 
answers or stated that they could not support the reforms.  Only Senator Preston B. Plumb 
answered requests in the affirmative.  Senator John Ingalls, in contrast, was the lone 
congressman who failed to respond to Alliance inquiries.   
Known as an acerbic politician, Senator Ingalls made many enemies throughout his 
eighteen years in Washington as a senator.  Opponents claimed that his election in 1873 and 
reelection in 1879 occurred through bribery.  Hearings in the Kansas legislature and U.S. Senate 
eventually cleared his name during the 1879 investigation, but Ingalls made strong statements 
against his foes during and after the investigation.  Besides antagonizing his enemies within the 
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Kansas Republican Party, Ingalls also lauded partisanship stating that everyone should be, “a 
partisan,” in all aspects of life, “partisan in religion, morals, education as well as politics.”  In 
contrast to the Alliance, he called the non-partisan “a hypocritical, sanctimonious, canting 
parasite.”6  
Ingalls put his support of partisanship into frequent practice by habitually attacking the 
Democratic Party as the party of the Confederacy.  He considered most Democrats to have 
suspect morals and loyalty to the Union.  Ingalls served as a commissioned colonel in Kansas 
and Missouri during the last year of the war.  Afterwards the Senator vigorously supported the 
Grand Army of the Republic and Union veteran pensions.  He claimed that those who opposed 
raising veterans’ benefits possessed an unhealthy devotion to the South and the Confederacy.  
Generally, these antagonistic characteristics ran counter to the rhetoric of the Southern Alliance.  
The differences between the agrarian group and the Senator were amplified when Ingalls 
responded to Peffer’s letter by stating that his response would arrive in “a few weeks.”  Ingalls 
added that his reply would not appear in the editor’s newspaper, the Kansas Farmer.  Peffer 
published both letters in the Farmer on February 26.  Through his actions Senator Ingalls added 
to his reputation as a cold public persona who generally opposed reform measures.7   
In the wake of the latest callous Ingalls remark, the county presidents of the Kansas 
Southern Alliance met on March 25, 1890 to discuss forming a third party.  The group also 
pledged to oppose Ingalls’ reelection and support unity between farmers and industrial workers’ 
unions.  Over the next two months plans proceeded and state Alliance president Ben Clover 
called for a convention in June with politics as its object.  Following the March meeting, the 
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Republican press in Kansas responded with additional indications that the party did not 
sympathize with agrarian complaints nor did they see the farmers’ movement as a serious 
political threat.  One G.O.P. editor set the tone by warning “the Alliance that no attack upon the 
policy of the Republican party will be tolerated.”  Despite maintaining his resistance to third-
party activity and his support for the G.O.P., William Peffer could not help but respond with 
irritation.  Peffer wrote that “this movement has grown so great that it cannot be checked by 
rehearsing patriotic memories, reviving buried prejudices, or appealing to old party 
associations.”  He concluded, “Nothing can save the parties and party leaders but prompt and 
earnest response to the popular will.”  At this juncture Peffer still thought that reform could take 
place within the Republican Party.  Clearly he objected to continued Republican resistance to 
agrarian reforms and their reliance on the work of the party in the fight to save the Union and 
defeat the Confederacy.  Like Alliance leaders, Peffer depicted the needs of the present as more 
important than the sectional loyalties forged during the Civil War.8 
Over two months after Peffer asked Senator Ingalls to state his position on Alliance 
principles, the latter had not responded.  Ingalls, however, took the time to be interviewed by the 
New York World.  The Senator set off a storm of criticism and added fuel to the Kansas third-
party movement with his comments.  When asked if “political ends justify the means,” Ingalls 
replied by calling morally clean politics an “iridescent dream.”  He further compared politics to 
warfare saying, “the republicans and democrats are as irreconcilably opposed to each other as 
were Grant and Lee in the Wilderness.”  He concluded, “The commander who lost a battle 
through the activity of his moral nature would be the derision and jest of history.  This modern 
cant about the corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme.”  Amidst an agricultural 
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depression, mounting public frustration, and during the last year of his senate term, these 
comments proved very insensitive and politically unwise.9 
Although the Republican Party held the vast majority of state and local offices and 
despite the Party’s pledge to support reform efforts in its 1888 platform, little improved for 
Kansans by 1890.  Ingalls’ comments turned an unresponsive Republican Party into an arrogant 
and callous representative of a people in need.  The Senator’s statement fit directly into Peffer’s 
criticism of Republican editors.  Ingalls emphasized sectional divisions, equated each major 
party with the armies of the Confederacy and Union, and promoted allegiance to a Civil War-era 
identity above increasing cries for reform.  He explicitly dismissed the very objects of many 
Southern Alliance speeches, editorials, and actions.  Ingalls ridiculed sectional reconciliation, 
non-partisanship, moral politics, and the pleas of his constituents.  
Unsurprisingly agrarian reformers reacted negatively to the Senator’s words.  Clover, a 
longtime critic, admitted that Ingalls possessed great “Democratic skinner” credentials.  The 
Alliance leader claimed that Kansas farmers also knew that “‘brigadier’ skins are the thinnest 
clothing a shivering family was ever wrapped up in.”  Other agrarian leaders expressed their 
disgust with Ingalls.  In late April and mid-May Peffer announced that he would not support 
Ingalls’ reelection.  The editor favored Alliance candidates over the Republican Party.  Peffer’s 
announcement carried significance because previously he suggested that voters should have 
patience with the Grand Old Party.  Unlike many Kansas Alliance leaders Peffer supported 
Republican candidates throughout the 1870s and 1880s.  As late as the summer of 1889 he stated 
that improvements could be enacted “without any breaking of old party lines,” and encouraged 
reformers to take their demands to political conventions.  In late April 1890 his patience with the 
                                                
9 New York World, April 13, 1890 in Clanton, Kansas Populism, 56-57. 
 135 
GOP reached its limit.  For third party supporters the news was encouraging.  Any hope for a 
successful challenge to Republican supremacy in Kansas depended on gaining additional 
defections from the dominant party.  As a lifelong GOP advocate, a Union veteran, and a very 
influential farm spokesman, Peffer’s departure demonstrated that other Kansas Republicans 
should leave the corrupted party in the name of justice, honesty, and the majority of citizens.  As 
he stated in an editorial, “Nothing short of a rebellion of the people will regain the power they 
have lost and restore justice in public administration.”10 
 Farmer allies in the South joined Kansans in a chorus critical of Ingalls.  Applauding the 
Kansas Alliance for opposing the Senator’s reelection by using the “Alliance yard stick,” The 
National Economist claimed that the “Alliance men of Kansas fulfill a God given duty to 
themselves and their country when they use it, and they will stand by their verdict, no matter to 
what political party each may belong.”  The newspaper viewed the Alliance stance as a sign that 
“sectional hate” had steadily lost ground since the Civil War.  An Economist editorial described 
Ingalls as a true example of “professional politicians, thieves, and speculators who desired class 
legislation” and the promotion of the “DOCTRINE OF SECTIONAL HATE,” which created “a 
solid North and a solid South.”  The Economist concluded, “look out, gentlemen politicians who 
depend on the doctrine of hate to fan the flames of sectionalism and prejudice.”  Farmers now 
wore “Alliance spectacles” and traveled with “the Alliance yard stick in his hand.”  In the 
months ahead, Ingalls received ample attention from Alliance leaders in Kansas and in the South.  
Through speeches and newspaper articles Alliance supporters denounced the Senator as the 
                                                
10 Kansas Farmer, June 6, 1889 (first quote); Clanton, Kansas Populism, 57-58; Kansas Farmer, June 4, 1890 in 
Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 32 (second quote); Kansas Farmer, June 25, 1890 in Argersinger, Populism and 
Politics, 35 (third quote). As Clanton notes Clover spoke from personal experience.  The Cowley County, Kansas 
farmer held an $18,000 mortgage and owed $1,800 in interest. 
 136 
prototypical “professional” politician who promoted sectionalism and consciously ignored the 
economic struggles of American producers.11 
 On June 12, 1890, third party supporters met in Topeka.  Present were twenty-eight 
members of the Knights of Labor, four Single Tax Club members, ten from the Farmers’ Mutual 
Benefit Association, seven Patrons of Husbandry (Grange), and forty-one Alliancemen.  The 
ninety delegates present voted unanimously to nominate a full slate of state candidates for the 
November elections.  Delegates chose the name People’s Party to represent the group.  On 
August 13, 1890, the first People’s Party convention chose candidates for the upcoming election. 
The nominees included Benjamin F. Foster, an African-American minister from Topeka, and 
Fanny McCormick of Barton County.  Foster and McCormick were selected for state auditor and 
state superintendent of public instruction, respectively.12  Foster was a former Republican who 
helped rally African Americans from Equality Political Leagues and the Negro Independents and 
Democrats of Kansas to form the Negro Populist League.  The pastor toured Kansas during 1890 
on behalf of the Populists who rewarded him with the nomination for state auditor.  Born into 
slavery in 1856, he attended Trinity School and Emerson Institute in Alabama, and achieved a 
degree from Chicago Theological Seminary.  In the late 1880s and 1890s he served as minister 
of the Lincoln Street Congregational Church.13  
Although the Alliance dominated the convention, members of the State Citizens’ Alliance 
also contributed mightily.  The new association’s secretary, William Franklin Rightmire, 
received the People’s Party nomination for Supreme Court chief justice.  Since the Southern 
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Alliance barred non-farmers from membership, the State Citizens’ Alliance formed in 1890 to 
organize urban reformers.  Started in Olathe, Kansas, the Citizens’ Alliance helped the budding 
People’s Party broaden recruitment efforts and increase the party throughout state.  The 
convention also pledged to look at current and future issues, declaring, “Old issues are dead.”  
Principles from the St. Louis 1889 Southern Alliance convention formed the basis of the party 
platform.  Some of the policies included the free coinage of silver, restrictions on railroad rates, 
the abolition of national banks, and government ownership of the means of transportation and 
communication.  Throughout the Sunflower state, citizens took to singing “Goodbye, My Party, 
Goodbye” as the farmers’ movement pulled supporters from the Democratic, Republican, and 
Union Labor parties.14  
Despite momentum the fledgling People’s Party had to confront the deeply entrenched 
power of the Republican Party.  The days of Bleeding Kansas had forged the state’s identity 
when slavery advocates and opponents engaged in brutal acts of violence to determine the fate of 
the newly formed territory.  When anti-slavery supporters triumphed, opposition to slavery, 
notions of freedom, and the Republican Party intertwined to create an identity for the state.  In 
the decades after Bleeding Kansas and the Civil War, Union veteran status became an unofficial 
requirement for access to political office.15  
Bolstering the importance of Union veterans was the resurgence of the Grand Army of 
the Republic (GAR) during the 1880s.  The state GAR also reinforced the idea that Kansas 
played a special role in the Civil War.  At the 1890 encampment GAR leader Harry Booth 
encouraged further membership growth of the veterans’ association that was “founded to 
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perpetuate the memories of that great struggle, and to increase and strengthen that loyalty and 
patriotism which knows only one country and one flag.”  GAR officials identified the state as a 
place where the organization should thrive because “This great soldier state of Kansas, whose 
soil drank the first drop of blood shed for the great principle for which the late war was waged,” 
contained over one hundred thousand veterans.  Booth suggested that the Sunflower state 
possessed a unique and patriotic history because he identified Bleeding Kansas as the beginning 
of the Civil War.  The first guardians of the Union cause, Kansans chose “to defend with their 
lives, if need be, the institutions under which we lived, and to maintain the honor of the flag.”  
Like the Southern Alliance, the GAR officially maintained a non-partisan stance toward politics.  
In reality the veterans’ group heavily supported the party of the Union and Lincoln.  Amidst a 
climate where memories of the Civil War, patriotism, and the Republican Party intertwined to 
define state identity, many state residents viewed opposition to the Republican Party as a threat 
to liberty, freedom, and equality.16   
William Peffer described what happened when Kansans challenged the power of the 
Republican Party.  During the 1880s the editor noted that leaving the dominant Republicans 
would be considered “treason” and further warned of the “seclusion” of those who left the GOP.  
Peffer, a loyal Republican, wrote, “Such is the prejudice in this matter that these men are covered 
with opprobrium, and made to endure insult, suspicion, and sometimes even violence.”  Clearly 
Peffer considered political defection a delicate matter.  The Union veteran’s statements also 
show how seriously Kansans, like other Americans, considered political identity.  In the eyes of 
                                                
16 Proceedings of the Annual Encampments, Grand Army of the Republic, Department of Kansas (1884-1890), 
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Encampment: 6. 
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many Kansans, to betray the dominant Republican Party was to defy the community and to 
express loyalty to outsiders.17  
In the 1890s Kansans still considered white Southerners to be outsiders.  Despite the 
official end of Reconstruction in 1877, Kansas Republicans continued to warn the public about 
the persistence of Confederate sympathies in the South.  When the Kansas Alliance acted to form 
the People’s Party during the summer of 1890 these criticisms intensified.  Republicans argued 
that the Alliance represented a southern Democratic effort to weaken the GOP in the North and 
dismantle Republican accomplishments made since 1861.  As an outgrowth of the Alliance, the 
Populist Party represented treason and the Confederacy in headlines proclaiming, “The People’s 
Party Is the Scheme of Ex-Rebels.”  Republican papers further attacked Populists with claims 
that Alliance President Leonidas Polk “murdered in cold blood a number of [unarmed Union] 
prisoners of war.” 18  
Into the autumn these attacks continued.  The Republican Topeka Daily Capital warned 
African Americans that staunch racists Polk and Ben Tillman ran the Southern Alliance.  One 
writer in the Winfield Courier compared Polk and other visiting white Southerners to those 
Southerners who came to establish slavery in territorial Kansas.  The writer claimed, “His father 
stood shoulder to shoulder with John Brown and Jim Lane to repel the first invasion” and 
establish a “free” Kansas.  He pledged to honor his father “faithfully at the ballot box” to ward 
off the present southern threat.  Republicans also prominently featured Union veterans at rallies 
during the campaign of 1890 and received strong support from the official Grand Army of 
Republic newspaper.  Through these actions the Republican Party connected the Civil War, 
                                                
17Kansas Farmer, July 5, August 9, November 15, 1882, January 26, 1887, July 26, 1888 (Peffer quotes) in 
Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 10. 
18 Topeka Daily Capital, August 15, September 28, October 12, 18, 23, 1890 in Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 
45. 
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freedom, and nationalism to the Grand Old Party, while it described the Alliance as oppressive 
and un-American.19  
Such tactics worked in limited instances.  Some Republican members of the Shawnee 
County Farmers’ Alliance resigned from the latter organization, stating that they “would no 
longer affiliate with an organization which was officered by southern brigadiers and run in the 
interest of the Democratic party.”  Many Alliancemen, however, supported the People’s Party 
and criticized Republican rhetoric as nothing more than political posturing.20  
At other times Republican efforts to use Civil War memories on their behalf backfired.  
During a debate for the Seventh Congressional District seat for U.S. House of Representatives, 
the Republican candidate Colonel James R. Hallowell challenged the Union record of the 
Populist nominee, Jerry Simpson.  Although Simpson served in an Illinois regiment he became 
ill and did not see combat.  In their debate Hallowell stated that Simpson never smelled rebel 
gunpowder.  Simpson responded by calling Hallowell “Prince Hal” and claimed that the 
Republican wore silk slippers.  Summarizing the exchange a Republican editor countered that 
Simpson wore no socks at all.  The Populist accepted the nickname and Jerry “Sockless” 
Simpson became recognized nationally for his unusual moniker.  He also won the election over 
Hallowell.  
The story reveals several important attributes about Populism.  First, the narrative became 
important to Populism by portraying its followers as ordinary people attempting to change an 
unresponsive political system tied too strongly to wealthy corporate interests.  Republican 
Hallowell and his “silk stockings” contrasted with Simpson and other Kansas farmers who 
                                                
19 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 45; Winfield (KS) Courier, October 30, 1890; Kyle S. Sinisi, “Veterans as 
Political Activists: The Kansas Grand Army of the Republic, 1880-1893,” Kansas History (Summer 1991): 96. 
20 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, July 13, 1890 in Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 45.  For examples of Kansans 
expressing support for Polk see Progressive Farmer, August 12, 27, 1890. 
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suffered so much from the effects of economic downturn that they went “sockless.”  While 
Republicans offered no remedies to counter corporate exploitation, the Populists understood and 
proposed changes for the common good.  Second, the Simpson tale shows that Populists did not 
choose to define their masculinity solely through wartime service and military.  Like Polk’s 
Fourth of July speech in Winfield, Kansas, Simpson promoted hard work as an equally manly 
and American characteristic.  Third, the story displays how the Populists responded to Civil War 
references.  Instead of engaging Hallowell in a debate over the relation between patriotism and 
his Civil War service, Simpson chose to ignore the war and shift the debate to the present 
economic problems that touched the lives of many Kansans in 1890.  Railroads, financial 
speculators, and bankers posed a greater threat to American farmers than Southern Rebels of 
yesteryear.21  
Other Kansas Populist candidates followed a similar pattern.  In 1890 the People’s Party 
nominated John Grant Otis as the Populist candidate for the fourth Congressional District of 
Kansas.  Before the Civil War, Otis was an adamant abolitionist.  When the war began he helped 
organize the first Union African-American regiment, the First Kansas Colored.  Otis led troops in 
battles in Kansas, Indian Territory, Arkansas, and Missouri.  After the war he left the Republican 
Party in the 1870s to pursue reform through the Patrons of Husbandry (Grange), Greenback 
Party and by promoting prohibition.  Although his Union Army credentials were important in a 
state like Kansas, Otis did not rely solely on his military record to win political office.  Instead he 
promoted the importance of economic and moral issues.22  
                                                
21 Clanton, Kansas Populism, 82-87.  Simpson understood the plight of Kansans in a very personal way.  The severe 
winter of 1886-1887 killed his cattle and wiped him out financially. 
22 Ibid., 81-82; Kansas Historical Society, “African American Civil War Soldiers,” kansapedia, 
http://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/african-american-civil-war-soldiers/15122 (accessed June 18, 2013); Kansas 
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Percy Daniels was another Populist who served in the Union Army, but did not depend 
on these credentials alone.  Born in Rhode Island, Daniels joined the Union Army and served 
with the Army of the Potomac in major battles.  He thereafter was transferred to the Southwest, 
where he fought for Burnside and Sherman.  In 1864 he rejoined the Army of Potomac and 
served the rest of the war in the eastern theater.  When the war ended Sergeant Daniels had been 
promoted to Colonel.  After the war Daniels moved near Girard, Kansas where he farmed, 
surveyed land for railroads, and served as a Brigadier General in the state militia.   During the 
worsening economic crisis in Kansas the Union veteran broke with the Republican Party in a 
very public way.  Daniels wrote a letter the Girard, Kansas Press published, saying that “THE 
TIME HAS COME WHEN EVERY INSTINCT OF CHARITY, JUSTICE AND PATRIOTISM 
DEMANDS THAT THE POWER OF CAPITAL FOR WRONG AND OPPRESSION BE 
CURTAILED.”  The state Republican Party reacted unfavorably and Daniels lost the GOP 
nomination for the state senate.  In the next several years Daniels became a leader of the state 
Populist Party and won election to lieutenant governor in 1892.  He also served as the 
commander of the Kansas National Guard.23  
William Peffer combined many of the same attributes.  Born in Pennsylvania Peffer grew 
up in a family that opposed slavery and supported temperance.  Prior to the Civil War Peffer 
farmed in Indiana and Missouri.  Because of his anti-slavery beliefs, in 1861 Peffer moved his 
family to Illinois where he joined a Union regiment and served in the western theater as an 
infantryman and quartermaster.  During his spare time he continued his habit of the previous 
decade by studying law.  As the end of the war approached, he served as judge advocate of civil 
cases on a military commission in Clarksville, Tennessee.   
                                                
23 Girard (KS) Press August 1, 1888 in Clanton, Kansas Populism, 43 (quote), 42-45.  The letter was dated July 18, 
1888. 
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Peffer next established a law practice and moved his family to Clarksville.  The Union 
veteran dabbled in politics, publicly encouraged respect for the law, and promoted reconciliation 
between Tennessee’s Confederate and Union veterans.  He also maintained his support for equal 
rights when he supported African-American enfranchisement, the right to sit on juries, and the 
unbiased application of the law.  In principle he supported Congressional Radicals, but Peffer 
opposed their tone and methods.  Like Congressional Radicals, he believed that Governor 
William G. Brownlow’s Radical Republican policies promoted continued animosity rather than 
peace, reconciliation, and reunion.  Peffer initially joined the Conservative Tennessee political 
faction, but over time he became alienated from the group due to their abandonment of black 
rights and their open support for the Democratic Party.   
During the late 1860s prospects dimmed for reconciliation between whites and blacks, 
Unionists and Confederates in Tennessee.  When violence against African Americans increased 
and with the ascendance of Democrats in state government, Peffer’s consistent political beliefs 
then placed him in the Radical camp.  Former allies accused Peffer of deception and life in 
Clarksville became very unpleasant.  As he wrote a decade later, his family was treated “as 
common enemies, politically, socially, and religiously ostracized…slighted upon all occasions, 
on the streets, at the concert, at the schools, in the social circles, in the churches.”  The Peffers 
chose to leave Tennessee.24  
The Peffer family moved permanently out of the South in 1870 and into Kansas.  During 
the next two decades Peffer practiced law, served as state senator, and edited the Fredonia 
Journal, Coffeyville Journal, and Kansas Farmer.  When he broke with the Republican Party in 
April 1890 Peffer emphasized economic reforms and sectional reconciliation.  Like other 
                                                
24 Coffeyville, Kansas Journal, December 4, 1880, quoted in Peter Argersinger, “The Conservative as Radical: A 
Reconstruction Dilemma,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34 (1975): 168-87, (quote 186-87). 
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Populist candidates in Kansas, Peffer stressed the importance of current issues over any strict 
adherence to the Civil War-era Union and Republican Party.  As the nomination of Simpson, 
Otis, Daniels, and Peffer demonstrated, the third party did not ignore the significance of Union 
veteran status and former allegiance to the Republican Party within the Sunflower state.  
Populists, like Peffer, encouraged the presence of veterans and former Republicans on the party’s 
1890 ticket.  The party emphasized these facts when it promoted candidates like Simpson as “a 
good soldier; he is a practical farmer and has been a long time.” 25 
William Peffer also served as an important figure in the national agrarian movement.  
Like Leonidas Polk, Peffer demonstrated a consistent advocacy for the reconciliation of 
opposing sides, modern farm methods, and economic reform.  Similar to other Kansas Populists, 
Peffer believed that the Farmers’ Alliance promoted friendship between the North and South.  
He believed that white and black Southerners would join Kansans and other Northerners in a 
national People’s Party.  Like Polk, Peffer traveled outside of his native region to promote 
reconciliation and the national agrarian movement.    
Kansas Populists needed patient and calm leaders, like Peffer, when they tried to attract 
Southerners into a national third party during 1890.  Despite Alliance membership growth, ample 
efforts to promote reconciliation within the organization, and a growing faith among Kansans 
that a national political party would best advance Alliance ideas, most Southerners did not 
support joining a third party.  In large measure Southerners preferred to work within the two 
major parties because of recent regional history and due to the reception that white Southerners 
received from Democratic leaders.  Although Republican and Independent parties challenged its 
control since the end of Reconstruction, the Democratic Party dominated politics in most 
                                                
25 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 1-2, 37-38.  Peffer also compared the People’s Party to the early Republican 
Party, Ibid., 42; Kansas Farmer, August 6, 1890. 
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southern states.  At the end of Reconstruction Southerners tended to racially segregate 
themselves into the two major parties.  Since the Democratic Party ended Reconstruction and 
supposedly eliminated the corrupt and inept rule of white “scalawags” and “carpetbaggers” and 
“inferior” blacks, it became the party of the white Southerners.  Because Republicans supported 
the emancipation of slaves, citizenship and enfranchisement rights for ex-slaves, and acted to 
uphold these laws, the GOP became the political home for most southern African Americans.  
Like Kansans, many white and black Southerners held strong emotional attachments to their 
political party, attitudes which the Civil War and Reconstruction forged.  Although some 
Southerners rejected these party identities and embraced challenges to both major parties, 
support of a national Populist Party was not strong in 1890.26  
Unlike the Republican Party in Kansas, initially the Democratic Party generally extended 
a friendly hand to the Alliance in the South.  When southern Alliance members emerged from 
the 1889 St. Louis Alliance convention ready to apply the “Alliance yard stick” to politicians, 
most responded with support for some agrarian principles.  In Georgia, the greatly influential 
editor of the Atlanta Constitution, Henry Grady, expressed affinity for Southern Alliance goals. 
Grady invited Leonidas Polk to the 1889 Cotton Exposition in Atlanta.  Polk accepted and Grady 
paid for his rail passage along with that of Mrs. Polk, Josephus Daniels, and Mrs. Daniels.  The 
Constitution editor welcomed his guests with an elaborate celebration.  A key figure in the 
Georgia Democratic Party, Grady presided over Alliance Day at the Cotton Exposition.  Grady 
heaped praise on his guests during their visit to Atlanta.  Other prominent Democrats in the state 
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courted the organization, including John B. Gordon “the hero of Appomattox” and member of 
the Patrons of Husbandry.  Georgia Alliance president Leonidas Livingston possessed ties to 
some members of the Democratic Party.  Livingston served in both house of the state legislature 
as a Democrat from 1876-77 and 1879-83.  The relationship between the Democratic Party and 
the Farmers’ Alliance in Georgia remained cordial throughout 1890.27  
In other southern states the reception of the Alliance varied.  Reuben Kolb of Alabama 
served as Commissioner of Agriculture in 1887 as a Democrat.  While some Democrats wished 
to ignore the Alliance, Kolb embraced the group and received its support.  In Texas Stephen 
Hogg found substantial Alliance backing for his efforts to create a railroad commission.  Hogg, 
however, alienated many Alliance supporters for opposing the subtreasury and he clashed with 
many agrarians throughout his time in office.  Although his relationship was tenuous with the 
agrarian group, Benjamin “Pitchfork” Tillman courted the Alliance in South Carolina.  Tillman 
earned support from many farmers for his producerist rhetoric, opposition to the monopolistic 
control of railroad corporations, support for the establishment of an agricultural college, Clemson 
College, and his initial embrace of the subtreasury plan.  Simultaneous to the rise of the Alliance, 
Tillman staged a challenge within the Democratic Party that channeled much agrarian frustration 
with political, social, and economic conditions.  Many Alliance members in the Palmetto state, 
                                                
27 Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk: Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1949), 212; Josephus Daniels, Tar Heel Editor (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939), 
381-83; Gaines Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 
1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 11; Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists, 
19; Barton C. Shaw, The Wool-Hat Boys: Georgia’s Populist Party (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1984), 24, 30.  Grady promoted the free coinage of silver, improved agricultural practices, agricultural and economic 
diversification, and expressed concern over the concentration of wealth and power in monopolies.  In another 
similarity to the Alliance Grady encouraged sectional reconciliation between whites by praising brave Union and 
Confederate soldiers.  See Raymond B. Nixon, Henry Grady, Spokesman of the New South (New York: A.A. Knopf, 
1943), 308-310, 343.  For a less flattering view of Grady see Harold Davis, Henry Grady’s New South: Atlanta, a 
Brave and Beautiful City (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 120-23, 130-32.  
 147 
however, remained skeptical of his commitment to the agrarian orders’ principles and viewed 
Tillman as a power-hungry politician.28  
Throughout the South, many Democratic politicians pursued a similar strategy with the 
Alliance.  Most southern elected officials avoided directly embracing the full slate of agrarian 
reforms.  Gordon, Tillman, and Hogg, for example, did not support the subtreasury plan, which 
was the primary reform championed by Alliance leaders in 1890.  Due to the partial embrace of 
agrarian principles, many Alliance members were left with a tough decision.  Should they vote 
for candidates who pledged to enact some of their reforms, or should they only back a candidate 
who supported the full slate of agrarian demands?  Alliancemen considered their options 
throughout the South in 1890.   
The Alliance’s relationship with North Carolina Senator Zebulon Vance demonstrates the 
nuanced relationship between the Democratic Party and the agrarian organization in the South.  
Senator Vance was an old friend of Alliance president Leonidas Polk.  Both men belonged to the 
state Whig Party before the Civil War and Polk served under Vance in the Confederate Army.  A 
native of mountainous western North Carolina, Vance possessed a folksy charm that contributed 
to his popularity during and after the war.  As wartime governor of the state Vance was 
extremely popular because he resisted efforts by Confederate President Jefferson Davis to 
centralize power in Richmond.  Governor Vance refused to procure supplies and troops for the 
Confederacy, demanded that North Carolina troops serve only in the Tar Heel state, and he 
protected state officials from Confederate conscription.  Vance remained popular after the war.  
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Pardoned in 1876, he won election as governor in the same year.  Polk campaigned in favor of 
“Redemption” and his friend Vance.  During the Vance administration Polk worked successfully 
to establish the Department of Agriculture and he became the first Commissioner.29 
Because of his popularity in North Carolina, his general support of reform, and his 
relationship with the Alliance president, Vance sponsored a subtreasury bill in the U.S. Senate, at 
the behest of Polk and Charles Macune.  Vance obliged the request and introduced legislation in 
February 1890.  Several months later Senator Vance wrote a North Carolina Alliance member 
that he could not support the subtreasury bill.  Vance shocked many Alliancemen by publicly 
explaining his reasoning in a July 1890 open letter.  The Senator stated that he supported the 
principles behind the bill, but he doubted the constitutionality of the measure.  Macune took to 
the National Economist to denounce the Senator for lacking the “moral courage” necessary to 
push the bill against opposition in the Senate.  He also asked why Vance waited so long to 
express his opinion.  Although Polk was in Kansas, J.L. Ramsey, the editorial manager of the 
Progressive Farmer, directly questioned Vance’s explanation.  Ramsey asked what Vance found 
unconstitutional in the proposal and chastised him for failing to abide by the will of his 
constituents.   
Vance supporters in the Democratic press reacted with heavy criticism for Polk, whom 
they assumed penned the critical editorial.  Polk then defended Ramsey and provided a thorough 
account of Vance’s earlier support for the subtreasury bill, which Polk claimed the Senator 
considered flawed, though the best available relief measure for farmers.  The Alliance president 
also expressed dissatisfaction with Vance for releasing his message of opposition after Polk left 
Washington D.C.  Overall, Polk’s account conveyed a feeling of surprise at Vance’s about-face. 
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Polk also announced that the Progressive Farmer would not support a senate candidate who 
opposed the subtreasury.30 
Other Alliance members wrote Vance directly and expressed their feelings of betrayal 
with less polite words.  One writer stated, “We have followed blind folded for 25 years—now we 
propose to contend for our principals in our party, we intend to meddle awhile, let the 
consequences be as they may.”  The author concluded tartly, “Hoping that your ardent duties (as 
well as those of all the should be representatives) may soon permit all to return home on a short 
vacation (at least) and become acquainted with the people and changes, I am yours etc.”  W.A. 
Harbold, a tenant farmer from Chapanoke, expressed similar frustrations with the post-Civil War 
Democratic Party.  Harbold said, “We feel sir that we have been deceived and we have become 
dissatisfied with those who make promises only to be broken.”  Others wrote to support the 
senator.  A Tarboro man who belonged to the Alliance said, “I think you exactly right in 
opposing the Sub Treasury bill.  The Farmers doesn’t need any new laws for their relief but a 
repeal of the obnoxious laws already in force and all this we can get inside of the democratic 
party with full possession of the legislation of the Country.”31  
Throughout the summer and fall Polk and Vance supporters explained their respective 
positions as the expiration of Vance’s senate term loomed.  While his reelection was not much in 
doubt, the two sides differed on how much instruction the Senator should take from the Alliance.  
Polk and his supporters wanted Vance to pledge his support for the subtreasury bill.  Vance allies 
resented Alliance efforts to dictate the senator’s actions.  Although the two sides did not engage 
in outright public hostility, throughout the summer and fall emissaries from each camp met in 
                                                
30 Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 240-47. 
31 “Alliance” [Ridgway, North Carolina] to Zebulon Vance, July 15, 1890; Harbold to Vance, July 14, 1890; H.C. 
Bourner to Vance, July 11, 1890, all in Zebulon Vance Papers, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Southern 
Historical Collection and quoted in Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 242-43. 
 150 
private negotiations.  Ultimately, a state legislature that contained many Alliance members 
reelected Vance.  The legislature passed a resolution that required Vance to support legislation in 
accordance with Alliance principles.  Through subtle maneuverings by Alliance members in the 
North Carolina legislature, the resolution, however, failed to specify which particular reforms 
Vance must follow, leaving the senator free to interpret when legislation contained Alliance 
principles.  Polk approved of this compromise, but some Alliancemen claimed to be taken by 
surprise.32 
The relationship between the Southern Alliance and Senator Vance reveals three 
important points about the broader agrarian movement in the South.  First, not all Alliance 
members favored third party action.  Unlike Kansans, a majority of Southerners were not ready 
to abandon the dominant political party of the region in 1890.  Because of the somewhat 
favorable reception from Democrats and due to over two decades of loyalty to the two major 
political parties, third party formation gained little traction in the South.  Second, Alliancemen 
exhibited varying levels of loyalty to organizational goals.  Members disagreed over which 
improvements were most important to the agrarian group and when they should apply the 
principles.  Because many reforms lacked specificity they appealed to a wide audience.  Once the 
Alliance began the process of defining and applying its policies, the membership responded with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm.  After 1890, this process increasingly created divisions within the 
Alliance.  Third, politicians in the South and in the other parts of the country responded with a 
flexible strategy in their relations with the Alliance.  Vance, for instance, supported Alliance 
calls for silver coinage and a lowered tariff.  He did not, however, favor government ownership 
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of railroads or the subtreasury plan.  As stated above, other southern politicians followed a 
similar pattern.  Because many politicians responded by partially embracing Alliance demands, 
they effectively divided Alliancemen and left voters with a choice.  Agrarians could either vote 
for the candidate who embraced the full slate reforms or a candidate who supported a few 
Alliance policies and tended to possess broader popular appeal.  In 1890 most Alliance members 
in the South chose the latter option.33  
The divergent positions taken by members of the Southern Alliance toward the formation 
of a third party subtly but significantly affected the national agrarian cause.  While momentum 
and growth continued in the movement, external challenges to Alliance unity made it necessary 
to reaffirm the national character of the organization.  Republicans in Kansas put the farm 
association on the defensive when they ridiculed the Alliance as a Democratic and white 
southern conspiracy to weaken the Union and its faithful political party, the G.O.P.  The attacks 
questioned Southern Alliance claims of sectional reconciliation and also suggested that these 
latest southern “rebels” did not have loyalty for the people of the Sunflower state.  Kansas 
Republicans challenged the ties that linked farmers in an infant national agrarian movement. 
While the Kansas People’s Party responded in part with the nomination of several Union 
veterans for political office, the leadership of the Southern Alliance reacted with increased 
efforts to promote sectional reconciliation and trust between American producers of wealth.  
Although Alliance President Leonidas Polk left for his tour of the West and Midwest to 
encourage membership growth and enthusiasm between active Alliancemen and women, he also 
went to reinforce trust between farmers of Kansas and the South.  Polk left North Carolina at the 
end of June, almost two weeks after the establishment of the People’s Party in Topeka, Kansas.  
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As seen in the previous chapter, Polk emphasized economic policies and sectional reconciliation 
during his tour of the Midwest.  Alliance newspapers followed a similar pattern.  Reports of 
Polk’s speaking engagements appeared frequently throughout the summer and fall of 1890.  
Many letters to the editor and editorials emphasized sectional reconciliation.  The coverage of 
sectional reconciliation in agrarian newspapers served to maintain unity within the Southern 
Alliance.  Through the espousal of an identity based on producerism and a rejection of partisan 
and sectional bias, the Alliance acted to keep the organization strong and assure Kansas Populists 
that the agrarian association pursued the same goal through different methods.  
Alliance editors did not exclusively author material that advanced the cause of 
producerism and sectional reconciliation in their newspapers.  Rank and file members of the 
Southern Alliance wrote into newspapers in reaction to speeches and articles by leaders of the 
farm association.  Agrarian editors and supporters provided a recurrent theme by arguing for the 
artificiality of sectionalism and the glory of the producing classes of America.  R.W. Coleman 
wrote an article for The National Economist describing the natural cordiality of American 
producers that emerged with the removal of sectionalism.  Coleman described the Civil War as a 
time when trusted political leaders misled the people for the sake of financial profit.  He wrote 
that these Americans, “who subordinated all feelings of patriotism to a selfish greed for gain,” 
manipulated the emotions of Northerners and Southerners.  Citing the authority of the late 
President Lincoln, Coleman argued that the postwar years saw a continuation of rule by the 
gluttonous thanks to their use of sectionalism.  He continued, “They have played upon the 
prejudices of the people as predicted by President Lincoln, and thereby maintained a supremacy 
of the money power.”  Attempts to challenge this “money power” ended because “we are 
helpless so long as one particle of sectional prejudice remains in existence.  Whenever a 
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movement for the amelioration of the masses originates in either the North or South, the other 
side is always ready, with a vast deal of bloody-shirt waving, to oppose bitterly its going into 
operation.”  Here Coleman described the “bloody-shirt” as a weapon of greedy sectional 
agitators from both regions, rather than the exclusive tool of Northerners.   
In true Alliance form, Coleman offered solutions to the problems of sectionalism and 
economic exploitation.  He asserted that brave acts of forgiveness were required if average 
Americans wished to fix their economic problems.  Coleman declared, “The only hope for our 
common country is to hurl from the land the spirit of bitterness between the sections, and let 
common sense do its ‘perfect work.’  The people North and South must combine to turn on the 
sunlight of truth.  We must destroy the blind prejudice that makes us grope helplessly when, 
could we open our eyes, the way is clear.”  He argued “Our interests are identical, and we must 
join hands in a strong, fraternal grasp that will cement our brotherly relations and make it 
impossible for a rupture to ever occur again between us.”  Like Polk and other Alliance 
members, Coleman urged a manly reconciliation of Americans to overcome the false divisions of 
sectional bitterness.  He also wrote to encourage the continued national unity of the Alliance as 
Kansas Populists faced a deluge of Republican attacks questioning the motives of white 
Southerners.34  
More signs of support for the Alliance emerged from rank and file members.  In the wake 
of the midwestern speaking tour by Alliance President Polk, the Marble Alliance of North 
Carolina passed several resolutions.  The sub-Alliance responded to newspapers in the North and 
South who attacked Polk.  Declarations from the North Carolinians described these newspapers 
as “working tools of Wall street, whose corruption is as black as outer darkness.”  Marble 
                                                
34 National Economist, October 18, 1890. 
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Alliance members pledged to boycott these newspapers and keep them away from their families.  
The sub-Alliance next announced its support for Polk.  They resolved, “that Col. Polk has done 
more to harmonize the war prejudice than any man or set of men, and should be waised while 
living for his noble acts.”35  
Other agrarian newspapers joined the chorus of producerist solidarity against 
sectionalism.  In Kansas, the Topeka Advocate republished an editorial from the Progressive 
Farmer that declared the end of the “old Mason’s and Dixon’s line.  It is a thing of the past.  It is 
history.”  According to the writer “The Farmers’ Alliance is now obliterating the old line by 
giving us a new policy.”  Thanks to the Alliance a new boundary emerged running from Toledo, 
Ohio south to the Potomac River.  Northeast of the line manufacturing characterized an economy 
run by “plutocracy” and “money power.”  While the Northeast possessed half of the national 
wealth and less than third of the population, the region controlled both major political parties.  
The writer concluded by stating that “If the people are true to themselves, to their country and to 
their God, the days of the plutocracy are numbered.”36   
Some Alliance newspapers characterized the agrarian group as a blend of sectional 
reconciliation and class appeals.  The Kansas Farmer reprinted the Republican Topeka Capital, 
which asked if Kansas senators would “‘establish the supremacy of the producing region over the 
exchangers of Wall Street?’”  The Farmer concluded, “The farmers have undertaken to unite the 
South and the West and –the whole country.”  Later in the summer the newspaper continued the 
theme stating “There is no one object of the Alliance more sincerely and earnestly sought at this 
time than the nationalization of the people on a basis of patriotic devotion to the best interests of 
                                                
35 Progressive Farmer, December 23, 1890.  I have taken these quotes from the original.  The final quote above is 
likely a typographical error in the original newspaper publication.  Most likely the authors meant to write that Polk 
should be praised rather than “waised.” 
36 Topeka Advocate, July 16, 1890. 
 155 
all the people—a union of North and South in sincere fellowship.  When a Southern Alliance 
man comes North he comes with an olive branch in his hand and a message of peace and 
goodwill in his mouth.  Not a word does he utter in ill temper or in unmanly mood.  A fraternal 
spirit moves the whole body South.  It is constantly giving evidence of a sincere effort to 
obliterate all unfriendly feelings between the sections.”37  
Texans echoed these sentiments.  At the state meeting of the Southern Alliance delegates 
endorsed a resolution to “grasp with a tightened Alliance grip the hands of our Alliance brothers 
of the north and west, determined to hold together with locked shields, despite all efforts to 
arouse prejudice and sectional strife between us until the financial emancipation of the laborer 
and producer is accomplished.”  The Southern Mercury further bolstered its feelings of sectional 
reconciliation and producerism with news from the Midwest and Northeast.  Readers found 
multiple reprinted articles that announced the feverishly rapid spread of the Alliance in New 
York, Illinois, Michigan, and Illinois during 1890.38  
Several accounts of Polk’s tours of the Midwest went beyond rhetoric to show acts of 
reconciliation taking place during Alliance gatherings.  The Ohio State Journal wrote that Polk 
was a “union man up to the outbreak of the war, when he went with his native State.  He fought 
through the Shenandoah and last night locked arms and discussed incidents of the battle of 
                                                
37 Kansas Farmer, May 14 (first quote), August 27, 1890 (second quote). 
38 Southern Mercury, June 19, September 4, 1890 (quote).  Next to the June 19, 1890 articles celebrating the spread 
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movement.  Particularly with the emergence of the Populist Party, southern white men felt the pull between political 
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Winchester with those who were on the other side.”  The mini-veterans reunion demonstrated the 
national healing possible in the Alliance and the willingness of Northern and Southern farmers to 
reconcile past battles for the sake national farmer cooperation.  The Journal further emphasized 
the absence of sectionalism in the Alliance president’s heart, stating “Colonel Polk is a warm 
friend of General W.S. Jones, of Delaware, the latter having been the guest of the colonel at his 
home in the South as he was returning to the North at the conclusion of the war.”  Through this 
account Polk appeared as a consistent reconciliationist and Southerner who truly forgot the 
bitterness of the Civil War era.  In the hands of such men, the Alliance appeared to legitimately 
embrace sectional reconciliation.39  
Rank and file members also expressed their joy over acts of reconciliation during Polk’s 
tour.  Kansas Union veteran, E.P.C. Webster wrote Polk a letter that reappeared in the 
Progressive Farmer.  Webster told Polk “I shall not soon forget the greeting you and the Georgia 
delegation gave us when we reached the hall where were assembled the delegates to the State 
Alliance.  This meeting with you and the others of your party I shall cherish as among the 
happiest events of my life.”  Webster continued, “Oh how thankful I am to believe that the old 
sectional hatred that the G.O.P. would like to keep rife, is disappearing.  When I was in the army 
I used to hear the Southerners called hot blooded people.  I have found them warm hearted, as 
well.”  Webster celebrated the forgiveness of past enemies and hoped that from the acts of 
reconciliation farmers could join together and create positive economic, political, and social 
changes.  The stories of Polk and Webster encouraged midwestern and southern farmers to trust 
each other and unite under the Alliance banner.40 
                                                
39 The Ohio State Journal was reprinted in the Progressive Farmer, November 4, 1890. 
40 Progressive Farmer, December 9, 1890. 
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During this particular visit Alliancemen from Georgia and Kansas discussed one of the 
most controversial and bitterest memories of the Civil War, Andersonville prison.  The 
Confederate prison for Union captives operated from February 1864 to April 1865.  
Andersonville held over 45,000 Union inmates, 13,000 of whom died at the prison camp.  
Memoirs from former Union prisoners appeared in great numbers after the war and stimulated 
outrage in the North. Combined with the assassination of President Lincoln, the passage of Black 
Codes in southern states, and several race riots, Andersonville memoirs created public pressure 
for the prosecution of ex-Confederates.  Because of the lurid stories and visual proof of 
emaciation of Union soldiers that emerged from Andersonville, the superintendent of the prison, 
Henry Wirz, became the only Confederate soldier or government official executed after the war.  
Even with the punishment of Wirz, Andersonville remained a source of much bitterness.  David 
Blight claims that accounts by prisoners of Union and Confederate wartime camps worked 
against reconciliation for years.  Into the 1890s, the personal accounts of prison experiences 
induced animosity among the public.  Many of the most non-reconciled writers came from the 
ranks of prison narrators.41 
The grounds of the former prison became a tourist attraction during the years 
immediately following the Civil War.  In 1865, Congress made the Andersonville cemetery into 
a national cemetery.  Federal soldiers, hired workers, and a former Confederate cleaned the 
cemetery, reburied exposed corpses, and built a fence around the cemetery.  The Women’s Relief 
Corps (WRC) maintained the cemetery for several decades.  Over these same decades the prison 
grounds became useful in a variety of ways.  Local residents took apart the stockade for personal 
use.  The grounds of the prison served as the site of an African-American school, a place for 
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black church gatherings, and a cotton farm.  In 1889 the Grand Army of Republic (GAR) helped 
organize a Memorial Day commemoration on the former prison grounds.  Local newspaper 
accounts characterized the Memorial Day celebration as festive and populated by a majority 
African-American crowd.  The commemoration featured grave decorations, speeches, and a 
crowd of an estimated three thousand.  Memorial Day commemorations increased in popularity 
during the 1890s with attendance rising to 4,000 in 1890 and 10,000 in 1892.42  
GAR involvement with Andersonville began with the formation of the Georgia Division 
in 1889.  Dr. J.W. Stone and Captain I.D. Crawford helped create the post with the intention of 
raising funds for the purchase of the Andersonville prison grounds.  After its formation, 
Crawford became commander of the post.  Initially Stone and Crawford wanted to make the old 
prison into a for-profit park, but public pressure caused them to alter their plans.  The group 
decided to purchase the former prison grounds and create a public park.  Stone traveled to the 
North to raise funds to purchase the land.  In October 1890, his efforts led him to Topeka, 
Kansas in the company of two Confederate veterans, Alliance President Leonidas Polk and 
Georgia State President Leonidas Livingston, and Judge W.A. Wilson.43  
The Southern party arrived in Topeka during the Kansas State Alliance annual meeting 
and they met a group of Union veterans at the train station who escorted the guests to the 
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convention.  Annie Diggs recounted the visit in an article for the Progressive Farmer.  Diggs 
was a reform advocate and co-editor of Topeka’s The Advocate with Dr. Stephen McLallin.  
Diggs related that initially three Union veterans were to escort the Southerners, but so many 
applied for the “privilege” that eighty-two Union veterans met Polk, Livingston, Stone, and 
Wilson.  The Union veterans paid military tribute to the group, which contained two Confederate 
veterans and one Union veteran, and “marked step and kept time in the triumphal march of that 
procession.”  When the group entered the meeting hall, “cheer after cheer arose, and hand 
clasping and voices broken with emotion testified that no barrier lay between these reunited loyal 
sons of our great republic.”  An Alliance song was then sung to the tune of “Marching Through 
Georgia.”  Diggs added, “Oh! how changed the time since those far off, terrible years.  In this 
glad, new time Georgia comes marching through Kansas on a mission of peace and good will 
and right royally is the progress hailed.”44  
Each southern visitor addressed the Kansas convention.  After Stone’s address the 
Kansans raised $100 for the Georgia GAR purchase of Andersonville.  Diggs continued to 
describe positive interactions at the convention, calling it “a veritable love feast of reminiscences 
of the old sad days when the war cloud shadowed the land.  The utmost test of fellowship came 
when ‘Andersonville’ was recalled.  With bravery of another and nobler kind than ever was on a 
battlefield, these men of the North and men of the South spoke of the bitter past, and the spirit 
they displayed revealed the truth that not one little, least, last spark of sectional hate remains.  No 
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demagogue, North or South, can rekindle fierce flames in the hearts of these true patriots.”  
Diggs emphasized the discussion of Andersonville and acknowledged the emotional weight 
contained in memories of the prison.  She rejoiced at the absence of conflict and presence of 
courage when Alliancemen from the North and South discussed Andersonville.  Diggs portrayed 
the discussions as acts of reconciliation and “true” love of nation, in contrast to the continued 
sectional bitterness of the “demagogue, North and South.” 
Diggs provided further proof of the desire of farmers to reconcile and join in a strong 
national movement.  Pouring rain and muddied roads did not prevent the arrival of “several 
thousand farmers and laborers and their families” to hear Polk and Livingston speak.  Polk 
addressed the crowd without discussing “partisan politics.”  Only the “cause of the world’s 
toilers had glorious pleading.”  Diggs mentioned that some were present who tried to portray the 
Southern Alliance as an enemy to Kansans.  The journalist claimed that these men must have felt 
“inward shame” as they listened to Polk and Livingston as “these two noble specimens of 
Southern manhood uttered patriotic sentiments and breathed through all their discourse the spirit 
of reconciliation and fraternalism.  How immeasurably above the slaves to party prejudice and 
sectional hate these two patriots towered.  They maintained a dignified silence concerning the 
malicious and vindictive assaults made by the corrupt and partisan press on the very day of the 
meeting.”  Diggs compared these “patriotic sentiments and philosophies” favorably to those of 
Ingalls’ statements concerning the absurdity of the purification of politics.  As a visual reminder 
to the crowd, these quotes from the Senator lay on a banner near the speaker’s platform.  In 
contrast to the greedy and corrupt Ingalls, Polk and Livingston appeared as brave and manly 
American loyalists.45 
                                                
45 Progressive Farmer, October 28, 1890. 
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At the largest rally later that evening in Topeka, Polk followed Mary Lease on the 
speaker’s platform.  Lease gained fame throughout the United States for her speaking abilities 
made on behalf of the Alliance and Populist Party and her famous words to encourage farmers to 
“raise less corn and more hell.”  Lease moved to Kansas from Pennsylvania in 1873 and became 
one of the few female lawyers in the Sunflower state.  She abandoned the GOP in 1888 and 
campaigned for the Union-Labor Party.  Like Diggs and other women, Lease supported the 
Alliance and Populism because of its critiques of monopolies, support of temperance, and 
advocacy of female suffrage.  During 1890 she spoke frequently to crowds on behalf of the 
Populist Party, which may explain why Diggs did not report her words to the Topeka crowd.  
Whatever the case may be Lease had a personal connection to Andersonville.  As she revealed 
publicly several years later, Lease’s father died at the prison as a Union captive.  If Lease 
discussed the matter during her Topeka speech, it is hard to believe that Diggs would have 
neglected to include the comments in an article devoted to Andersonville and sectional 
reconciliation.  For reasons unknown, Lease chose not to discuss Andersonville on this day.46 
Following Lease, Polk took the podium after receiving a handshake from Benjamin F. 
Foster, the African-American Populist candidate for state auditor.  Diggs noted the significance 
of the moment writing, “‘What changes hath not time wrought.’  As these two men, one an ex-
slave, the other an ex slave owner, shook hands heartily the enthusiasm knew no bounds.  Mr. 
Foster testified to the good treatment he had always received in the South.”  Diggs depicted the 
greeting between Polk and Foster as further confirmation to the Kansas audience that white 
Southerners in the Alliance truly sought reconciliation with their Northern brethren.  She asserted 
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publicly.  Perhaps Lease sought to prevent any outpouring of bitterness that was connected to the memory given that 
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that Polk no longer viewed black Americans as slaves.  Like white Northerners, white 
Southerners now thought of African Americans as worthy of respect.  Diggs suggested that 
African Americans were welcome in the farmers’ movement as equal and valued partners.  The 
Kansas audience responded to act of racial and sectional reconciliation with great approval, as 
the journalist wrote, “the enthusiasm knew no bounds.”47   
Foster confirmed this interpretation by telling the crowd that he always received fair and 
positive treatment from white Southerners.  This act of friendship suggested to the Kansas 
audience that Republican depictions of the Southern Alliance as a neo-Confederate scheme 
carried no validity.  White Southerners, like Polk, treated African Americans with respect and 
decency.  The Republican press and Senator Ingalls made statements to the contrary to distract 
the public with negativity, sectional hatred, and lies to protect the monopolies that stole from 
hard working, true Americans.  Diggs asserted these ideas when she summarized the impact of 
the meetings.  She wrote, “Sectionalism has received its death blow.  The monster will die hard 
because it is the only hope of evil men who strive to prolong it that they may retain political 
supremacy.  The unparalleled viciousness of the present campaign is but a symptom of the 
expiration of sectionalism in politics.”  In contrast, the writer proclaimed that the agrarian 
movement would bring about “a time of prosperity, of good fellowship and growth of all things 
excellent.”  Diggs portrayed the Alliance as a vehicle for sectional reconciliation and racial 
reconciliation.  In her depiction, the agrarian movement put into action its cherished mottos, such 
as the slogan borrowed from Andrew Jackson followers, “equal rights to all, special privilege to 
none.”48 
                                                
47 Progressive Farmer, October 28, 1890. 
48 Ibid.; Robert C. McMath, American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992), 52. 
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Since she wrote for the North Carolina audience of the Progressive Farmer, Diggs also 
reassured white Southerners that most Kansans possessed trust and acceptance for their agrarian 
allies south of the Mason-Dixon.  The southern party of guests in Topeka received a warm and 
enthusiastic welcome.  Diggs hoped to return the favor of paying the South a visit.  She noted 
that the Kansas Alliance convention elected Diggs and “three old Union soldiers” delegates to 
attend the next Georgia State Alliance meeting.  Once again sectional reconciliation received 
ample attention with the Southern Alliance and its press.  Diggs and three Union veterans 
planned to prove their allegiance to reconciliation by visiting the South.  In a reversal of Polk’s 
tours of the Midwest and West, the Kansans planned to go to the South as ambassadors from the 
North.  Both visits served as a veterans’ reunion for agrarians where healing and national unity 
received ample attention.  The trips also contained the added objective of building a national 
movement for the betterment of the agrarian economy and political life in America.  Through an 
emphasis on reconciliation, members of the Alliance thought they would strength their cause for 
national reform.  During 1891 and 1892, the validity of these beliefs would be tested.49  
Although the reconciliationist feeling was prevalent in Topeka, the choice of “Marching 
Through Georgia” was an interesting tune to use for an Alliance song.  Henry Clay Work, a 
Connecticut-born abolitionist and Chicago printer, wrote the popular 1865 song, which sold half 
a million copies by 1877.  The song focused on the emancipation of slaves and defeat of the 
Confederacy during one of the most infamous examples of “total war.”  General William 
Tecumseh Sherman led Union troops on a march that left a path of destruction that crippled a 
large portion of the Confederate breadbasket and railroad corridor.  The fall of Atlanta won 
President Lincoln a second term, while the march to Savannah and the subsequent movement 
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into South Carolina and North Carolina, provided the devastation necessary to hasten the end of 
the Civil War.  Sherman made his reputation from this carefully planned military operation and 
became a national hero in the North.  Many white Southerners remembered the march with 
intense bitterness.  In the memories of these white Southerners, the march came to represent the 
brutality and dishonorable methods employed by the Union Army during the Civil War.50  
While there is no record of a negative reaction from the southern guests, Sherman’s 
March had personal meaning for at least two of the southern guests at Topeka.  Polk and 
Livingston served in the Confederate Army.  Sherman’s March also destroyed the farms of both 
men.  Livingston farmed in Newton County, Georgia, just outside of Atlanta.  Sherman’s troops 
destroyed the Polk farm when they moved north from Georgia and tore through South Carolina 
and North Carolina.  Polk’s slaves left the farm with Union troops.  Although Sherman’s March 
resulted in the destruction of their personal property, neither Polk nor Livingston left any 
evidence to suggest irritation with the hearing “Marching Through Georgia” in Topeka.  
Kansans clearly did not think that their guests would mind hearing the tune.  No evidence 
exists to show that they chose the song out of maliciousness.  More likely, the Kansas Alliance 
delegates considered the past to be dead, as Alliance leaders consistently said.  Indeed, playing 
the tune seemed to validate Alliance reconciliationist pronouncements.  Diggs’ article in the 
Progressive Farmer suggested reconciliation by contextualizing the visit and song within the 
                                                
50 Edward Caudill and Paul Ashdown. “Long Remember: Sherman on Stage and Screen, in Song and Poetry,” in 
Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory, ed., Edward Caudill and Paul Ashdown (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2008), 140-141.  White Southerners were not the only people who hated Work’s “Marching 
Through Georgia.”  Because bands and choirs performed the song at nearly all his public appearances, Sherman 
hated it as well.  During an 1890 GAR parade in Boston, 305 bands played the song as they passed the General on 
the grandstand.  One observer saw Sherman turn his head in disgust as the song began yet again.  Sherman once 
said, “If I had thought when I made that march that it would have inspired anyone to compose such a piece, I would 
have marched around the state.”  Despite his opinion, the song became popular worldwide among military bands 
that played the tune through World War II.  The song was also played at Sherman’s funeral.  See Caudill and 
Ashdown, Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory, 140 (quote in footnote); Charles Royster, The Destructive War: 
William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 364-65. 
 165 
Kansas State Alliance convention.  Immediately after chronicling the entry of the Southerners to 
the cheers and the tune of “Marching Through Georgia,” she celebrated “this glad, new time 
Georgia comes marching through Kansas on a mission of peace and good will and right royally 
is the progress hailed.”51  
Diggs’ comments suggest a second explanation for playing the song.  Adapting 
“Marching Through Georgia” for use in an Alliance song also contained military connotations.  
As addressed in the previous chapter, Alliance leaders and members viewed the agrarian order as 
a nonviolent reform army.  The farmers’ movement portrayed itself as a brave and loyal coalition 
of noble warriors bent on reducing the power of the wealthy and restoring the rule of “the 
people.”  Like Sherman’s conquering army, the Alliance sought to sweep the nation and destroy 
those who stood in opposition to pure American democracy.  Perhaps the Kansas Alliance 
members simply liked the immensely popular song.  Whatever the reasons, Kansans playing 
“Marching Through Georgia” for a white southern audience carried significance for advancing 
the reconciliation agenda of Farmers’ Alliance.  Intent on spreading the southern-based 
movement into other sections of the country, the events in Topeka contributed to evidence that 
the Alliance truly sought forgiveness between old foes for the sake of advancing better economic 
and social conditions for the American working majority.52  
Beyond the direct implications, Diggs’s account reveals more about the character of 
reconciliation in the Alliance movement in 1890.  The article highlights a rare instance when 
agrarian efforts to promote sectional reconciliation involved more than white men.  Written by a 
white woman, Diggs’ article highlighted the involvement of an African-American man in a 
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public act of sectional and racial reconciliation.  When Foster greeted Polk on stage with a 
“hearty handshake” the act served as an indication to Northerners that race relations in the South 
had improved.  Because the white South appeared to be racially reconciled to African-American 
citizenship and equality before the law, sectional reconciliation between whites of the North and 
South could take place.   
Acts of racial reconciliation and their discussion in print continued in the agrarian 
movement.  The Foster-Polk handshake set the terms and limits for future acts of interracial 
cooperation moments.  Whenever southern whites and southern blacks showed public affection 
for one another or spoke about cordial race relations in the South, they focused on positive past 
experiences, but failed to account for African-American Civil War service.  When the agrarian 
movement based sectional reconciliation on military and masculine memories of Civil War 
combat, they did not include black Americans.  This form of reconciliation, focused on 
battlefield courage, was for whites only.  Incentives existed for white Northerners and 
Southerners to avoid discussing the role of African-American combat troops.  Taught that 
African Americans were an inferior race, the specter of black Union troops produced extremely 
negative reactions for many southern whites.  Most white southerners bitterly remembered black 
soldiers during and after the war as a symbol of injustice and Northern misrule.  Since many 
white Southerners in the Alliance grew up in the presence of slaves, some may felt betrayed 
when slaves ran away during the war or left with Union troops, or were “taken” by Union troops 
never to return, as in Polk’s case.  Southern whites generally could not accept former slaves as 
social equals and, therefore, could not acknowledge black combat bravery and heroism.  
Combined with post-war economic and social struggles, many whites viewed the success of 
some African Americans as proof of further erosion of white superiority and black inferiority.     
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Whatever the particular reason, most southern white men failed to recognize African American 
combat service during the Civil War.53  
White Northerners also avoided references to African-American combat during the Civil 
War.  Even though several prominent Kansas Populists, including William Peffer and John Otis, 
supported abolitionism before the war, white Northerners ignored the topic in the interest of 
reconciling with white Southerners.  Racism also played a role.  Before and after the War of the 
Rebellion, many Northerners viewed African Americans as inferior racially, even if they 
respected the extension of civil rights to former slaves.  For the sake of the youthful national 
agrarian movement, whites from the North and South agreed to exclude African Americans from 
discussions of sectional reconciliation based on masculine battlefield bravery.  Having 
compromised on the issue of racial segregation in sub-alliances at the 1889 St. Louis convention, 
it is highly possible that white Northerners were willing to do so again on an issue so historically 
divisive.  Nor were agrarian supporters alone in the exclusion of African Americans veterans 
from Civil War commemorations and memories.  In the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century racially integrated parades and Memorial Day festivities decreased and many 
predominantly African American celebrations suffered from dwindling participation.  During the 
peak of Civil War monument construction in the 1890s and 1910s, few Union monuments 
included depictions of black soldiers.54   
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A variety of factors explain why African Americans failed to press for the recognition of 
black Civil War combat service within the framework of Alliance sectional reconciliation.  First, 
the organizations most identified with the commemoration of black military service, such as the 
GAR and its auxiliaries, possessed strong ties to the Republican Party.  As Frederick Douglass, a 
staunch Republican supporter and the major advocate for remembering black Civil War military 
service, stated, “the Republican Party is the ship, all else is the ocean.”  Many Union veterans in 
the GAR agreed.  Most all-black GAR posts existed in areas where the Republican Party fared 
well.  The confluence of GAR membership and Republican support handicapped the prevalence 
of African-American Union veterans in the Alliance.   In most southern states Democrats proved 
more sympathetic to the farmers’ association and, therefore, tainted the Alliance in the eyes of 
many African Americans.  In short, those most active in the commemoration of black military 
service tended not to be among the agrarian constituency.55  
A second reason for the absence of blacks in agrarian accounts linking battlefield courage 
and sectional reconciliation is that many African Americans who participated in the agrarian 
movement were too young to serve in Civil War combat.  Black leaders, such as John Rayner 
and Walter Patillo, did not have battlefield experiences to recall and place into the context of 
Alliance sectional reconciliation stories.  Without memories of combat, black agrarian leaders 
may have been more willing to sacrifice these references for the sake of achieving Alliance 
economic reforms.  Several scholars have shown that the Farmers’ Alliance and Populism 
attracted African Americans for reasons both ideological and practical.  Often the immediate 
needs of black Americans, such as higher prices for agricultural products, improved farm 
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techniques, and protection under the law took precedence over references to manly courage in a 
war nearly three decades past.56 
Immediate needs also served as the primary focus of women in the agrarian movement.  
The Civil War proved transformative to the lives of some Alliance spokeswomen, but for 
different reasons than their male counterparts.  Bettie Gay, a fervent Alliance member from 
Columbus, Texas, documented her struggles running a plantation during the Civil War.  
California Alliance organizer Anna Ferry Smith served as a wartime nurse in Pennsylvania.  
Civil War experiences were points of pride for Gay, Smith, and other Alliance women since the 
war “was the common point of reference for the emergence of the self-reliant woman.”  Devoted 
to the cause of female empowerment, Civil War memories served different purposes for female 
and male Alliance members.  The recollection of Civil War memories informed the goals of 
many women in the agrarian movement, which included woman’s suffrage, temperance, 
reducing female rural isolation, raising good kids, and scientific agriculture.  Unlike the veterans’ 
memories, however, the content of women’s Civil War memories rarely advanced the sectional 
reconciliation of North and South.  Agrarian female reformers worried less than male reformers 
about resolving the contested memory of the War Between the States.  Women worked more on 
building consensus to solve the social, economic, and political problems of the late nineteenth 
century.  Resolving differences over woman’s suffrage, increasing support for temperance, and 
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improving education in the home proved more important to women in the agrarian movement 
than promoting sectional reconciliation.57  
Despite the exclusion of African Americans and women, and the divergent views taken 
toward the formation of a new political party, agrarians rejoiced when Populists achieved 
victories in Kansas.  Populists won election to attorney general, five of seven congressional 
seats, and 96 of 125 places in the state legislature.  Just two years before Republicans carried 120 
of 125 seats in the legislature and won the governor’s race handily.  Although Republican 
Governor Lyman Humphrey won reelection in 1890, it was a narrow victory.  With John Ingalls’ 
up for reelection to the U.S. Senate and a Populist majority in the legislature, GOP prospects 
were further damaged.58 
The People’s Party triumphed for several reasons, including a high voter turnout.  
Populists performed well in counties where there were a high percentage of mortgaged farms.  
The party did well by ignoring controversial issues such as prohibition, which was a favorite 
issue of many Alliance women, but divisive among men.  A greater number of elected Populists 
previously belonged to the Republican Party than the Democratic or Union Labor parties.  
Dissatisfaction with the Republican Party equaled victory for the Populists in 1890.  In the years 
ahead Kansas Populists faced a difficult task in uniting its diverse coalition drawn from 
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Democrats, Union Laborites, and Republicans.  These concerns mattered little to most Populists 
in 1890 who celebrated their dramatic upset in the staunchly Republican Sunflower State.59 
Good news came from the South, too, where Alliance candidates won multiple victories.  
Candidates who supported some Alliance reforms won four races for governor, nineteen of 
twenty-seven congressional races, eight of eleven state legislatures.  Since Alliance legislators 
formed a majority, supporters hoped that eight Alliance candidates would win election to the 
U.S. Senate.  Prospects appeared bright for the agrarian movement.60  
 In Kansas and the South, Alliance members celebrated their victories.  E.P.C. Webster, a 
Union veteran in Kansas, used military language to describe the victory.  Calling Republican 
criticisms “missils,” Webster claimed, “While we have gone through a hotly-contested battle and 
won,” Populists would not rest on their victory.  The organization was “working hard all the time 
to re enforce our ranks.”  He continued, “While we vanquished the enemy and routed him, we 
are still in the field and drilling all the time so as to be ready to be called on to go and fight for 
our principles.”  The veteran explained his comments further: “I mean by fighting for our 
principles, the same kind of a fight we have just gone through, as we believe them to be true and 
consistent with the will of God and the betterment of the masses.”  Webster relied on familiar 
Alliance themes when he claimed that the movement actively defended the divinely sanctioned 
beliefs of the American majority.61  
 Another Kansan celebrated Populist success with an article titled “Sectionalism Bound to 
Go.”  The author, listed as “Blair” from Oak Valley, Kansas, stated that “The people are 
awakening to their interest; prejudice is laid on the shelf.  We will stand shoulder to shoulder and 
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keep the good work moving on.”  Blair continued the military theme by noting that Ben Clover 
spoke to a crowd with “Mr. Dunsmore and Mr. Frybus.”  The author said “The two last being old 
soldiers, they made an impression upon their comrades who still are widening the breach 
between North and South, and a blush of shame could seen on their cheeks.”  After lamenting the 
performance of Congress, Dunsmore and Frybus caused a few Republicans in the audience to 
“sneak off one by one.”  Blair ended the article asserting, “Let the good work prosper, both 
North and South.”  The article used common Alliance themes to connect the agrarian 
organization to masculine military terminology and reconciliation.  Happy with the electoral 
victories, the Progressive Farmer said, “We put down the triumph of the party in Kansas as the 
most significant political action that has occurred in the history of our country, and it was 
precipitated and inspired by the bitter sectional speech of Senator Ingalls in the Senate last 
February.”  The newspaper remarked with great satisfaction that the party “was literally a mighty 
uprising of the industrial classes to assert their man hood and they did it gloriously.”62  
The electoral victories of 1890 were cause for celebration throughout the Alliance 
organization.  In less than five years a movement of local farmers grew from small beginnings to 
elect public officials across the country to state and federal offices.  The victory in Kansas was 
the most shocking and satisfying.  A political party that encompassed Southern Alliance 
demands ousted the Republican Party where it was most synonymous with state and national 
identity.  The national agrarian crusade survived criticism and rallied members around Alliance 
reforms and an identity based on producerism and sectional reconciliation.   
Fresh from these triumphs the Alliance faced its annual national convention with great 
anticipation and confidence.  Difficult questions, however, lay ahead for the agrarian 
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organization.  United by policies, members debated whether a separate political party was 
necessary to turn Alliance reforms into law.  While southern Democrats embraced some Alliance 
reforms, the existence of the Populist Party in Kansas and its electoral successes of 1890, created 
the possibility of forming a third party in the South.  After 1890 the temptation to join Kansans, 
to prove the legitimacy of their reconciliationist rhetoric, and confirm their loyalty to all Alliance 
platforms weighed heavily on white Southerners in the Alliance.  Should the Democratic Party 
fail to enact Alliance reforms and work with members of the People’s Party, how should the 
Southern Alliance react?  If popular elected officials like Zebulon Vance opposed Alliance 
reforms, would Southern Alliance members abandon them in favor of candidate more loyal to 
the agrarian cause?  Which reforms would the Alliance compromise and which were essential to 
their support for the Democratic Party?  
Kansas Populists faced similar questions.  How long could the Populist Party wait for 
Southerners to join their political party before their reconciliationist rhetoric rang hollow?  How 
long would former Republicans remain loyal to the People’s Party in a state with a rich identity 
that combined freedom, Union, and Republicanism?  Could the Populist Party continue to win 
elections and pass laws or would it be forced to compromise with Republicans and Democrats? 
Southerners and Kansans were about to discover the limits of loyalty to Southern Alliance 
principles. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
OCALA, POLITICS, AND SECTIONALISM 
 
 
 
Fresh from the electoral victories of 1890 the Alliance faced its annual national 
convention with great anticipation and confidence.  Held in Ocala, Florida, the December 
conference tested agrarian solidarity.  Although the organization agreed on a platform, politics 
and regional distinctions created difficulties at the meeting.  Kansans and other Midwesterners 
increasingly lobbied for a national third party to enact Alliance reforms into federal law.  Most 
white Southerners preferred to use the Democratic Party to achieve agrarian goals.  Transitioning 
from a general movement for the American producer majority into an organization that criticized 
specific politicians and policies exposed differences within the Alliance.  While the political and 
regional divisions that arose during the conference did not immediately destroy the Alliance, 
they would ultimately spell trouble for the Southern Farmers’ Alliance as a national organization.  
After several years of inter-regional harmony, politics and sectionalism emerged at Ocala and 
subsequently became a major threat to the agrarian movement.  
 The 1890 national convention produced three specific issues that revealed the internal 
divisions within the Alliance.  All three matters revolved around politics, ranging from the 
election of an “Alliance” senator, to the formation of a national third party, and the Lodge 
Federal Elections Bill.  The troubles began the prior month with the November election of a U.S. 
Senator in Georgia.  Alliance supporters won the vast majority of seats in the state legislature 
during the 1890 election, and everyone expected that they would elect a Senator who advocated 
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the agrarian order’s principles.  The presence of four Senate candidates who championed the 
Farmers’ Alliance complicated the process.  In the ensuing struggle the Alliance confronted 
problems that arose when it entered the political arena and tried to implement its reforms into 
law.  
Senatorial candidates in Georgia included James K. Hines, a circuit judge and attorney 
from Atlanta, Thomas M. Norwood an Alliance member and former U.S. Senator, Nathaniel J. 
Hammond, a former congressman and Alliance foe, Patrick Calhoun, Atlanta railroad attorney, 
and Governor John B. Gordon.  When Gordon announced opposition to the subtreasury plan in 
August 1890, all of the other candidates joined the race.  Only Gordon opposed the subtreasury 
plan, which was frequently used as the Alliance “yard stick” in 1890.  Among the candidates 
Patrick Calhoun was the most curious because his dearth of governmental service.  The grandson 
of John C. Calhoun, Patrick had amassed a large fortune by the age of thirty-four by specializing 
in corporate law.  He served as attorney for the powerful Richmond and West Point Terminal 
Railway and Warehouse Company and sat on its board of directors.  The Richmond Terminal 
controlled nearly 9,000 miles of rail in the Southeast by 1890, ranking second nationally.  
Calhoun also invested in real estate, farming, railroads, manufacturing, street railways, and 
mining.1 
Calhoun received the support of two powerful Alliance leaders who promoted his 
candidacy.  Leonidas “Lon” Livingston, president of the Georgia Alliance, and Charles Macune 
encouraged Calhoun’s political ambitions by promoting the lawyer in state and national Alliance 
newspapers.  Macune used The National Economist to praise the attorney as a legitimate 
reformer with sound ideas on finance and statesmanship.  Macune also provided Calhoun with 
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opportunities to communicate his views, which included supporting railroad connections 
between the South and West, railroad regulation, denouncing the tariff as a thorn in the side of 
farmers, and portraying Republicans as the pro-tariff and pro-sectionalism party.  He praised the 
Alliance for advocating reconciliation, the subtreasury, and the free coinage of silver.  These 
articles also appeared in the Southern Alliance Farmer, an Atlanta-based paper owned in part by 
Macune.  Livingston and Macune also directly lobbied Alliance state legislators on Calhoun’s 
behalf.2  
The National Economist took a far different approach with Governor Gordon.  The 
newspaper devoted a great amount of attention to attacking Gordon during the fall of 1890.  
After Gordon criticized the Alliance and its leaders, the Economist published a speech made by 
William L. Peek who described the Governor as an enemy of farmers.  Peek warned Alliance 
members not to allow Gordon and his allies to “stampede us with the old soldier racket.  They 
are making it merchandise.”  The newspaper also published letters critical of Gordon written by 
Alliance members.  H.L. Smith of Merritt, Georgia wrote that farmers loved Gordon “for his 
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gallantry; we honor him for his record as a soldier and statesman, but while this is true, we are 
forced to believe that he has been induced by some means to throw himself between us and our 
platform of principles.”  Smith continued, “If Gordon is elected to the Senate, then the Alliance 
of Georgia has been whipped and put to shame, (unless Gordon changes his tactics.)”  Smith 
argued that “educated” and “loyal” Alliance members would not vote for Gordon.  Smith 
finished his letter by promoting Alliance reform over place of birth or past political party 
allegiance, a clear reinforcement of agrarian reconciliation and reform.3  
A. Barnwell, president of the Bibb County, Georgia Alliance wrote the Economist to 
argue that Gordon opposed the principles, leaders, publications, secretive nature, and subtreasury 
plan of the agrarian organization.  Barnwell asked why the Alliance would support such a 
candidate for political office?  He sarcastically suggested an answer, “Because he fought the 
Yankees! and is a true Democrat!”  The Alliance officer claimed that Gordon supported farmers 
in the past, but that the Governor failed to make changes demanded by farmers.  Barnwell said 
“The Georgia farmer of to-day don’t want to fight any Yankees, and in as much as he is making 
some very staunch, very true, very important Republican friends, he can stand less talk about 
party than about anything else.”  Barnwell concluded, “Now, laying all sentiment aside, Gordon 
is an enemy, and a dangerous enemy, to the Alliance, and they know it at last.”  The Alliance 
leader said that Gordon’s record made clear that “gold greatly attracts him, and in any sort of a 
scuffle between the laborer and the money power Gordon is not the sort of man to stand out for 
labor.”4  
Gordon provided the Alliance with ample reasons for distrust.  In a career that spanned 
three decades, Gordon represented the economic and political status quo in 1890 Georgia.  
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Known as the “hero of Appomattox,” Gordon led workers from his father’s north Georgia mines 
to enlist in the Confederate Army where they served under Robert E. Lee.  Gordon earned his 
nickname for leading the final charge of Lee’s army at Appomattox, Virginia.  During 
Reconstruction Gordon joined the Ku Klux Klan and helped “redeem” Georgia from Republican 
rule.  Like the Reconstruction leaders he criticized, Gordon established ties with railroad 
companies and made investments in numerous New South enterprises.  He profited handsomely 
from the railroads and mining investments and utilized extremely cheap convict labor that he 
leased from the state.  Although not as close as C. Vann Woodward suggested, Gordon formed a 
“Bourbon Triumvirate” with Joseph Brown and Alfred Colquitt.  The men exchanged positions 
as governor and senator from 1872 until 1890.  Gordon resigned from the Senate in 1880 to work 
for the state-managed Western and Atlantic Railroad.  In part, these railroad connections led 
Gordon to work with other white Southerners, including L.Q.C. Lamar, in achieving the 
Compromise of 1877, which effectively ended Reconstruction.5  
Throughout his postwar career Gordon promoted himself as a chief proponent of the Lost 
Cause.  Gordon and his ally, Atlanta Constitution editor Henry Grady, heavily emphasized the 
General’s Confederate veteran status during his successful gubernatorial campaign of 1886.  
When the United Confederate Veterans formed in 1888, Gordon became its leader.  Gordon 
promoted the Lost Cause and sectional reconciliation by appearing at Confederate soldier 
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reunions and making speeches on behalf of the New South on northern tours.  He worked with 
the GAR to fund a Confederate veterans’ home and create a Blue-Gray veterans’ association.6  
Besides his work to promote sectional reconciliation and the Lost Cause, Gordon 
possessed other qualities that made him attractive to certain elements in the farmers’ movement.  
Gordon joined the Patrons of Husbandry, or Grange, which tended to represent large and middle 
landowners in much of the South.  The Governor also favored the free coinage of silver, 
supported a low tariff, and claimed to be a friend to farmers.  When the Alliance elected two-
thirds of the state senators and three-fourths of the state representatives, Livingston and Macune 
acted to ensure Gordon’s defeat.  A caucus of Alliance legislators, however, dissolved after 
disagreement erupted over a pledge to vote against “the hero of Appomattox.”  When a group 
met again to support Calhoun over Gordon, about 53 of the 125 Alliance legislators showed up.  
Some non-Alliance members, such as Gordon adversary, Clark Howell were present.  Howell 
edited the Atlanta Constitution, supported Calhoun, and had recently been elected Speaker of the 
state House of Representatives by the “Alliance legislature.”  Although the Constitution 
supported the Alliance from its origins in Georgia, the newspaper could hardly be considered a 
supporter of all agrarian reforms, including the subtreasury.  The Georgia Senate election 
involved the Alliance in seemingly bizarre partnerships.7  
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As the above letters in The National Economist demonstrate, many Alliance members did 
not trust Gordon’s loyalty to the agrarian order.  Like Macune, Leonidas Polk viewed Gordon as 
a false representative of the Alliance.  While The Economist clearly opposed Gordon and 
supported Calhoun, Alliance President Polk endorsed Norwood.  Polk made several speeches in 
Georgia where he asked farmers to vote for a candidate who favored the subtreasury, but not one 
who served as a railroad attorney.  He also urged Alliance members of the state legislature to 
vote only for candidates who supported the full slate of Alliance reforms.  Although Polk 
probably did not know it, Norwood formerly served as attorney for several Georgia railroads and 
counsel to the Southern Pacific.  Clearly the convoluted Senate election created tough choices for 
Georgia voters, state Alliance members, and the national Alliance leadership.  The agrarian order 
did not respond with unity, nor did it emerge from the election in a healthier state.8  
When the state legislature made its decision, on November 18, 1890, Gordon emerged the 
victor.  Norwood finished second, Calhoun third, Hines fourth, and Hammond fifth.  The vote 
count revealed that the Gordon won handily, Calhoun did not come close to winning, and that the 
majority of Alliance legislators favored Gordon.  The combined total number of votes for 
Norwood, Calhoun, Hines, and Hammond did not come close to the total number cast for 
Gordon.  William Holmes concludes that Gordon won because none of the alternative candidates 
attracted Alliance members, the agrarian order represented a diverse lot of interests, and the 
appeal of Gordon as a familiar candidate who represented the state’s Confederate heritage.  
Regardless of the explanation, the Gordon victory seemed perplexing to outside observers.  The 
Farmers’ Alliance elected an official from the political establishment that the agrarian 
organization had ridiculed and pledged to change.  Electing Gordon, with his business 
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connections, promotion of his Civil War service, weak reform record, and strong ties to the 
region’s dominant political party, was in many ways the equivalent of reelecting John Ingalls 
Senator in Kansas.9  
Gordon’s election by an Alliance-dominated legislature sent shock waves throughout the 
South and Midwest.  Kansas Republicans used the results as evidence that the Alliance truly was 
a scheme of unreconstructed Rebels working through the Democratic Party.  The Republican 
Topeka Capital noted that Alliance Democrats had “forgotten” the subtreasury when they elected 
Gordon, “a Democrat, a distinguished Southerner, a gallant soldier, a loyal Confederate, a man 
whose eloquence would be a strong fortress for the solid South in Congress.”  The Capital 
appealed to the Republican Alliancemen elected to the Kansas legislature and asked them why 
they should exclude Ingalls from the Congress since the South included one of its foremost 
spokesmen.  If Ingalls lost and voters sent Gordon to the U.S. Senate, the newspaper claimed that 
Alliance would achieve a major victory by sending “the champion of the South and eulogist of 
the late Confederacy.”  The Capital called Alliance reconciliationist rhetoric a mask for its true 
purpose, “the exaltation of the insolent South and the suppression of every Northern voice brave 
enough to speak for justice and the constitution on the problem of the ballot.”  The latter claim 
referred to electoral violence and fraud in the South, and the Lodge Bill, then in consideration in 
Congress.  Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed the bill as a means to promote fair 
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role in ending Reconstruction with the Compromise of 1877.  Some Georgia state legislators may have viewed 
Gordon as a dependable and capable leader in the Senate who could help defeat the Lodge Bill in the Senate and 
protect white Southerners from this latest “invasion” of Northern (federal) authority.  The House of Representative 
narrowly passed the bill in July 1890, while the Senate voted to table to the bill in September of the same year. 
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elections in the South.  The proposed law sent federal supervisors to any congressional district 
where fifty citizens requested their presence.  Many white Southerners decried the legislation as 
a Republican scheme to control the region.  Foremost among the southern critics was John B. 
Gordon.10  
With Populists in control of the Kansas legislature and the election of a new senator yet 
to be decided, Alliance newspapers in the North and South needed to reaffirm the national 
commitment of the agrarian order.  Since Kansas Populism relied heavily on former Republicans 
for support, the People’s Party had further incentive to address charges that southern 
Alliancemen merely represented the Civil War-era Democratic Party.  Kansas Populists 
expressed disappointment with Gordon’s election in the Topeka Advocate, but they also 
published remarks from Georgia Alliance members disheartened by his victory.  The newspaper 
concluded that Georgia proved the necessity of forming a political party to directly achieve 
reform.  Because members formed the People’s Party largely in reaction to Ingalls, the Advocate 
did not expect to see Kansas mimic Georgia by sending an old guard politician to the Senate.  In 
the Kansas Farmer Peffer portrayed Gordon’s victory as a result of Alliancemen splitting their 
votes for other candidates.  Peffer called on Alliancemen to stand firm in their opposition to 
Ingalls, “like the patriot fathers of the Revolution,” since they had carefully weighed their 
options and chosen a course.  The editor claimed that “new issues” necessitated leaving the “old 
parties.”  Peffer then compared the correspondence between Gordon and the state Alliance 
newspaper of Georgia with Ingalls letters to Alliance press in Kansas.  Like Ingalls, Gordon 
expressed his opposition to some Alliance reforms, but Gordon treated the Alliance press with 
                                                
10 The Topeka Capital was reprinted in the Kansas Farmer, November 26, 1890.  For the Lodge Bill see Stanley 
Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans & the Southern Negro, 1877-1893 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1962), 202-38; Vincent P. De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question: The New 
Departure Years, 1877-1897 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 196-232.  On Gordon’s resistance to the 
Lodge Bill see Woodward, Origins of the New South, 255. 
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courtesy and respect.  Peffer concluded that this treatment earned Gordon a few Alliance votes, 
whereas Ingalls would receive none in Kansas.11  
In North Carolina, the Progressive Farmer also tried to limit the damage of the Gordon 
election.  The newspaper printed Gordon’s public thanks to all of his supporters in the Senate 
election.  An article also appeared that suggested that Alliancemen would vote only for their 
principles and not for Vance, Gordon, or Ingalls out of allegiance to political party.  Another 
republished article from the North Carolina Intelligencer claimed that Gordon and Vance 
favored the subtreasury plan and that they would work to enact Alliance reforms.  Despite their 
public opposition to the subtreasury bill before Congress, the Progressive Farmer depicted 
Vance and Gordon as supporters of the Alliance.12 
Although Alliance newspapers downplayed the negative results of Gordon’s victory, the 
Georgia Senate election continued to cause turmoil within the farmers’ organization.  In the 
weeks after the affair, parties who favored opposing candidates charged one another with various 
misdeeds, including bribery.  Because of the lingering effects from the Senate appointment, the 
agrarian order formed an investigative committee two weeks later at its annual national meeting.  
The committee consisted of one member from each state represented in the Alliance and sought 
to determine whether any member acted improperly during the campaign.  The committee 
focused on Livingston, Macune, and Polk, who publicly supported candidates in the election.  
After hearing testimony from the three men, the committee exonerated Alliance leaders, but 
chastised them for becoming too involved in the election.  
                                                
11 Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 51; Topeka Advocate, December 3, 1890; Kansas Farmer, 
November 26, 1890. 
12 Progressive Farmer, December 16, 1890.  For Vance’s opposition to the subtreasury bill and plan, see Noblin, 
Leonidas LaFayette Polk, 240-51.  For Gordon’s opposition to the bill and plan, see Shaw, Wool-hat Boys, 26, 30-
31. 
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The controversy did not end there.  A day after the committee issued its report Uriah Hall 
of Missouri demanded to speak before the convention.  As the only member of the twenty-six-
person committee who refused to sign the report, Hall wanted to explain his actions.  Hall had a 
history of criticizing Macune’s leadership, and some Macune supporters did not wish to allow 
the controversy to continue.  The convention, nonetheless, granted Hall an opportunity to speak.  
He told the convention that Macune’s testimony revealed misdeeds, including spending sixteen 
days in Atlanta lobbying for Calhoun’s election, accepting free railroad passes from Calhoun, 
and receiving a $2,000 loan from the Senate candidate without proper collateral.  Hall claimed 
that the committee overlooked these facts and unjustly exonerated Macune.  The accusation 
created a stir at the meeting that Leonidas Livingston successfully silenced during a recess in the 
proceedings.  When the convention resumed later that evening Hall agreed to cease his attack.  
Macune took the floor and explained that the loan covered costs for The National Economist, he 
possessed proper collateral, and that newspapermen frequently received railroad passes.  
Although he remained editor of the official newspaper of the Southern Alliance, Macune’s 
reputation suffered from his actions in Georgia.13 
                                                
13 Holmes, “Georgia Senatorial Election of 1890,” 217-18.  In an indication that the Georgia senatorial affair 
weakened Macune’s position, Alliancemen who favored the formation of a national third party surrounded him on 
the newly formed National Reform Press Association editorial board.  The committee was responsible for selecting 
editorials written in support of Alliance doctrine and ensuring that Southern Alliance newspapers published them.  
Other board members included Cuthbert Vincent of Kansas, William Lamb of Texas, and Ralph Beaumont of the 
Knights of Labor.  W. Scott Morgan of Arkansas won election as the secretary.  See Lawrence Goodwyn, 
Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 230-31, 643 n. 
27.  In the following year, Hall continued to attack Macune.  Hall decried the limited investigation made at Ocala, 
which relied solely on testimony from Polk, Macune, and Livingston.  The Missourian also noted that the state 
Alliance newspaper of Georgia, the Southern Alliance Farmer, dropped its support of the Olive Bill when Macune 
became part owner of the publication.  The bill prevented the state from making leases with out-of-state companies 
who engaged in monopolistic practices.  Had it passed, the Olive Bill would have prevented the Richmond Terminal 
from leasing the most important rails in Georgia.  Hall claimed that the Southern Alliance Farmer changed its 
position on the Olive Bill because of Macune’s close association with the Richmond Terminal.  William S. 
McAllister supported Hall by also attacking Macune.  McAllister, the Mississippi Alliance lecturer, published a 
private letter from John H. McDowell, Alliance president in Tennessee and a member of the Alliance investigatory 
committee at Ocala.  McDowell claimed that 10 of 26 committee members initially voted against exonerating 
Macune.  In the interest of unity, these dissenters eventually altered their stance and by a vote of 25-0 found Macune 
had committed no wrong.  Hall refused this action and was the only member to withdraw from the committee.  In a 
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Though less dramatic, the dispute continued in other forms at the Ocala meeting.  In a 
veiled attack on Macune, Calhoun, and Livingston, Polk criticized the influence of railroad 
corporations in state legislatures.  He thought that railroads used their influence to control 
legislators and dilute the regulatory might of railroad commissions.  The Alliance president 
endorsed the Alliance’s St. Louis platform of government ownership of railroads as a more 
effective remedy.  Livingston responded by supporting government ownership only if state and 
federal regulatory commissions failed.  When delegates voted on the Ocala platform at the end of 
the convention, they altered the official Alliance stance and advocated Livingston’s stance of 
railroad commissions.14 
Besides the Georgia Senate election and railroad policy, a second issue divided the 
Alliance at its Ocala meeting.  Emboldened by their electoral success, Kansans and other 
Westerners hoped to use the convention as a launching pad for a national third party.  Westerners 
called for a conference to be held in early 1891 where delegates would form a national party.  
Colored Alliance Superintendent Richard Humphrey joined with Westerners by endorsing 
independent political action.  Fresh from electing Alliance candidates to state offices, most white 
Southerners resisted these efforts.  The southern group included the majority of the delegates and 
leaders such as Polk and Macune.  In the end, the Alliance decided to postpone consideration of 
                                                                                                                                                       
letter to Alliance members in the August 15, 1891, The National Economist, McDowell criticized McAllister for 
publishing the private letter.  McDowell also stated that he was suspicious of Macune at Ocala.  Since corresponding 
with other Alliance members, the Tennessean claimed he was convinced that Macune acted in the best interest of the 
agrarian association.  See Holmes “Georgia Senatorial Election of 1890.” 
14 Holmes, “Georgia Senatorial Election of 1890,” 218.  By July 1891 Calhoun earned the ire of many Georgia 
Alliance members when he allegedly arranged a deal that gave the Richmond Terminal a monopoly of the most 
important rail lines in Georgia.  When the Richmond Terminal subsequently found itself overextended, the company 
increased freight rates creating devastation for Georgia vegetable and melon growers.  The popular outcry led to 
proposals in the state legislature to cancel railroad leases and to prohibit manipulating railroad stock prices.  
Calhoun and other railroad lobbyists led a successful campaign to squash the railroad bills.  See Shaw, Wool-Hat 
Boys, 31-32. 
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forming a national political party until February 1892, but it agreed to immediately launch a 
political education campaign.15  
Led by Kansans, the Western group pledged to proceed with plans to hold its conference.  
Several Kansans made conciliatory statements to show that they were willing to wait on the 
South to join them in the future.  Alliance Vice President and Kansas leader, Ben Clover, told the 
Southern Alliance Farmer that his state favored a third party.  Clover allowed other states to 
determine their political fate when he explained, “If you can manage without a third party in 
other states, it is all right with them, but on financial matters we must be together.”  Other 
Kansans expressed similar patience with the South.  The Southern Alliance Farmer reported that 
John F. Willits, a potential senatorial candidate, “emphasized the declaration that the war was 
over, and sectionalism is buried, but did not in so many words, urge the formation of a new 
party.”  Although delegates did not intensely debate the subject of starting a national political 
party, it was another example of sectional differences within the agrarian movement.  The topic 
did not go away and it only increased in significance over the next year.16 
Debate of the Lodge Federal Elections Bill became a third divisive issue within the 
Alliance convention.  Mississippi delegate William S. McAllister initiated a motion to officially 
condemn the Lodge Bill.  Like Uriah Hall, McAllister did not hold typical Alliance opinions.  
McAllister opposed the subtreasury program, a third party, and the leadership of Charles 
Macune. Alonzo Wardall of South Dakota asked the convention to delete from convention 
records any reference condemning the Lodge bill.  Wardall, a Union veteran, had a history of 
organizing farmers, was a member of the Knights of Labor, and he orchestrated one of the most 
                                                
15 McMath, American Populism, 139-40; Atlanta Constitution, December 4, 1890. 
16 Southern Alliance Farmer, December 9, 1890. 
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successful Alliance cooperatives in South Dakota.  In the vote that followed, Alliance members 
reflected sectional divisions within the nation.17 
 Introduced in March 1890, the Lodge Bill represented the work of congressional 
Republicans who labored for several years on crafting a bill to eliminate fraudulent elections.  
The South was a particular focus of the bill since Congress received a high number of contested 
election complaints from the region.  After the election of Benjamin Harrison in 1888, 
Republicans felt emboldened to pass a law that supplied federal supervisors to all voter 
registration and polling places when voters requested their presence.  The proposal also gave the 
president authority to use the U.S. military to enforce the measures.  Democrats immediately 
objected to the bill.  The minority party claimed that the proposal represented an unnecessary 
federal intrusion into state affairs.  Democrats also charged that Republicans would use the bill’s 
enforcement guidelines to achieve electoral victories for their party in the South.  Opponents 
simplified their criticisms by referring to the legislation as the “Force Bill.”  During 
Reconstruction, white Southerners used the term “Force Bill” to attack the Enforcement Acts of 
1870 and 1871, which gave the federal government the right to prosecute those who infringed 
upon the free exercise of the vote and fair elections.  The intent of the Enforcement Acts was to 
protect newly given franchise rights for African-American men.  In the early 1890s Democratic 
opponents again resisted what they viewed as an infringement upon individual liberty and a 
threat to their political power.  Democrats conjured negative memories of Reconstruction-era 
“bayonet rule,” racism, and charges of partisanship and sectionalism to ridicule the Lodge Bill.18 
                                                
17 McMath, American Populism, 101-02; The National Economist Almanac, (Washington, D.C.: National Economist 
Print, 1890), 72. 
18 Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt, 202; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-
1877 (New York: Perennial Classics, 1988), 454-55.  The Lodge Bill required that federal supervisors enter an area 
when Congress received a petition from 100 citizens of a congressional district or a city of 20,000 or more, or 50 
citizens living in any section forming a part of a congressional district.  For more on the details of the bill see De 
Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question, 198-99.  Michael Perman chronicles a split within the Republican 
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After the bill narrowly passed the House on July 2, Democratic opposition to the Lodge 
Bill intensified in the South where comparisons were constantly made between the proposal and 
Reconstruction.  Southern Democratic newspapers claimed that the region made it through “one 
reconstruction,” but “It remains to be seen whether it will meekly submit to another.”  The 
Atlanta Constitution confidently reminded white Southerners of their victory over 
Reconstruction by writing, “What we did twenty years ago we can do again.”  Additional 
opposition appeared in a collection written by southern congressmen, entitled Why the Solid 
South? Or Reconstruction and Its Results.  The articles described the similarities between the 
Lodge Bill and Reconstruction and explained why white Southerners considered the previous era 
a negative and unjust time.  Chief among the objections were northern interference in the South 
and the incompetent rule of African Americans in the region.  Alliance allies Zebulon Vance and 
Ethelbert Barksdale penned essays that chronicled the horrors of Reconstruction in North 
Carolina and Mississippi respectively.  Dedicated “to the business men of the North,” Why the 
Solid South carried with it an economic threat made clear in the statements of John B. Gordon 
who advocated boycotting northern goods if the Lodge Bill passed the Senate.19  
Far from ignoring the Lodge Bill controversy, Alliance newspapers joined in the 
condemnation of the Republican proposal.  In July The National Economist cited the Lodge Bill 
as an example of politicians using “old animosities” to “array the sections against each other,” 
which resulted in their reelection and division between American producers.  The paper 
                                                                                                                                                       
Party that handicapped the passage of the Lodge Bill in Congress.  Perman and J. Morgan Kousser show how fears 
of implementing the Lodge Bill led to efforts to legally disfranchise African Americans in Mississippi, which in turn 
provided the blueprint for restricting the franchise in other southern states.  See J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of 
Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974), 20-33, 140-41; Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South 1888-1908 
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19 Jackson (MS) Clarion-Ledger, December 5, 1890; the Atlanta Constitution was quoted in the Richmond (VA) 
State, July 19, 1890.  Both newspaper quotes and the Gordon information are taken from Woodward, Origins of the 
New South, 254-55.  Hilary A. Herbert, Why the Solid South? Or, Reconstruction and Its Results (Baltimore: R.H. 
Woodward, 1890), iii.  
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associated “New England,” “the East,” “monopoly,” and “money owners” as a group arrayed 
against the “wealth producers” of the “South and West.”  Other Alliance criticisms used pro-
slavery southern antebellum arguments by emphasizing the familiarity of southern whites and 
blacks, the less than ideal nature of northern urban populations, and error of northern interference 
in southern matters.  The National Economist published a letter written by H. M. Cross of 
Newburyport, Massachusetts.  Cross wrote to his U.S. Senators whom he requested to act as 
“statesmen and patriots, and not as partisans” by rejecting the Lodge Bill.  The writer said that he 
had lived in the South where he observed great progress in race relations and economic growth 
after the withdrawal of federal troops and “carpet bag government.”  Cross also noted that 
“Business, social, political, and educational interests are now uniting the North and the South as 
never before.”  He worried that the Lodge Bill would retard the “promise of the peaceful solution 
of every race and political problem” and end “the present friendly relations and future peace and 
prosperity of both races in the South.”  Cross compared African-American enfranchisement to 
conditions in the North where “even such mixture of immoral and ignorant voters as we have in 
our greatest cities is already a source of present evil and of serious anxiety for the future.”  The 
writer then stated that “if voters of this description were five times as numerous as they are and 
could be controlled in a solid mass by unscrupulous demagogues,” this would describe the South 
made by the Lodge Bill.20  
Alliance newspapers featured interpretations of the Lodge Bill as the work of partisan 
politicians who worked in the interest of monopolies and money interests.  The Lodge Bill 
threatened to sour the “friendly relations” between southern whites and blacks and between 
Northerners and Southerners.  Ignoring contemporary turbulent race relations, voter fraud and 
                                                
20 National Economist, July 26, November 15, 1890.  In the first entry, the newspaper used another description of 
the producers of wealth to characterize inter-regional unity when it portrayed a coalition of “the farmer of the North 
and West, together with the planter of the South.” 
 190 
intimidation, and economic and political progress made during Reconstruction, Cross expressed 
standard southern Democratic views of the Lodge Bill.  It is unclear if the Alliance realized the 
contradiction between its position and Cross’s statements concerning the “progress” of the South 
since the end of Reconstruction.  Unlike Cross, the Alliance depicted the post-Reconstruction 
years as an era of decline, characterized by uneven progress, excessive greed, rampant 
corruption, and economic struggle for most Americans.  The agrarian organization was a 
movement built around the notion that the “progress” of the South and the country were not 
reaching millions of farmers and laborers and that actions were necessary to improve the lives of 
the American producing majority.  
Like the Alliance, Cross described the South as an environment of positive race relations 
and sectional reconciliation.  His letter also demonstrated to southern Alliance readers that many 
Northerners disliked the Lodge Bill.  The Cross note, therefore, reinforced the Alliance 
reconciliationist agenda.  In the judgment of agrarian leaders, their opinions were not “partisan” 
or biased, but based on sound judgment and concern for the country.  Alliance leaders suggested 
that Northerners and Southerners were mutually capable of thinking in this unbiased manner.  
Through the work of its organization, Alliance members believed that the sectional prejudices of 
the past could be eliminated and the nation could progress to a more just future.   
The National Economist demonstrated its version of reconciliation in the aftermath of the 
1890 elections.  The newspaper cited the Lodge Bill as the cause of Republican defeats and 
stated, “The war closed a long time ago, hence the old-fashioned bloody shirt campaign of 
sectional hate fails to draw the votes.”  In another column in the same edition, The Economist 
stated “Dead as any door nail.  That is, sectional hate.”  The newspaper continued its assault 
writing, “Mr. John Cabot Lodge, the scholar in politics, can now contemplate the ruin he has 
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wrought.”  Editors of The Economist concluded their gloating by noting that “The people of 
Kansas don’t seem to hate the people of North Carolina so all-fired much after all.”  Unaware 
that they could be irritating former Republicans in the Kansas Populist Party, Southerners in the 
Alliance focused their ire on the dominant political party of the North.  Southern politicians who 
represented orthodox regional beliefs, like John B. Gordon, did not receive similar criticism by 
Alliance newspapers in the South.21 
At Ocala William McAllister justified opposition to the Lodge Bill because the measure 
resurrected “the gory ghost of sectional estrangement.”   The Mississippian also said the bill 
would excessively curtail states’ rights and contradict the Alliance “holy war which we have 
declared against sectionalism.”  He further labeled the proposed law an “unpatriotic measure, 
which can result in nothing but evil to our common and beloved country.”  Reacting to 
McAllister’s proposal, Alonzo Wardall requested, “that no reference in the minutes be made to 
the resolution condemning the Lodge bill.”  In response, Uriah Hall requested Wardall’s motion 
be tabled.  The vote supported Hall and the anti-Lodge bill advocates.  A review of the vote 
shows a strong adherence to regional voting patterns.  While Texas, Alabama and half of the 
Arkansas representatives joined states north of the Mason-Dixon line, the rest of the former 
states of the Confederacy voted to table Wardall’s request.  The border states of Maryland, 
Kentucky, and Missouri joined former Confederate states in voting to table Wardall’s request.  
All of the northern states present voted against tabling Wardall’s request.22  
                                                
21 National Economist, November 8, 1890. 
22 Southern Alliance Farmer, December 9, 1890 (first quote); National Economist, December 13 (second and third 
quotes), December 20, (fourth quote) 1890.  The final vote to table the Wardall motion was 48-31 among the 
delegates, but 13-9 by the states, with the Arkansas and West Virginia delegations evenly split. Colorado was not 
present for the vote, while the Indiana group chose not to vote.  One member of the Missouri delegation voted 
against tabling Wardall’s request, while the four other members voted in favor of the motion.  Likewise, one Florida 
delegate voted against tabling Wardall’s motion, while two others voted in the affirmative.  Both Indian Territory 
votes went to the northern group.  The northern states represented in the vote included Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, 
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Northern votes supporting Wardall did not necessarily equal votes in favor of the Lodge 
Bill.  Many may have thought a condemnation outside the boundaries of the “non-political” 
Alliance, while others may have been afraid of alienating potential Alliance supporters in their 
home states.  Unlike newspapers produced for a primarily southern audience in the Alliance, 
Kansas newspapers did not publish anti-Lodge articles prior to the Ocala convention.  Since they 
relied largely on former Republicans as voters in the Populist Party, Kansas newspapers may 
have sought to avoid addressing a proposed law that had little to do with Senator Ingalls, 
agrarian debt, the price of wheat and corn, or the power of railroad corporations.  Whatever the 
exact reasoning, Kansas Alliance and Populist newspapers did not deem the Lodge Bill to be a 
partisan act of “money owners” worthy of public condemnation.  The absence of criticisms of the 
Lodge Bill in the Kansas agrarian press and the North-South vote at Ocala demonstrate that 
regional differences played a disruptive role in the Alliance and the infant Populist Party.23 
While the Lodge Bill exposed regional differences at Ocala Alliance it also demonstrated 
racial divisions within the farmers’ movement.  Following the pattern set at the St. Louis and 
Meridian conventions, the Colored Alliance held its annual national convention separately, 
though simultaneously in Ocala.  The black agrarian group received statements welcoming them 
to Ocala, had white delegations from the Northern and Southern Alliances visit their meeting, 
and returned the favor by sending committees to each of the white meetings.  Although the 
Colored Alliance reached a confederation agreement with the other Alliances, the African-
American group also expressed its autonomy when its delegates voted unanimously to support 
the Lodge Bill.  In a resolution passed December 5, two days after McAllister’s call for protest, 
                                                                                                                                                       
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.  California voted to table Wardall’s request.  The vote can be found 
in National Economist, December 20, 1890. 
23 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 227-28. 
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the Colored Alliance passed a resolution to “urge upon Congress to pass the Lodge election bill, 
and let it apply to all sections.”24  
In its original statement on the Lodge Bill the Colored Alliance openly criticized the 
Southern Alliance for condemning the Republican legislation.  According to the Mobile Daily 
Register Colored Alliance delegates did not speak in support of the Lodge Bill as much as they 
expressed disapproval of their white agrarian allies “for going out of its way to intermeddle with 
politics.”  Newspaper accounts suggest that organization members divided over support for the 
Lodge Bill.  Superintendent Humphrey stated that members felt that the bill was some twenty 
years “too late.”  Other accounts from the Atlanta Constitution claimed that Georgia and 
Alabama delegates strongly favored the proposed law.  Regardless of their lack of unanimity on 
the Lodge Bill, the farm group stood united in questioning the necessity of condemning the 
legislation.  During its first day of conference, the Colored Alliance stated that Southern 
Alliance’s “action has no reference whatever to the aims and purposes of the organization, and 
was calculated to check the growth and influence of the alliance.”25 
The existing evidence supports the conclusion of the Colored Alliance.  McAllister 
intended condemnation of the Lodge Bill to prevent the formation of a third party by dividing 
white Southerners from Kansans.  The Lodge measure was a controversial issue throughout the 
nation.  White Southerners and some Northern Democrats had already widely condemned the 
congressional proposal.  In an organization with a white southern majority, the Alliance did not 
need to address the issue.  The Lodge Bill was clearly unpopular in the South.  Aware of white 
                                                
24 Gerald H. Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement: Ballots and Bigotry in the New South, rev. ed. (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2005), 40; Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1890.  In its December 23, 1890 edition, 
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southern opinion, McAllister and his ally Uriah Hall, knew the proposed law would create 
controversy at the Alliance convention.  Hall and McAllister were the most consistent advocates 
for the Lodge condemnation measure.  Both men also opposed the formation of a third party and 
may have wished to prevent the spread of a political party in light of the recent success of the 
People’s Party in the Sunflower state.  Dividing the Alliance along sectional lines was a good 
way to divide white Southerners from black Southerners and Northerners.  Unfortunately for the 
farmers’ movement it was not the last time that sectional tension weakened the agrarian crusade. 
McAllister and Hall had good reasons to fear independent action within the Alliance. 
Kansans brought political momentum to Ocala where many acted to achieve official Southern 
Alliance support for a third party.  Frank McGrath, Kansas Alliance President and a participant 
at the Ocala convention, expressed disappointment with the Lodge affair.  McGrath stated, “The 
agitation in the South over the Lodge bill precludes the possibility of an independent movement 
at this time.”  Although editors of the official Southern Alliance newspaper, The National 
Economist, downplayed the drama surrounding independent political action, other newspapers 
did not.  Accounts of the Ocala convention from the Atlanta Constitution and the Mobile Daily 
Register mostly printed articles dealing with the third party and the Lodge Bill.  In the weeks 
following the convention, The Economist explained its opposition to a national third party, but it 
also published letters to the editor in support of an independent political party.  Writers from 
North Carolina, Kansas, and Illinois expressed their support for political action in accordance 
with their Alliance principles and sectional reconciliation.  While Alliance leaders acted to limit 
the internal controversy caused by discussing third party action, the topic was of great interest to 
members of the farmers’ organization.26 
                                                
26 William DuBose Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion: Virginia Farm Politics, 1885-1900 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1935), 73 (quote); National Economist, February 21, 1891.  The Atlanta Constitution 
 195 
While the Ocala convention of the reform forces revealed internal divisions within the 
national movement, the six-day conference produced several positive developments.  Like the St. 
Louis meeting the year prior, the 1890 meeting of agrarian forces failed to produce any mergers 
among the Colored, Northern, and Southern alliances.  The Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association 
and the Knights of Labor, also present at Ocala, did not fuse with the Southern Alliance.  A 
confederation agreement among all of the organizations was reached, however, which bode well 
for the continuation of a national movement.  The associations agreed to uphold the “common 
citizenship…commercial equality and legal justice” of its members.  Colored Alliance 
Superintendent Richard Humphrey later remarked, “this agreement will be known in future ages 
as the burial of racial conflict, and finally of race prejudice.”  The Southern Alliance Supreme 
Council passed a resolution stating that “equal facilities, educational, commercial, and political, 
be demanded for colored and white Alliance men alike, competency considered, and that a free 
ballot and a fair count be insisted upon and had for colored and white alike.”27 
The agreement showed that although the Lodge Bill divided the Colored Alliance and 
some southern whites in the Southern Alliance, both parties agreed to the legal equality of the 
races.  The inclusion of the “competency considered” phrase, however, showed that the alliances 
supported qualifications for exercising the franchise.  Parts of Tennessee and the Mississippi 
Constitutional Convention of 1890 set the standard for other states when they enacted the poll 
tax, a two-year residency clause, and the interpretation clause as requirements for exercising the 
franchise.  In the years ahead, these voting laws characterized an era of racial exclusion and 
oppression that would not be undone until the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Within the context of 
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27 Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement, 38-39. 
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the 1890s many white Southerners viewed these laws as necessary reforms that would eliminate 
the corruption of “ignorant” voters.  Many southern whites claimed the laws would reduce racial 
conflicts and allow debates concerning the passage of reforms to receive primary consideration 
among the public and elected officials.  In the immediate aftermath of the Ocala Convention, 
however, the agreement provided a basis for future cooperation between the white and black 
alliances.28 
  Beyond the confederation of reform associations, a second positive development at the 
1890 Alliance convention was the agreement on a set of principles, known as the Ocala Platform.  
Like the St. Louis Platform of 1889, the Ocala Demands called for the abolition of national 
banks, an increase in currency circulation, unlimited coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, a 
limited tariff, and the direct election of U.S. senators.  The new Alliance platform also included a 
land-loan agreement within the subtreasury plan, and advocated for the strict regulation of 
communication and transportation industries. During the next two years, Alliance members used 
the Ocala Platform as the basis of their reform activities.29 
 A third accomplishment of the Ocala convention was the survival of the Southern 
Alliance and its national prestige.  No states or individual delegates chose to leave the 
organization, despite the emergence of internal differences.  Additionally, the election of 
Alliance allies across the South and in Kansas promised the implementation of reform in the 
years ahead.  In Kansas, a third party ousted the powerful Republican Party from the state house.  
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The defeat of Senator John Ingalls, a major symbol of sectionalism, corruption, and monopoly, 
seemed imminent in the Sunflower State.  A supporter of the Farmers’ Alliance seemed poised to 
replace Ingalls.  The agrarian organization also launched its National Reform Press Association, 
which pledged to spread the Alliance gospel throughout the country, educating the American 
people in a manner that mainstream newspapers, controlled by monopolies, could not.  
Membership totals in the Southern Alliance and Colored Alliance reached their peak in 1890 and 
an educational campaign promised to increase its ranks and influence.  Finally, reformers from 
many stripes continued to view the agrarian movement as the best opportunity to effect social, 
economic, and political change.  The National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union, the 
National Alliance, the National Colored Farmers’ Alliance, the Knights of Labor, and the 
Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association continued to agree to work toward mutual goals.  The 
farmers’ movement appeared unified as 1891 dawned. 
After the Ocala convention Alliance newspapers turned their attention to events in 
Kansas.  Supported by the Populist majority in the state legislature, the agrarian movement 
seemed poised to oust incumbent Senator John Ingalls and elect the first Populist to the U.S. 
Senate.  Throughout the country Alliance newspapers launched criticisms at Ingalls, while they 
portrayed the People’s Party as the representative of farmers and sectional reconciliation.  
Newspaper articles reminded readers of Ingalls views on the role of the golden rule in politics 
and compared his statements on morality and politics unfavorably to Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address.  Other articles cited Ingalls as the inspiration for the People’s Party, predicted his 
defeat, and portrayed it as victory over sectionalism.  The Southern Mercury predicted that 
General John H. Rice would replace Ingalls as Senator.  The newspaper noted that Rice lived in 
 198 
Georgia prior to 1865, indicating that he understood people from both regions and he would 
serve as a leader who was free from sectional hatred.30 
When the newly elected Kansas legislature met to nominate a U.S. senator, members of 
the People’s Party predominated numerically with 92 seats, compared to 66 Republicans and 10 
Democrats.  This majority was significant because it allowed the People’s Party to outnumber 
Republican and Democratic representatives in the lower and upper houses of the legislature, only 
if the third party stayed unified.  Since Ingalls reelection was the central issue of the 1890 
campaign, the People’s Party could feel good about staying united against the Republican 
Senator.  The Georgia Senate election, however, demonstrated that Alliance supporters could be 
divided and the Republican Party launched a strong campaign to divide Populist legislators 
immediately after the November election.31 
Kansas Republicans relied on the results of the Ocala convention and Civil War memory 
to persuade the state legislature to return Ingalls the U.S. Senate.  Republican newspapers across 
the state quickly noted that Southerners in the Alliance refused to join Kansans in a national 
political party.  The Emporia Republican noted that Southern “brethren” remained faithful to the 
Democratic Party, did not stop Westerners from leaving the GOP, and then “doubtless did a large 
amount of laughing in their sleeves.”  For these actions the Topeka Capital added that 
Southerners at Ocala were “very slick.”32 
Foremost the Republicans hoped to appeal to Civil War memory in their efforts to reelect 
Ingalls.  Since the Populists hosted Polk and other white Southerners who represented a “second 
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invasion” of the state during their 1890 visits, Republicans questioned the patriotism of Kansas 
Populists.  According to Republican newspapers, Populists demonstrated their lack of 
commitment to America by failing to attend Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) meetings, 
unlike Republicans.  The GOP also turned to its supporters in the GAR for reinforcements.  The 
party sent the Union veterans’ organization petitions asking Ingalls to be reelected, which the 
GAR in turn sent to the state legislature in large numbers.  Although officials remained silent, the 
official GAR newspaper also promoted Ingalls’ as a patriot, a friend to farmers, an advocate for 
bimetallism and a lower tariff, and an enemy to eastern bankers.33 
The GAR went further in its support for Ingalls’ reelection to the U.S. Senate.  During its 
annual departmental meeting a month before the November election the GAR hosted President 
Benjamin Harrison and other speakers who encouraged the audience to vote for Republicans 
who would send Ingalls back to the Senate.  At other public rallies, veterans claimed that the 
Alliance was unpatriotic and acted to promote the Democratic Party in Kansas.  Speakers 
charged that the South treated Union veterans poorly and hated Ingalls.  Other veterans claimed 
that if Ingalls were not elected it would be a “direct blow to the defenders of our country in the 
hour of her greatest need.”  The message was clear.  Ingalls believed in patriotism, loyalty, and 
honored Union veterans.  Populists did not respect those who fought for the United States and 
they supported Confederates who tried to destroy the Union.34 
Besides heavy opposition from the Republican Party and some members of the GAR, the 
People’s Party had other worries as the state legislature met to elect the next Kansas Senator.  
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Aware of the use of bribes, intimidation, and general scheming during past Senate elections, the 
People’s Party took precautions to avoid these pitfalls of politics.  Populist legislators stayed at 
cheaper hotels off the main streets and appeared in public with an entourage of bodyguards.  As 
in the Georgia senatorial election, multiple candidates appeared who supported Alliance reforms.  
The People’s Party caucus considered seventeen nominees during its deliberations.  Unlike the 
Georgia representatives, the Kansas caucus eventually reached a consensus.  After five hours the 
caucus chose William Peffer on the eighteenth ballot.35  
Populists held firm in the final vote for the Senate and Peffer defeated Ingalls 101-58.  
Populists celebrated their victory.  The new senator addressed a large crowd of supporters in 
Topeka the day after his election.  He thanked the crowd and told them that it was time for a new 
party to do the people’s bidding.  Addressing Republican questions concerning the patriotism of 
the Populists, Senator Peffer reminded the audience, “I, too, was a soldier; not a kid glove 
soldier, but a man in the ranks.  Is it reasonable that a man who fought for years in the union 
army and spent the best part of his life on the field should ever forget the old soldiers?  If trouble 
ever comes upon this nation the old soldiers who now belong to the alliance party would 
shoulder their guns and march back to the field of battle as readily as we did in ’61.  As soon as I 
could get my family out of the reach of the guerillas, I became a union soldier.”  Through his 
statements, Peffer asserted that he and the Populist Party were just as patriotic, brave, and 
masculine as Republicans.  Peffer continued this theme by telling the crowd, “In ’92 the great 
army of the farmers will win its first grand victory and in ’96 they will control the nation.”  He 
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denied that the Populists were radicals, saying “We are not anarchists; anarchists don’t carry the 
grand old flag that we love as dearly as our lives.”36 
Populist allies in the South celebrated the victory over Ingalls and sectionalism.  Polk 
called Peffer’s victory over Ingalls “the greatest blow at sectionalism that has been struck for 
twenty-five years.”  Peffer also received congratulations from his former southern neighbors.  
The Montgomery County Tennessee agrarians sent Peffer a note of congratulations and 
applauded the “admirable selection” made by the Kansas legislature.  The Peffers lived in 
Montgomery County during Reconstruction, only to flee when members of the community 
ostracized Peffer for his political stance.  After twenty years, a note of best wishes carried 
significance for an agrarian movement that emphasized sectional reconciliation.  Peffer 
published the note in the February 25th edition of his Kansas Farmer.37 
In the months following Peffer’s election the Alliance acted to continue the momentum 
of the movement.  Kansas leaders sought to address accusations made by the Republican 
opposition and demonstrate the health of the national agrarian crusade.  In early 1891 Alliance 
leaders in the Sunflower state published newspaper articles to convince Kansans that white 
Southerners in the Alliance truly desired reform, did not represent a Democratic scheme to hurt 
Republicans, and that whites in the South genuinely sought a partnership with Northerners.  
Through these newspaper articles Kansans also acted to build consensus with Southerners in 
hopes of establishing a national Populist Party in time for 1892.  After Ocala Northerners also 
launched speaking tours to demonstrate their desire to partner with Southerners in the agrarian 
movement and to persuade southern voters to join the third party.  Southerners also wished to 
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remain allied to Northerners in hopes of implementing Alliance reforms into state and national 
laws.  Aware of internal divisions, but confident that their objectives could be achieved, leaders 
of the Alliance communicated a message of solidarity to Northerners and Southerners in early 
1891.  
During the first few months of 1891 the Alliance press used the Lodge Bill to portray a 
united agrarian front, obscuring regional differences that the legislation evoked at Ocala.  After 
tabling the bill in August, the Senate began to consider the proposal in December 1890 and 
January 1891.  The bill had little chance of passing the Senate, but that did not stop commentary 
on the Lodge Bill in the national press.  Alliance newspapers joined in the national discussion 
and used the Federal Elections Bill to enhance harmony within their organization.  Statements by 
Alliance journalists also revealed regional differences within the agrarian movement that 
hampered future efforts to promote a national reform coalition.   
In the wake of the Ocala convention the two major Alliance newspapers in Kansas 
glossed over regional differences exposed by discussion of the Lodge Bill.  William Peffer’s the 
Kansas Farmer reported that the Alliance unanimously condemned the Lodge Bill at Ocala.  Dr. 
Stephen McLallin’s Advocate avoided this inaccurate statement, but published several critiques 
of the Elections Bill in the days that followed the national Alliance convention.  The Advocate 
objected to the proposal because of the expenses created by enforcement and due to the presence 
of federal troops at polling stations.  In an article two weeks later the newspaper expressed 
opposition to the bill based on grounds that it gave too much power to the federal government, 
took away local “home rule” of elections, and, therefore, allowed “political managers” to exert 
party wishes into electoral contests.  Neither newspaper mentioned Wardall’s objection to the 
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Lodge Bill condemnation nor the North-South split of votes cast in favor of denunciation at 
Ocala.38 
Like Kansans, southern newspapers also criticized the Lodge Bill after the Ocala 
convention.  Unlike Kansans, Southerners expressed more hostility toward the legislative 
proposal.  The National Economist portrayed the Farmers’ Alliances as a more effective force for 
advancing justice and good race relations than the Lodge Bill with its heavy doses of 
“sectionalism” and “political demagogism.”  In another instance the newspaper declared that the 
election bill was “the real sentiment of but one section of this country—New England.”  The 
Economist claimed no state “Outside of that section” would pass a bill meant to “rekindle the 
almost extinct fires of sectionalism” and “the old feeling of animosity between the North and 
South.”  Again the newspaper argued that the bill encouraged “sectional hate” and only benefited 
“the interest of the politician and not of the people.”  Through such depictions Alliance 
newspapers encouraged readers to view the Lodge Bill as a struggle of New England politicians 
against the American majority who lived in the South and the West.  Agrarian newspapers 
suggested that the sectionalism of New England no longer found resonance in other parts of the 
country.39 
In an article first published in the Progressive Farmer and republished in the Southern 
Mercury, Alliance newspapers described the Lodge Bill as irrational and potentially dangerous.  
The Progressive Farmer writer claimed that a friend met an old African-American man who 
asked for an explanation of the Lodge Bill.  After the friend summarized the bill in the “simplest 
way,” the old man reflected on the information and supposedly remarked “Hit ‘pears to me dey’s 
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fixin’ ter git some moah niggers killed.”  Although the author offered no commentary, the article 
conveyed that even those people deemed the “simplest” understood that racial violence would 
accompany the enforcement of the Lodge Bill in the South.  The article implied that white and 
black Southerners understood the full ramifications of the proposed law, while the bill’s New 
England authors did not comprehend seemingly unalterable southern race relations.  In an 
important addition to Southern Alliance criticisms of the Lodge Bill the story suggested that 
southern African Americans opposed the Federal Elections law.40 
 Reverend Thomas Dixon also told his Twenty-Third Baptist Church congregation in New 
York City that African Americans did not want the Lodge Bill.  Dixon, a North Carolina native, 
frequently appeared in Alliance newspapers because of the mutual appreciation between the 
minister and Alliance leaders, like Leonidas Polk.  During sermons the Baptist preacher often 
praised the Farmers’ Alliance as a just movement of farmers acting in accordance with Christian 
teachings.  Polk and many others, including John D. Rockefeller, viewed Dixon as an excellent 
modern preacher for modern times.  Noting that some within and without the congregation did 
not agree with his views on the Lodge Bill, Dixon launched into an assessment of the legislation 
because of its evocation of social, economic, political, and moral issues.  The Progressive 
Farmer printed his sermon in its January 27, 1891 issue.41 
Dixon supported his views of the Lodge Bill with several points.  The minister first stated 
that the congressional plan was foolish because it repeated the mistakes of Reconstruction, which 
he called “the errand of a fool.”  Dixon claimed that Reconstruction proved that African 
Americans were not ready to exercise the vote responsibly.  Supporting his views he cited the 
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views of an African-American journal from the Hampton Institute in Virginia.  The journal did 
not mention the Federal Elections Bill, but it expressed belief in the “educational and moral 
reconstruction of the South” that would “never come from any legislative hall.”  Dixon believed 
that Reconstruction served as a poor model for legislation that was “inspired by memory, not 
fact.”  A second problem Dixon identified with the Lodge Bill was that African Americans did 
not request the law.  He argued that most black Americans opposed the proposed law and that the 
bill originated in Massachusetts, the home of “a certain narrow New England fanaticism that yet 
lives, wedded to a chronic sectionalism.”  A third fault in the voter legislation was that it 
unnecessarily provoked “race bitterness, hatred and suspicion” in a region where conflicts were 
disappearing.  Although Dixon saw black-white relations in terms of a “weaker race” and a 
“stronger race,” he also thought that the groups were mutually dependent.  As he told his New 
York congregation “The stronger race is beginning to see that it could not get along without the 
weaker—that they are bound in life by ties economic, industrial, social and fraternal, that cannot 
be broken, without doing violence to the civilization they are jointly building, whether will or 
not.”  The Baptist minister stated that a final problem with the proposed election law was that it 
diverted attention from more pressing problems of the era such as taxes, education, and monetary 
policy.42 
Through Dixon’s sermons and articles in newspapers run by Macune and Polk, white 
Southerners in the Alliance communicated stronger opposition to the Lodge Bill than Kansans.  
Rather than focus merely on the costs of the legislation and the politics of its implementation, 
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white Southerners involved African Americans in their arguments.  White Southerners contended 
that southern African Americans did not want a law intended to effectively promote the free 
exercise of the franchise in the South.  Through its reasoning, these Southern Alliance 
spokesmen asserted that the southern race relations were cordial and that the Lodge Bill was 
created to fix a problem that only existed in the New England imagination.  In reality, white 
Alliance leaders claimed that African Americans were content in the South.  White Southerners 
published tales of healthy race relations in part to prove that the South of 1891 was not the South 
of 1861.  Citing African Americans who agreed with their condemnation of the Lodge Bill 
demonstrated white Southerners’ claims that progress had occurred in the region since the end of 
slavery.  Black voices also stood as evidence that Kansans could trust white Southerners as 
partners in the national agrarian crusade.  Contrary to the charges of Kansas Republicans, 
southern whites in the Alliance did not represent the South of the Civil War era.  Southern whites 
were reconstructed.  
Despite this narrative of unity, African Americans in the agrarian movement expressed 
support for the Federal Elections Bill.  Contrasting with the Southern Alliance and its white 
Superintendent, Richard Humphrey, the Colored Alliance unanimously supported the Lodge Bill 
at Ocala.  After the convention members of the agrarian organization continued to endorse the 
election legislation.  In March 1891 The National Economist published a strong letter by Colored 
Farmers’ Alliance leader and African Episcopal Methodist Reverend John L. Moore.  The 
Crescent City, Florida minister responded to a Jacksonville, Florida editorial that accused the 
Colored Alliance of supporting the Lodge Bill only to promote Republican political power.  
Moore countered that the Colored Alliance endorsed the bill because it was one way to ensure a 
“free vote and an honest count.”  He said that the proposal had problems, but it was the best 
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proposal available at that time.  Speaking in Alliance language that promoted biracial class unity, 
Moore encouraged farmers and laborers to vote as a block and to reject party affiliation.  Whites 
and blacks had common interests as laborers, and Moore concluded, “Anything that can be 
brought about to benefit the workingman, will also benefit the negro more than any other 
legislation that can be enacted.”  The reverend said that African Americans wanted equal access 
to equal facilities rather than forced social relations with whites.43  
While the agrarian movement did not reach a consensus on the Lodge Bill, the alliances 
did establish several compromises on issues pertaining to the legislation.  Specifically, the 
Alliance promoted alternatives to the legislation to address free and fair elections and better race 
relations.  The agrarian association advertised the Australian ballot system or private ballot as a 
substitute to federal supervisors.  In August 1890 William Peffer published an article that 
described how the private ballot system functioned and summarized a Massachusetts law based 
on the Australian method.  Essentially, the Australian ballot system acted to reduce manipulation 
at the polls by making voting a private, rather than public process.  Under the system states 
assumed the financial cost of printing ballots for elections.  The law also allowed voters to 
support candidates in multiple political parties since all candidates were featured on the state-
sponsored ballot.  Because voters cast their vote at a polling station in private, rather than 
publicly dropping the party ticket in a ballot box, their vote remained secret in theory.44  
Other agrarian leaders endorsed the Australian ballot at the Ocala convention.  L.D. 
Miller of the Colored Alliance delegation told the Southern Alliance Ocala convention that 
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African Americans supported the Australian ballot as a reform measure.  Miller said that the 
Alliance would “give” blacks the private ballot, which would promote reform over partisanship.  
Kansans too demonstrated a willingness to move beyond their disagreement with white 
Southerners on the Lodge Bill.  Published soon after the end of the Ocala convention, Stephen 
McLallin’s Topeka Advocate supported the Australian ballot system as a favorable alternative to 
the use of federal troops.  The newspaper called the Australian method of voting “a great 
safeguard against organized ignorance assaulting the sanctity of the ballot.”  Through these 
endorsements of the Australian secret ballot system, the Alliance found consensus on a measure 
that promised fair elections and enhanced the ability of reform candidates to win contests against 
corrupt politicians.  Advocacy for the Australian system also allowed white Southerners to deny 
that they opposed the Lodge Bill solely because the legislation favored black voting rights and 
the Republican Party.45 
Like the Australian ballot system, the Alliance promoted racial justice prior to the Ocala 
meeting.  After the Alliance meeting the organization intensified its efforts to promote reforms 
for white and black agrarians and improve race relations in the South.  In the summer of 1890, 
William Peffer argued that the agrarian crusade would unite the South and West and end racial 
animosity below the Mason-Dixon.  Peffer wrote, “The farmer will solve the southern problem 
with his friendly grip in social greeting.”  Leonidas Polk’s newspaper published a similar 
depiction of the agrarian movement.  The Progressive Farmer ridiculed the notion that the 
Colored Alliance was an organization that intended to create poor race relations by quoting from 
the official newspaper of the Colored Alliance, The National Alliance.  Noting that the Colored 
Alliance publication emphasized cooperation between white and black farmers to resolve their 
common financial struggles, the Progressive Farmer said that the black agrarian group stood for 
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“peace and the Subtreasury.”  The article ended by concluding, “Does it not look as if the 
farmers, the hayseeders, would settle the race question?  Get the politicians out of the way and 
the farmers will settle it at once.”46 
At the 1890 national convention of the Alliance, agrarians continued to tout the 
benevolent effects of their organization for race relations.  Colored Alliance delegate L.D. Miller 
told the audience to forget past Republican or Democratic political affiliations.  Miller pledged to 
serve in the agrarian cause, which enabled him to “act and live for the people and devote my 
future to their cause.”  Harry Tracy, a Southern Alliance organizer, followed Miller and told the 
convention and according to the Atlanta Constitution “the farmers were going to solve the negro 
problem.  They were the friends of the negro whom they had been separated from by the 
chicanery of politicians.”  Tracy then pledged that neither Democratic nor Republican politicians 
would lead the Alliance.  Through the Alliance, whites and blacks pledged to solve racial 
problems.47 
Kansans joined in Alliance discussions of racial issues in the aftermath of the Ocala 
convention and added a political twist.  When asked about the prospects of a national third party, 
Stephen McLallin told a Kansas newspaper that third party considerations would be delayed.  
McLallin stated that white Southerners were considering the question and that southern African 
Americans were “ready to join a third party as soon as they know that the whites will leave the 
Democratic party.”  The Kansas Alliance portrayed southern blacks and whites as a united front 
that was ready to move as one toward joining Midwesterners in a new political party.48 
Amidst sweeping Populist victories in Kansas, the Topeka Advocate urged readers to 
remain patient with the South.  The newspaper claimed that white Southerners were not opposed 
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to a third party and it predicted that the South would join Kansans in the Populist Party.  In its 
efforts to counter Kansas Republicans who continued to charge that the Alliance represented a 
southern Confederate conspiracy, The Advocate said that “The Alliance third-party movement 
will also settle the race question of the South, and black and white will vote together for the 
common interest of all.  The declaration of the Ocala convention upon this subject is worth more 
than force bills, and will be far more effectual.”  Despite opposition to southern participation in a 
third party, The National Economist reprinted the article.49 
Throughout 1891 the Alliance faced pivotal questions.  With the creation of a third party 
in Kansas, the organization faced increased pressure from its political foes.  Many supporters 
began to worry about the validity of accusations hurled against the agrarian movement that it was 
a conspiracy initiated by sectional outsiders who wished to cripple the political and social 
stability in the region.  One Populist wrote The Advocate to discuss these charges of disloyalty to 
state and regional loyalties.  The writer stated that “In the south, people are told that this 
movement is of northern origin, a Republican device to disrupt the Democratic party of the 
south, strike down white rule, and establish black supremacy instead, while in the north, 
politicians tell us the movement is a southern institution, devised by southern Democrats…and 
designed to destroy the Republican party of the north…and thereby abrogate all the results of the 
war.”50 
The 1890 meeting at Ocala exposed meaningful differences within the national agrarian 
movement for the first time.  At the heart of these differences stood politics and their association 
with regional identities.  The formation of a third party by Kansans fundamentally altered the 
character of the Alliance.  Kansans took the bold step of supporting all Alliance reforms through 
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a new political party.  In the aftermath of its electoral victories, Kansas Populists felt pressure to 
incorporate the South into the third party and prove that the agrarian movement was willing to 
truly throw aside all past allegiances to political parties and regional identities in order to form a 
truly national political movement of the American producer majority.  Kansans followed 
Alliance ideology to its purist conclusion and they now asked black and white Southerners to 
honor their loyalties to the Alliance banner and join in the People’s Party.  While many southern 
African Americans demonstrated their willingness to join Midwesterners, most southern whites 
hesitated.  In the wake of experiencing success within the Democratic Party, most southern 
whites saw little need to abandon the regionally powerful party.  Publicly, Northerners, black 
Southerners, and white Southerners politely debated a third party at the 1890 Ocala convention.  
Emboldened by their electoral success and the election of William Peffer as U.S. Senator, 
Kansas Populist continued to patiently promote the third party to hesitant southern whites in 
1891.  As the Senate elections in Georgia and North Carolina revealed, the Democratic Party did 
not stand completely with the Southern Alliance.  Kansas Populists saw potential in the South 
and intensified their political recruiting in the region.  
Hoping to silence critics and to enhance the political power of the agrarian movement, 
Kansans set out on a “Southern Crusade” in 1891.  Kansas Populists hoped to convince 
Southerners that a national third party was necessary to achieve the reforms of their cherished 
Alliance movement.  In the South, African Americans and whites considered their options as 
they awaited the implementation of Alliance reforms by state legislators who were friendly to the 
agrarian movement.  A critical year lay ahead for the farmers’ crusade.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  
SECTIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEEDS OF DESTRUCTION  
 
 
 
Agrarian enthusiasts had great hope for their prospects in 1891.  At the December 1890 
national convention in Ocala, Florida the Alliance endorsed an educational campaign to send 
speakers across America to promote its reforms.  Through the communication of the farmers’ 
program, Alliance leaders hoped to produce more supporters and exert greater political pressure 
to enact reforms into law.  Agrarians emphasized the benefits of cooperatives, the subtreasury 
plan, an increased circulation of cash, and greater control of banks, railroads, and speculators.  
Throughout its promotional activities the Alliance also attacked sectionalism as a barrier to the 
unification of the American producer class majority.  During the two previous years this Alliance 
formula of reform and sectional reconciliation achieved unity and growth.  The trend began to 
change at the 1890 national meeting.  Ocala exposed meaningful fissures within the Southern 
Alliance.  At the center of the differences stood politics, which revealed sectional tension.  
Despite great agrarian efforts to dilute its importance, sectionalism increasingly overwhelmed the 
Alliance throughout 1891 and 1892, and planted the seeds of destruction that ended the farmers’ 
movement in 1896. 
In the aftermath of the Ocala convention, however, positive trends continued to suggest 
success for agrarian reform.  Leonidas Polk continued to generate enthusiasm in his tours of the 
country.  In an October 1891 visit to southern California, Polk spoke to agrarian supporters, 
including a group of Union and Confederate veterans.  Californians wrote “Linked Evermore: 
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The Grey and the Blue” and dedicated the song to Polk.  Elsewhere Alliance supporters received 
a warm welcome.  In New York City Baptist Reverend Thomas Dixon Jr. praised the Southern 
Alliance before his congregation.  Dixon called Alliance efforts to “throw off the curse of 
traditional sectionalism” a victory for “The Christian manhood of America.”  The Reverend 
criticized the perpetrators of Civil War bitterness as “ghouls” who “began their ghost dance over 
the fields made rich with the blood of heroes” when veterans returned home after the war.  Dixon 
charged “They have made progress impossible because they have made issues of memories, and 
marshaled the hosts of the living to fight the hopes of the dead.”  But, the North Carolina native 
argued, “The battle has ceased.  We are children of a common Father.”  Through organizations 
like the Alliance he saw a new “day of fraternity.”  For agrarian supporters Dixon linked 
Alliance political, social, and economic goals to a strong religious base.  The minister’s success 
in the North further demonstrated that white southern farmers could trust regional outsiders and 
participate in the national reform movement.1  
At the Ocala convention, Kansas agrarian Annie Diggs also showed that the Alliance was 
a vehicle for sectional reconciliation that united North and South.  In a rare exception to the male 
dominated rhetoric concerning Civil War memory, Diggs told the crowd that she was “happier 
today than I have ever been in my life,” because she met southern women who treated her well.  
During the Civil War, Diggs heard that the women “would scratch our eyes out if we came 
south.”   When Diggs passed by a Confederate cemetery she noted that became overwhelmed 
with “a sense almost of guilt, so intensely did the terror of those dark days and the full 
appreciation of what you people suffered rush upon me.”  Diggs claimed that many kept 
                                                
1 A copy of “Linked Evermore: The Grey and the Blue” is in the Polk Papers at the University of North Carolina. 
See L.L. Polk Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Box 1, Folder 99.  Dixon quotes 
in the Progressive Farmer, December 9, 1890. 
 214 
“sectional hatred” alive for too long, but with the People’s Party victories in her home state 
sectionalism received its “death sentence.”2 
 Diggs celebrated the unity of the “solid west and the solid south” at Ocala.  She also 
alluded to a worry that prevailed among a growing number of farmers’ advocates.  The agrarian 
reform journalist expressed hope that party loyalties would not prevent the combination of 
western and southern farmers, whether it was through the People’s Party or not.  Although 
temporarily avoided at Ocala, the issue of forming a national third party to advance the goals of 
the Alliance did not go away.  Diggs pointed to a major problem for the national agrarian 
crusade.  In the wake of Populist electoral victories, Kansans pressed white southern members of 
the Alliance to join them in a national third party movement.  Rebuffed by white Southerners at 
Ocala, Kansans reluctantly agreed to delay a convention of national third party supporters until 
1892.  Kansas Republicans immediately declared that white Southerners postponed endorsing a 
third party because they had no intention of breaking with the Democratic Party.  Republicans 
claimed that Democrats controlled the Alliance and sought to weaken Republicans in the North.  
Pressured by these criticisms, Kansas Populists quickly reversed course and endorsed the 
Cincinnati meeting to discuss the formation of a national third party.3 
The southern reaction to the third party convention was less than satisfying to midwestern 
Populists.  No southern state Farmers’ Alliance endorsed the Cincinnati meeting of the third 
party advocates.  Macune and Polk continued to reject the idea behind the conference.  Both 
Alliance leaders preferred that action be postponed until southern Democratic state legislators 
had a chance to implement Alliance reforms.  Other white Southerners demonstrated their 
                                                
2 Southern Alliance Farmer, December 9, 1890. 
3 Southern Alliance Farmer, December 9, 1890; Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer 
and the People’s Party (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 81-82. 
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irritation with Kansan efforts to establish a third party by saying “We are Democrats first and 
Alliancemen next.”4  
Despite southern requests for patience, Kansas Populist leaders continued to advocate a 
national third party and put pressure on white Southerners.  Frank McGrath, President of the 
Kansas state Alliance, urged Southerners to match their words with their actions.  McGrath noted 
criticism that portrayed the Alliance as a Democratic tool and described southern participation in 
the upcoming Cincinnati conference as test of their dedication to “a union with us in the ‘middle 
of the road’ between the old parties, or whether the South is working to divide the North and 
place the Democracy in unlimited power in our national affairs in 1892.”  McGrath extensively 
quoted Polk who encouraged Southerners to follow “our brethren of Kansas” and defeat “all the 
old war leaders who show incapacity to rise above the sectional questions which have so long 
divided and harmed our common country.”  The Kansas Alliance leader asked if Southerners 
would be true to these words.  If Southerners did not join the third party, McGrath said that 
Midwesterners would rejoin the Republican Party.  He stated that the “the union of the West and 
South,” would then “be deferred for another generation.”  McGrath demonstrated the urgency of 
forming a union of the South and the West and the growing internal pressure within the agrarian 
movement for a national political movement.  Kansans now directed the momentum of a national 
farmers’ crusade begun by white Southerners.5 
 Throughout 1891 most white Southerners reaffirmed their rejection of a third party and 
remained patient with Democrats who pledged support for Alliance reforms.  The sole exception 
to this pattern occurred in Texas, the birthplace of the Southern Alliance.  Throughout the 
existence of the Alliance, Texas members debated whether to enter politics directly or to remain 
                                                
4 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 83. 
5 Kansas Farmer, April 15 1891; Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 84. 
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officially apolitical.  Pressed by the sentiment of Midwesterners, like Frank McGrath, 
Alliancemen in the Lone Star State quickly grew dissatisfied with the pace of reform set by 
Democrats.  Texas agrarians particularly became disenchanted with the new governor James 
Hogg.  Elected with strong Alliance support in 1890, Hogg irritated many farmers’ advocates by 
achieving few reforms during the first state legislative session.  When Alliance spokesmen 
criticized Hogg, the governor denounced the subtreasury plan and accused the Alliance of 
seeking a third party.  Nearly two-dozen Alliance Democrats from the state legislature joined 
Hogg in his denunciation.  The attacks alienated many Alliance members who considered 
themselves Democrats.   
On April 21, 1891, Texas agrarians met at Waco to discuss their educational campaign 
whereby lecturers informed the public about the aims of the Alliance and recruited supporters.  
The true intent of the meeting was to discuss the formation of a third party.  Aware of the actual 
purpose of the conference, participants arrived from across the state and beyond.  Third party 
supporters, including Kansan Henry Vincent and Knights of Labor leader Ralph Beaumont, 
attended the meeting.  Joining them were anti-third party advocates and Alliance Democrats, 
recruited by Charles Macune, including Lon Livingston of Georgia, South Carolinian E.T. 
Stackhouse, and Alonzo Wardall of South Dakota.  As the potential link in a third party 
movement of southern and western states, Texas became a key battleground state in the farmers’ 
crusade.6 
Rather than create a split in the national agrarian movement, the 1891 Waco meeting 
showed that divisions within the Alliance were not at a fatal impasse.  While debate became 
tense at times, the conference produced compromises that favored third-party supporters.  
                                                
6 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 234-37. 
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Alliance members pledged to send delegates to the May Cincinnati meeting of third party 
advocates.  In exchange, Alliancemen who favored independent political action agreed to hold 
their assemblies outside of regular Alliance meetings.  During the separate conferences Texas 
Alliancemen agreed to form a state Reform Press Association, which third-party supporter 
William Lamb led.  The meetings also resulted in the formation of the Texas Citizens’ Alliance, 
an association created for those who were sympathetic but not eligible to join the Farmers’ 
Alliance.  In Kansas, the Citizens’ Alliance proved an instrumental organization in the formation 
of the People’s Party.  Collectively, the Waco conference produced momentum for the 
partnership of Southerners and Midwesterners in a national third party.7 
Despite these positive developments for supporters of a national third party, Texas and 
Arkansas were the only southern states to send significant representation to the Cincinnati 
conference.  Kansas, Ohio, Illinois, and Nebraska sent large numbers of delegates, while other 
midwestern states accounted for the rest of the 1,417 attendees.  Senator William Peffer chaired 
the conference of labor and farm organizations.  The meeting resulted in the formation of the 
National People’s Party and the appointment of an executive committee with instructions to 
attend the February 1892 conference of industrial organizations.  Comments from Southerners at 
the conference, however, caused alarm among some third party supporters.  Georgia Alliance 
leader and Democratic congressmen Leonidas Livingston told the Cincinnati Commercial-
Gazette that white Southerners were “naturally Democratic.”  Livingston stated that southern 
whites would delay supporting a third party until they determined that Democrats opposed 
                                                
7 Robert C. McMath, American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992), 144-45; 
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 239-40. 
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agrarian reforms.  The Georgia Alliance president said, “If that party will recognize the Alliance 
demands, they will take no step toward a third party.”8 
While many Northerners were disappointed with the southern presence at the conference, 
they continued to promote Alliance reforms, including the Ocala platform and sectional 
reconciliation.  In a symbolic gesture of support for reconciliation, Texan James H. “Cyclone” 
Davis joined Indianan C.A. Power on stage for a handshake.  Both men were veterans of the 
Civil War.  In an act of improvisation, a member of the Colored Alliance took to the stage behind 
the two white men.  The embrace and the presence of an African American on stage with two 
veterans reminded attendees that the agrarian movement sought to destroy sectionalism, reunite 
Confederate and Union veterans, and encourage good race relations.  North and South, whites 
and blacks, all were welcome in the national farmers’ crusade.9  
Besides the acts of reconciliation at Cincinnati, third party advocates encountered little 
southern participation in the national political movement.  Greater concerns emerged when the 
Alliance “yardstick” strategy played out in Democratic legislatures in the South.  Throughout the 
region state legislatures failed to pass laws implementing the Ocala platform.  Georgia produced 
a particularly disappointing record.  Alliance supporters dominated the legislature, but the 
passage of acts favoring collectors over debtors and the failure of stronger regulations of 
railroads and other out-of-state corporations created great disappointment for many reform 
advocates.  Additionally, the legislature enacted racial segregation on streetcars.  A combination 
                                                
8 O. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1969), 95-99; 
McMath, American Populism, 145-46; Argersinger, Populists and Politics, 87 (Livingston quote). 
9 McMath, American Populism, 145-46; Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 181.  Kansas sent the most delegates with a total of 407.  As Postel notes, the uninvited appearance of the 
Colored Alliance member on stage reinforced notions among some Northerners that the agrarian movement 
supported equal rights for all.  A measure to racially segregate members on the convention floor went down to 
defeat.  Although stymied at this Northern dominated convention, additional signs of uneasy race relations would 
emerge within the alliances during 1891. 
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of powerful lobbying from business interests, the anti-regulation sentiment of the state press, and 
the weak commitment of many elected officials to Alliance proposals coalesced to handicap 
success in most other southern states.10  
In North Carolina the legislature produced a more reform-oriented record.  The assembly 
approved increased funding for public schools and the state’s agricultural college, and it 
established an African-American agricultural and manufacturing college, a Normal and 
Industrial school for women, and a school for the deaf and mentally handicapped.  Unlike 
Georgia, the legislature created a State Railroad Commission to prevent excessive and 
discriminatory freight rates.11 
Although satisfied with progress in North Carolina and the unity at Cincinnati, the 
absence of significant southern commitment loomed large for agrarian advocates of a national 
third party.  If the National People’s Party wanted to achieve success, southern support was 
essential.  Some third party supporters looked to the Alliance lecturing system as a tool in their 
efforts to spread third party sentiment throughout the country.  Enlarged at the Ocala convention, 
the lecturing system sent Alliance speakers into congressional districts to inform farmers about 
the goals of the agrarian association.  Texans particularly recognized that they could pull voters 
away from the dominant political party and into the People’s Party by highlighting the rejection 
of the subtreasury plan by the James Hogg Democrats.  Some leaders of the Alliance, such as 
Charles Macune, favored the promotion of the subtreasury as a lecture topic in hopes that the 
Democrats would consent to the proposal.  Macune opposed third party action and thought that 
the Alliance lecture system would create mass appeal that Democrats could not ignore.  Other 
                                                
10 McMath, American Populism, 147; Gerald H. Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement: Ballots and Bigotry in 
the New South, revised edition (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 102-03.  Gaither notes that the 
Georgia legislature also passed a law to fund an African-American school in Atlanta. 
11 Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk: Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1949), 251-52. 
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Alliance officials, such as Leonidas Polk, also opposed a national independent party and 
supported an aggressive Alliance speaking campaign in 1891.12 
Drawing inspiration from the Alliance lecture plan, Kansans launched a speaking tour 
below the Mason-Dixon they dubbed, the “Southern Crusade.”  The term suggested a religious 
journey into a land of non-believers where the converted sought to educate and enlighten a 
populace.  Since Midwesterners wanted to convert Southerners to their righteous cause of a 
national third party, friendly newspapers used the term “crusade” freely and referred to the most 
numerous group as the “Kansas missionaries.”  Throughout the summer of 1891 Northerners 
toured the South where they spoke to crowds in support of the Ocala platform and the necessity 
of a national People’s Party.13  
Populist supporters could rely on John Willits in their efforts to organize the speaking 
tour.  Since the Southern Alliance agreed to launch a more expansive educational campaign at 
the Ocala convention, the association enlarged its lecture bureau.  The agrarian order chose 
Willits as head of the Southern Alliance lecture system.  Willits also sat on the Populist National 
Executive Committee and the Kansas Populist State Central Committee.  Clearly he possessed a 
desire to see a national Populist Party flourish and the Kansan used the Alliance lecture system to 
advance this goal.  He particularly targeted July sub-Alliance meetings where delegates to 
Alliance state conventions were chosen.  The state conventions in turn selected delegates for the 
national meeting of the Southern Alliance.  If Midwestern Populists wanted the South to join 
                                                
12 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 240-43; James M. Beeby, Revolt of the Tar Heels: The North Carolina Populist 
Movement, 1890-1901 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008), 22-23. 
13 The Advocate, April 22, May 6, 1891; Girard Western Herald, May 30, June 13, 1891; J. C. Ruppenthal 
Scrapbooks 1: 427 KSHS; Topeka Daily Capital, July 18, 1891 in Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 86-87. 
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them in a national third party, it was essential that Southerners choose delegates who supported a 
third party.14 
With these hopes in mind, Willits placed Midwesterners throughout the South during the 
summer of 1891.  Senator Peffer spoke to audiences from West Virginia to Texas.  
Representative John Otis visited border states.  Congressman Jerry Simpson toured Alabama and 
Georgia with Annie Diggs and Mary Lease.  Simpson also spoke to crowds in Arkansas and 
Texas.  Throughout the tour the speakers received cordial greetings from crowds.  Georgia 
Alliance leader Lon Livingston introduced Simpson and third-party advocate James Weaver to 
audiences throughout the state.15 
Speakers consistently addressed two main themes during the Southern Crusade.  First, 
Populists addressed the failures of the Democratic Party to effectively embrace Alliance reforms 
included in the Ocala Platform.  Second, Northerners consistently asked Southerners to join in 
the rejection of sectionalism advocates, like Senator John Ingalls.  Since Peffer defeated Ingalls, 
the new Populist senator was a popular speaker in the South.  Reporting back to his Kansas 
Farmer, Peffer noted that from West Virginia to Texas pleasant crowds greeted him.  Like Polk, 
Peffer interpreted his experiences as a regional outsider and Civil War veteran.  The Union 
                                                
14 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 87, 91.  White Southerners knew of Willits’s preference for independent 
political action and still named him as head of the lecture bureau.  Clearly white Southerners did not intend to 
destroy a third party at this point in the development of the Alliance movement.  Consenting to Willits’s leadership 
conveyed that white Southerners remained uncertain about the future political fate of the farmers’ organization.  
Choosing Willits provided white Southerners with more time to allow the “yard stick” strategy to develop within the 
Democratic Party, while satisfying third party advocates from the Midwest and Texas. 
15 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 87; Berton Shaw, Wool-Hat Boys: Georgia’s Populist Party (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 36.  Although Southern leaders like Livingston, Macune, and Polk did not 
support a national third party, they consented to placing Willits in this position.  Some believed they did so as part of 
a compromise to delay the convention to consider a national third party.  Since these Southern leaders did not 
criticize Willits’ actions as head of the Alliance lecture bureau, it can be inferred that they did not strongly oppose 
his efforts to link the agrarian organization with Populism in early 1891.  Aware that white Southern opinion did not 
openly favor abandoning Democracy for Populism, Livingston, Macune, and Polk proceeded cautiously.  Lawrence 
Goodwyn argues that Macune and Polk strongly considered joining the third party in 1891, although they were not 
ready to publicly announce support.  See Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 247.  Berton Shaw contends that 
Livingston flirted with Populism throughout much of 1891.  See Shaw, Wool-Hat Boys, 36. 
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veteran noted, “Men who served in the rebel armies are particularly obliging.  They say to me—
‘Tell the old ‘Yanks’ when you go home that we are friends now, and if they want any proof of it 
to come down among us and see for themselves.’”  Peffer concluded, “It would be impossible for 
any people to receive a stranger more kindly than we Northern men are received in the South.”16  
Like Polk the year before, Peffer served as a regional ambassador to demonstrate genuine 
friendship between Northerners and Southerners.  Also similar to Polk, Peffer used his 
newspaper to publicize personal stories of friendly treatment in a formerly hostile region.  The 
Senator carefully referred to the kindness of Confederate veterans to show his Kansas readers 
that North and South had reconciled.  Since Civil War veterans witnessed the horrors of war 
firsthand they were assumed to be the bitterest Americans.  Because of their combat experiences 
many Americans expected veterans to determine public opinion concerning the forgiveness, or 
ridicule, of enemies.  From this position of authority former soldiers took the lead in advocating 
reconciliation within the agrarian movement.  Peffer suggested that if a Confederate veteran 
accepted a Union veteran and vice versa, then sectionalism was a dead issue.  If veterans could 
forgive, then the general public should forgive as well.  Any lingering bitterness could be 
attributed to dishonest politicians and businessmen.   
Democratic Attorney General Parker Watkins Hardin of Kentucky fit into this narrative 
when he told Peffer that he did not appreciate his presence because it represented a second 
Northern “invasion” of “Republican emissaries” and an effort “to recruit for the Northern 
armies.”  The Kansas Populist dismissed these criticisms and instead noted that Democratic 
reforms could not solve the economic struggles of American farmers.  Democrats proposed tariff 
reduction and the free coinage of silver, which Peffer said did “not reach the core of the trouble.”  
                                                
16 Argersinger, Ibid., 89, 94; Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891. 
 223 
He believed that neither policy helped farmers significantly reduce their debts.  The Senator 
asserted that the subtreasury would prove far more effective.17 
Where one person sees a liberation campaign, another sees a wave of oppression.  
Kentucky Attorney General Hardin was not alone in condemning the Southern Crusade.  Many 
southern Democratic newspapers also interpreted the arrival of Northerners as an aggressive act 
of coercion made by unwanted regional outsiders.  After Mary Lease criticized Democrats during 
her Georgia visit, the Sparta Ishmaelite called her a “watery-eyed, garrulous, ignorant and 
communistic old female from Kansas.”  Northern newspapers also reported that Southerners 
threatened Simpson, Peffer, and other Populists with violence during their tour.18 
  Despite ridicule from the Democratic press, southern agrarian newspapers responded 
positively to the Southern Crusade of Midwestern Populists.  The Southern Alliance Farmer 
wrote “Our Western brethren have shown the faith by their works, and Southern Alliancemen 
should now meet them halfway.”  The editor further contemplated, “With what consistency can 
Alliancemen in the South ask their brethren of the North to throw the mantle of oblivion over the 
dead past, and still keep aflame the old war feeling themselves?”  Kansan J.T. Howe used a 
similar phrase to encourage Populist support in the South.  Howe described the process of 
Alliance members leaving the Republican Party for the Populist Party in his native state.  He told 
                                                
17 Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891.  Although Kentucky never seceded from the Union, the state contained a sizeable 
number of Confederate supporters.  A majority of Kentuckians supported the Union, but supported the 
constitutionality of slavery.  William C. Harris contends that most white Kentuckians disapproved emancipation, but 
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Kentucky, and Missouri, President Lincoln did not apply the Emancipation Proclamation to states in the Union.  
When Attorney General Hardin identified Kentucky with the South, he referred to a largely post-Civil War 
development.  See William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2011); Anne E. Marshall, Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War 
Memory in a Border State (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
18 Sparta Ishmaelite, June 5, 1891, quoted in Shaw, Wool-hat Boys, 36.  Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 115. 
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an Alliance crowd in Bell Spring, Virginia, “They have already made sacrifices by leaving their 
party and say they are willing to meet you halfway.  Are you willing to go the other half?”19  
The uses of the phrases “meet you halfway” and “meet them halfway” resembled the acts 
of reconciliation upon which Alliance leaders placed great emphasis.  Agrarian newspapers 
reported accounts of Polk shaking hands with white Union veterans, the Alliance president’s 
handshake with African American Benjamin Foster, and James “Cyclone” Davis’s handshake 
with C.A. Power at the Cincinnati conference.  Such events demonstrated the commitment of the 
agrarian movement to the reconciliation and unity of Northerners and Southerners.  The Southern 
Mercury displayed its admiration for this image of sectional healing and solidarity when it ran a 
cartoon that featured a white Union soldier and a white Confederate soldier meeting half way 
across a divide to shake hands.  The troops stood on pieces of rock labeled “A Solid North For 
Fear Of Rebel Brigadier Rule” and “A Solid South For Fear Of Negro Supremacy” respectively.  
Beneath the soldiers a dark divide populated with human bones is labeled “The Bloody Chasm.”  
Behind the soldiers a large rising sun emerged from behind clouds to brightly highlight the start 
of a new day for the nation.  Horace Greeley’s quote, “Let Us Clasp Hands Across This Bloody 
Chasm” sat beneath the drawing, which was labeled “The Blue And The Gray.”  Attached to the 
Greeley quote, the Mercury wrote, “Horace Greeley anticipated the inevitable.  The Farmers’ 
Alliance takes up his burden twenty years after he laid it down.”20  
Beyond images of reconciliation and unity, some white Southerners in the Alliance took 
action to match their words.  Amidst the Southern Crusade eleven state Alliance conventions in 
                                                
19 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 91 (first and second quotes); The National Economist, July 4, 1891 (third 
quote), quoted in Argersinger, Ibid., 88. 
20 Worth Robert Miller, Populist Cartoons: An Illustrated History of the Third-Party Movement in the 1890s 
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the South voted heavily in support of the subtreasury system by the end of August 1891.  
Alliance newspapers and many state leaders increasingly devoted more time to promoting the 
subtreasury system.  These votes occurred amidst increased Democratic attacks upon the 
subtreasury plan.  Many Democrats who criticized the subtreasury owed their election to 
Alliance voters.21 
Democratic newspapers joined elected officials in criticizing the subtreasury and also 
turned to race-based regional identity to weaken the southern agrarian movement.  For example, 
the Raleigh News and Observer denounced a “foreign-born fanatic like Peffer.”  Edited by an 
Alliance opponent, Samuel Ashe, the newspaper continued its assault proclaiming, “The farmers 
of the South will not follow such men.  The chivalry of Anglo-Saxon manhood, reverence for the 
virtue of Southern women, and respect for ancestral and race pride, all condemn and repudiate 
such self-confessed demagogues.”22 
Some Alliance writers asserted their opposition to a third party and similarly relied upon 
a race-based regional identity as a basis for resistance.  The Farmers’ Alliance: What It Aims to 
Accomplish noted general white southern disapproval of independent political action.  The 
publication cited a Mississippi Alliance member who expressed support for a third party in the 
Midwest because it weakened the Republican Party and helped Democrats.  In a quote that surely 
reflected the worst fears of Kansas Populists, the Mississippian concluded that Democratic 
loyalties remained strong in his home region.  He said that a third party movement “will not be 
supported by the white Alliance men of the South.”  Some Alliance outlets in the South 
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announced analogous opinions.  In its continued vacillation between the Democratic and Populist 
parties, The National Economist reported its resistance to any third party movement in November 
1891.  The editor of the Progressive Farmer quit over the increased emphasis on the subtreasury 
and criticism of politicians who resisted the plan.  Support for the subtreasury now came to 
denote third party advocacy.23 
Politics began to weaken the Southern Alliance from within as well.  Beginning in 1891 
active member totals began to decline in most southern states.  Local and state Alliances began 
to divide over support for the Democratic or Populist parties.  Georgia lost two-thirds of its 
active Alliance members by the summer of 1891.  Another half of active members quit the 
association before the election of 1892, leaving the state with 16,000 adherents.  Totals for North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Missouri lost some ten to twenty-five percent 
of its numbers.  Whether Democrats or Populists controlled local and state Alliances, the 
organization continued to decline in 1892 as national elections approached.24 
Despite the increasingly divisive role of independent political action, Alliance activists 
published several works to spread their beliefs and maintain unity within the farmers’ 
organization in 1891.  Robert McMath argues that such materials, in conjunction with sub-
Alliance meetings, traveling lecturers, and newspapers, served as the educational tools of the 
agrarian movement.  In this vein, W. Scott Morgan published the History of the Wheel and 
Alliance and the Impending Revolution to educate readers about the goals of the agrarian cause 
                                                
3 H. R. Chamberlain, The Farmers’ Alliance: What It Aims to Accomplish (New York: The Minerva Publishing Co.: 
1891), 58-59; The National Economist, November 21, 1891; Noblin, Polk, 231.  J. E. Bryan expressed similar 
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(Fayetteville, AR: 1891), 113-14. 
24 McMath places greater emphasis on the collapse of economic cooperatives than the advent of independent 
political actions.  He cites the cooperatives as the key source to rapid Alliance growth in the 1880s and states that 
with their decline, the individual tangible benefits of membership ended.  Among southern states, only Alabama and 
Texas experienced increased Alliance membership in 1891.  See Robert McMath, Populist Vanguard: A History of 
the Southern Farmers’ Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 122, 139. 
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and their place in American history.  Morgan set the tone for the book by dedicating his writing 
“To the Wives, Mothers and Daughters of the Farmers and Laborers of America, whose heroic 
devotion and patient fortitude helped to establish American liberty, and who now, as in the past, 
are nobly aiding in the second struggle for independence, this volume is respectfully dedicated, 
as a slight token of the author’s appreciation of their unselfish devotion.”  The Alliance writer 
described women as instrumental to a revolution comparable to the American Revolution.  
Selecting the 1890s rather than the Civil War, Morgan described America in the midst of a 
second dire conflict to determine the fate of the nation.25 
Morgan addressed various aspects of the Wheel and Alliance history in the first half of 
the book and a forecast of the “Impending Revolution” in the second part.  Throughout the 
second half of his work the agrarian leader discussed the Alliance interpretation of American 
history, which viewed the ascent of business and finance and the decline of producers in the 
American economy with great concern.  According to Morgan and other agrarian leaders, such as 
Charles Macune, Alliance reforms aimed to check the increasing greed and power of non-
producers and restore greater economic stability in the lives of the American producing majority.  
Interpreting the previous decades of the nineteenth century, Morgan saw a façade of race, 
slavery, Civil War, and Reconstruction that hid a sinister conspiracy to destroy the freedoms of 
U.S. citizens.   
Morgan supported his concerns by using quotes from American regional and national 
heroes.  George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, John C. Calhoun, Daniel 
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Webster, Abraham Lincoln, and Thaddeus Stevens expressed similar anxieties about the role of 
monopolies and banks in the Republic.  Morgan also cited freely from Pennsylvania Radical 
Republican congressman William D. Kelley who also supported producer rights against those of 
banks and monopolies.  From his perspective in 1876, Kelley interpreted the Civil War as 
creation of European money interests.  Morgan cited Kelley who said, “Sectional strife, hatred 
and animosity were created, engendered and encouraged.  Slavery was made the bone of 
contention, and Northern and Southern ears were rubbed by the emissaries of the gold king, until 
both factions were wrought to a pitch of wild frenzy.”  Morgan continued this narrative and 
applied it to the post-war period, stating “when careful, dispassionate and unbiased investigation 
shall prove that the yoke which the slave king had placed upon four million blacks has been 
transferred by the money king to the necks of fifty million whites, people will discover that the 
battles of the rebellion were not fought in the interest of humanity, or to perpetuate the will of the 
people.”26 
The Alliance author stated that both major political parties started as honorable vehicles 
of democracy, but that they became negatively transformed with the Civil War.  He praised the 
Republican Party for it “was born of the spirit of opposition to chattel slavery.”  Likewise 
Democrats began as the party of the American Revolution, fighting “ostentations and 
concentrated power.”  The party failed, however, when it became the “champion” of slavery.  
Democrats went further from their origins after the Civil War as they mimicked Republicans’ 
policies that embraced corruption and favored business interests over common citizens.  
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Contrasting the partisan gridlock that paralyzed late nineteenth century government, Morgan 
cited Washington and Lincoln who warned about the dire consequences for the nation when the 
wealthy worked the emotions of the people and when sectionalism dominated American politics.  
The agrarian reformer concluded “It becomes, then, the duty of every patriotic citizen and 
member of labor organizations to discountenance partisan spirit and prejudice.”27 
Unlike the two major political parties, Morgan argued that Alliance principles “were in 
line with the teachings of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Stevens.  As such they should have 
been endorsed by the grand old parties, and incorporated into their platforms.”  Far from radical, 
the Alliance promoted reforms that reflected their descent from generations of American political 
heroes.  Democrats and Republicans, meanwhile, invoked memories of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction to prevent the implementation of Alliance policies.  Both parties “Cry negro 
domination; low tariff; high tariff; radical; reconstruction; Powell Clayton; rebel; liar; thief; 
scoundrel; anarchist; bloody shirt; war; rebellion; blood and thunder.  Anything to get up an 
excitement, and rouse men’s passions.”  Morgan, like other Alliance leaders, viewed these as 
false issues that distracted the public from their economic exploitation.28 
Morgan’s economic interpretation of American history created a narrative that was useful 
to the agrarian reform cause.  Alliance members could blame non-producers for creating 
sectionalism, starting the Civil War, and causing economic ruin for most Americans in the years 
                                                
27 Morgan, Ibid., 715, 717-20. 
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Reconstruction Arkansas.  As governor Clayton used martial law and biracial militia to destroy the Ku Klux Klan.  
For his use of military force to achieve order, critics labeled him a tyrant.  See Thomas A. DeBlack, With Fire and 
Sword: Arkansas, 1861-1874 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003), 174-200.  John Clayton, Powell’s 
brother, also served as a state leader in the Arkansas Republican Party during Reconstruction.  During the 1880s 
John helped form a coalition between Republicans and the Union Labor Party, which combined African Americans, 
white farmers, and white labor advocates.  Morgan supported the Union Labor Party and would have familiarity 
with the Claytons.  John Clayton was murdered while gathering evidence to prove that electoral fraud produced his 
loss in an 1888 federal congressional election.  For more, see Kenneth C. Barnes, Who Killed John Clayton?: 
Political Violence and the Emergence of the New South, 1861-1893 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
 230 
since the war.  This argument enhanced reconciliation since neither North nor South could truly 
be blamed for starting the Civil War.  Because they did not start the war, the common people of 
neither region should have felt any lingering hostility.  While Morgan admitted that slavery was 
immoral, he identified non-producers as the ‘true’ culprit of the war.  The Alliance author argued 
that only the government, wielded by the American people, could check the immense power of 
bankers, monopolies, speculators, and other parasitic non-producers.   
Interpreting recent American history through the lens of economics also allowed Morgan 
to blend regional heroes such as Jefferson, Jackson, Calhoun, Lincoln, and Stevens into a single 
historical narrative to support Alliance beliefs.  Emphasizing the worries of these statesmen 
concerning the power of banks and businesses allowed Morgan to ignore their differences on 
issues such as slavery, tariffs, and federal authority over states.  Morgan’s interpretation also 
eliminated race as a legitimate division in American society and instead placed class as the true 
source of tension.  For instance, Morgan cited President Lincoln who warned “I affirm it as my 
conviction that class laws, placing capital above labor, endangers the Republic more fatally at 
this hour than chattel slavery in the days of its haughtiest supremacy.  The effort to place capital 
above labor will shake the Republic, and when the attempt grows into law it will be used to 
fasten still greater burdens upon the people until all liberty is lost.”  The economic driven 
narrative advanced by Morgan downplayed the suffering of African-American slaves and 
highlighted the potential suffering of the American producer class.29 
 Through their interpretation of American history Alliance leaders like Morgan hoped to 
demonstrate the artificial nature of sectional and racial divisions and the unity possible through 
the agrarian organization.  Like agrarian spokesmen before him, Morgan wrote to educate the 
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public and achieve reform.  He predicted, “The North and South will join hands against a 
common foe.  The New England farmer will grasp the hand of his sun-tanned brother of the 
South and West.”  In masculine language that echoed other Alliance writings that described the 
movement as a military force the agrarian reformer stated, “The independent manhood of the 
country is rising up in defense of its liberties.  An army of oppressed producers are organizing 
for victory…A million hearts are beating in response to this settlement, and millions of arms are 
ready to defend it.  The march of this mighty army is already felt by the enemy, intrenched 
behind the fortresses of King Mammon…The Wheel and Alliance stand to-day like a young 
army flushed with victory, without regret for the past, or fear for the future.”30 
Other official Alliance publications continued many themes included in Morgan’s work. 
The works especially emphasized unity within the farmers’ movement.  Nelson A. Dunning 
edited an 1891 history of the agrarian association that also included a collection of essays written 
by Alliance activists.  The articles in The Farmers’ Alliance History and Agricultural Digest 
addressed a variety of topics including race relations, women’s rights, sectionalism, partisanship, 
and monetary policy.  Throughout the work, essays emphasized the common financial struggles 
of ordinary Americans and the unjust actions of monopolies throughout various levels of the 
economy.  Dunning’s edited work advanced the Alliance argument that the struggles of the 
producing class should unify a majority of Americans and create political and economic reforms.  
Identities tied to which side one favored during the Civil War, race, region, and political party 
mattered greatly in the past.  The Alliance argued that times had changed and that Americans 
needed to recognize the realities of the nation in 1891.  Agrarians stated that the consolidation of 
economic and political power into the hands of an exclusive minority threatened the liberty, 
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freedom, and equality of the majority.  Failure to recognize the great forces at work would mean 
the further decline and ultimate doom of American citizens.  In short, the Alliance asked 
Americans to remember the past, but to focus on the present and future of the country.  
According to agrarian leaders, economic considerations and a producer class identity more 
accurately reflected the true status of the American majority than allegiances to race, region, and 
political party. 
Throughout 1891 it became increasingly apparent that Alliance goals could only be 
achieved by working through the political process.  Although agrarian leaders did not uniformly 
endorse pursuing Alliance objectives through an independent party, the possibility of a national 
third party movement influenced organizational activities in 1891.  The Dunning collection was 
not immune from these political considerations.  Articles in the volume addressed potential 
constituencies needed for a successful national third party challenge in 1892.  Women, African 
Americans, white Southerners, Northerners, farmers, and laborers all received individual 
attention in the Dunning tome.  Each article demonstrated that the social groups could find a 
common voice in the farmers’ movement, which sought unity among the American producer 
class.  
Because women actively participated in the Alliance from the beginning and due to their 
possible enfranchisement, the Dunning collection included an essay devoted to women.  As the 
woman’s suffrage movement gathered momentum throughout the West and Midwest in the 
1890s, some agrarians looked to women as a potential source of votes in efforts to turn Alliance 
reforms into laws.  Like Morgan, Bettie Gay of Columbus, Texas testified to the centrality of 
women to the Alliance.  Gay stated that the agrarian order gave women fair treatment and an 
equal voice at meetings.  The Texan argued that society no longer viewed women as 
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intellectually inferior to men.  Like the general Alliance historical narrative, Gay said that 
women entered a new era where their talents and interests received recognition.  She contended 
that the Alliance recognized women as equal contributors in the struggle to bring justice to the 
American producer class.  Like other essays in Farmers’ Alliance History, Gay suggested that a 
female identity did not exclude women from participation in the movement on behalf of 
American producers.  While women had been excluded from many social movements in the past, 
the Alliance welcomed them into a crusade that confronted contemporary economic problems.  
In short, women were not excluded from the producer class because of their gender identity.  The 
Alliance recognized that the political and economic problems of the late nineteenth century 
affected all members of the producer class, including women.31     
Other essays focused on two formidable obstacles to a strong national agrarian reform 
movement, sectionalism and partisan feeling, and their solution, reconciliation.  In his essay, 
“Sectionalism,” Ben Clover portrayed animosity between the North and South as a means to 
exploit the producer class.  Clover stated, “sectional hate and its other self, party prejudice, have 
been the means by which monopoly has been enabled to bind the people.”  Clover asked the 
South to forget the past and join the West to accomplish shared reform goals.  The Southern 
Alliance vice president suggested leaving the divisions of the war behind, while honoring the 
troops when he wrote “why should not we, in our memories, let them lie side by side, and over 
their graves clasp hands.”  Clover asked, “Will not the proudest monument we can build to their 
memory be a just and righteous government, that will protect the weak, do justice to all, and be 
of, for, and by the people?”32  
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Like Clover, Jerry Simpson attacked sectionalism.  He portrayed Kansans as a model for 
reconciliation since they “cast aside the chief apostle of this doctrine of hate, John J. Ingalls, and 
thereby set an example to the rest of the country, particularly to the South.”  Simpson said that 
voters in his home state realized “that for long years they had been blinded to their own interests 
by designing politicians, who kept alive the old war issues and prejudices.”  The Kansas 
Congressman claimed that the citizens of his state looked past sectionalism to identify “new 
issues” that needed to be addressed.  He triumphantly concluded that Alliance reforms started “a 
political revolution that bids fair to sweep from one end of the country to the other, and drive 
from place and power the men who fattened upon the labor of the people.”  Like other Alliance 
writers, Simpson and Clover described sectionalism and partisanship as false social divisions.  
The shared class identity of producers against monopolies stood as the true demarcation of 
America.  Since both men favored a national third party, the Kansans also appealed to 
Southerners who considered joining the Populist Party.33  
Although he did not yet advocate joining the Populist Party, Leonidas Polk, like other 
white Southerners, joined Simpson and Clover in calling for the forgiveness of past grudges and 
the embrace of new allegiances.  In his essay, “Sectionalism and the Alliance,” Polk stated that 
the agrarian “order recognizes the fact that the war ended in 1865, that chattel slavery is gone, 
and that the prejudices and divisions, born of its existence, should go with it.”  The North 
Carolinian described the Alliance as an organization that joined “the ex-slave holder of the 
South” with those “born and reared an abolitionist” into “a common cause – the cause of a 
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common country.”34  Like Simpson and Clover, Polk wanted to address more current matters.  In 
strongly religious language he urged his audience to 
‘Let the dead past bury its dead,’ and let us, with new hope, new aspirations, new 
zeal, new energy, and new life, turn our faces toward the rising sun of an 
auspicious and inviting future, and reconsecrate ourselves to the holy purpose of 
transmitting to our posterity a government ‘of the people, by the people, and for 
the people,’ and which shall be unto all generations the citadel of refuge for civil 
and religious liberty.35  
 
Unlike their Kansas allies, Polk and other white Southerners devoted part of their articles 
to addressing the failures of the recent American past.  In so doing, white Southern Alliance 
leaders sought to establish a consensus interpretation of the Reconstruction era, while also 
calling for a rejection of past loyalties.  Following increasingly prevalent trends in late-
nineteenth-century America, the farmers’ movement allowed a white southern narrative of 
Reconstruction to predominate.  Polk used the biblical story of King Jeroboam in a slightly 
veiled attack on the Reconstruction-era goal of African-American equality.  Like sectional 
agitators, Polk said that King Jeroboam of Israel attempted to unify his people through division.  
Jeroboam segregated his people into two groups and “made high priests of the lowest people,” 
but “the avenging hand of outraged of justice” destroyed him.  The Alliance president asked if 
“high priests” had not also been made of America’s “lowest people” and wondered if history 
would repeat itself.  He urged Americans not to divide as Jeroboam’s people had.36   
Instead of seeing the period as a positive time of democratic expansion, Polk conveyed 
the opinion that Reconstruction upset the social order and created sectionalism.  Northerners 
created animosity with white Southerners when they attempted to institute full rights and social 
equality for black Americans.  African Americans also acquired an artificial hostility for white 
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Southerners, thanks to the machinations of unscrupulous Northerners.  Polk’s interpretation 
identified sectionalism with Reconstruction, not with the Civil War.  While Polk noted the end of 
slavery and paid homage to the Civil War dead, he assertively dismissed Reconstruction as an 
unjust period that created artificial racial and sectional divisions in American society. 
Other white southern leaders in the Alliance expressed similar attitudes demonstrating 
that when white Southerners discussed sectionalism they could not avoid addressing race and 
Reconstruction.  Georgia Alliance President Leonidas “Lon” Livingston hinted at race and 
Reconstruction in his essay, “The Needs of the South.”  Livingston, who flirted with endorsing 
the Populist Party during 1891, started his essay by addressing what the South did not need.  
Foremost, he stated that the region did not require “advice” from “people either ignorant of our 
needs or wilfully opposed to the betterment of our condition.”  The Georgia agrarian thought that 
partisan outsiders with sectionalism in their hearts sought the ruin of the South and wanted to 
prevent the region from returning to its former glory.  Livingston claimed that the Alliance 
recognized the true needs of the region, which included education, greater exchange of goods 
with those from other sections of the country, less of the national tax burden and, a flexible 
monetary system controlled by the federal government.  He concluded by calling for good 
relations between the regions and the elimination of laws that favored one section over another 
as prerequisites for national peace and prosperity.37  
Like Polk and Livingston, J.H. Turner also criticized Reconstruction and accusations of 
constant southern racial strife from a southern white perspective.  Born and raised in Georgia just 
before the Civil War, Turner discussed southern race relations to “bring about a better 
understanding all over this country, that will bring peace and prosperity to the great common 
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people, both white and black.”38  In his article, “The Race Problem,” the Alliance Secretary-
Treasurer addressed past race relations in the South and presented a case for greater interracial 
cooperation through the farmers’ movement.  
Turner began his essay by describing how Northerners misled African Americans during 
Reconstruction.  He stated that the Northern “carpet-bagger” falsely promised ex-slaves social 
equality and economic assistance.  Misled and given false hope, African Americans failed to 
recognize that ex-masters were their true friends.  Once the promises of the “pretended friends” 
went unfulfilled, black Americans turned to self-help, pursuing happiness through education and 
property.  In the years since Reconstruction, the Alliance officer claimed that race relations 
improved despite the false claims made by journalists who wished to maintain sectional 
hostilities and party affiliations.  Like Livingston, Turner argued that the South should be left 
alone to resolve its racial problems.39    
Turner also blamed both major parties for using race as a sham issue to perpetuate party 
loyalties and avoid making agricultural reforms.  He indicted Democrats who continually warned 
of “negro supremacy,” while Republicans repeatedly charged that white Southerners were un-
Reconstructed.  In contrast, Turner described the Southern Alliance and Colored Alliance as 
vehicles for true political progress.  He contended that after being used during Reconstruction, 
African Americans were “willing and anxious to sever all past party affiliations” to join with 
western and southern white farmers to improve their circumstances.  While Turner admitted that 
white Southerners showed less desire to abandon Democrats, he claimed that whites were 
“perfectly willing and ready to take the negro by the hand and say to him: We are citizens of the 
same great country; we have the same foes to face, the same ills to bear; therefore our interests as 
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agriculturalists are one, and we will co-operate with you, and defend and protect you in all your 
rights.”40   
From this base of common interest, Turner encouraged more positive interactions 
between blacks and whites in the South.  The Georgian relied heavily on Henry Grady’s famous 
1886 New York speech to explain past, current, and future race relations.  In his speech Grady 
admitted to northern righteousness in the fight to end slavery, but he also stated that southern 
whites understood blacks better, and they should therefore lead African Americans to education, 
enlightenment, and citizenship.  Grady argued that the Civil War demonstrated the strong ties 
between the races in the South.  The Atlanta editor claimed that black slaves protected white 
women, while slave masters fought against emancipation.  The loyalty and devotion that slaves 
showed their masters justified equal legal rights for ex-slaves after emancipation.     
Grady also provided Turner and the Southern Alliance with a formula for keeping race 
relations constructive.  The Constitution editor said that “social equality” would not be achieved 
through law, but should be left to the “conscience and common sense” of individuals.  “Social 
equality” referred to removing all social barriers from white-black interactions, including 
restrictions against interracial marriage.  Southern whites viewed “social equality” as a 
threatening concept that suggested “negro domination” and the corruption of white female 
sexuality purity.  Many late-nineteenth-century African Americans expressed mixed feelings 
toward the desirability of social equality.  Some blacks wished to remove all social and legal 
barriers based on race, while others rejected assertions that African Americans wanted to force 
interactions with whites.41   
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Turner provided evidence to suggest that many African Americans fell into the latter 
group who rejected the enforcement of “social equality.”  Supporting his assertion he quoted 
another Southerner, a black Methodist minister and member of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance 
from Florida.  Reverend John L. Moore claimed that African Americans did not want “social 
relations with the whites either.  We do not want to eat at their tables, sleep in their beds, neither 
ride in the cars with them; but we do want as good fare as the whites receive for the same 
consideration.”  Indicating that a rejection of social equality did not prohibit political and 
economic cooperation, Moore said that his Putnam County Colored Alliance was “willing and 
ready to lay down the past” and support a political movement that favored laboring men, 
“irrespective of party, race, or creed,” to promote the “motto ‘Equal rights to all, and special 
privileges to none.’”42    
Turner’s article summarized the racial attitudes of the Southern Alliance and, later, 
Populism.  The Georgian claimed that black and white Alliance members agreed that racial 
separation could provide progress in race relations.  This position suggested that whites and 
blacks should separate until education reduced the likelihood of racial violence and animosity.  
Turner and other Alliance leaders asserted that a rejection of “social equality” did not prevent the 
equal application of civil laws or the political partnership of economically distressed farmers. 
Unlike the more hostile and aggressive views of Ben Tillman or the more liberal views of 
George Washington Cable and Frederick Douglass, the farmers’ movement promoted what was 
considered a progressive position of late-nineteenth-century race relations.  Although New South 
proponent Grady provided the framework for Alliance views of race relations, agrarians went 
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further by repeatedly supporting equal civil, political, and economic rights for African 
Americans.43 
Convinced that white and black Southerners in the Alliance could produce racial 
harmony in the region, Kansas Populists expressed confidence in the internal unity of the 
farmers’ movement.  Unlike white Southerners, northern agrarians avoided discussing 
Reconstruction and instead focused on contemporary race relations.  Kansans like Senator 
William Peffer did not contest white southern interpretations of Reconstruction and only 
indirectly referenced legacies of the era.  Indicating that he viewed racial and sectional 
prejudices as interrelated, Peffer pledged that Kansas Populists would never support laws 
motivated by sectional hatred and they would avoid “Northern lecturing,” which he considered 
ineffective.  As a former anti-slavery advocate and a resident of Reconstruction-era Tennessee, 
Peffer understood the sensitivity required when discussing southern race relations with residents 
of the region.  When Northerners told white Southerners how to treat black Southerners they 
aroused sectional hostilities that harkened back decades to debates concerning slavery.44 
Since Northerners believed that white and black Southerners resolved past differences 
under the banner of the Alliance, they attacked racial and sectional identities as artificial barriers 
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to producer class unity.  Like Turner and Moore, Peffer promoted equal treatment for whites and 
blacks under the law.  The Kansas senator also went further than white and black Southerners to 
denounce racial segregation since he believed that race no longer mattered in the South.  Peffer 
denounced barriers to black membership in the Kansas Alliance and Populist Party and he urged 
the South to follow this example.45 
Other Northerners praised the arrival of a new era where southern whites and blacks lived 
in peace.  Emboldened by southern pledges and by their experiences during the “Southern 
Crusade,” Northern agrarians expressed confidence in the national farmers’ movement during the 
summer and fall of 1891.  With race no longer a barrier, northern agrarians hailed the end of 
sectionalism and partisanship.  The Populist majority Kansas state legislature voted to condemn 
the Lodge Bill as partisan ploy to rekindle sectional prejudice.  Populist Congressman Jerry 
Simpson confidently stated “the Southern bloody shirt, fear of Negro domination, can no longer 
be waved successfully to hold the white people of the South solidly in the Democratic party.”  
Kansan Frank McGrath predicted that Populists would receive full southern black support in the 
1892 election.  Senator Peffer wrote, “It is wonderful how men are breaking away from the 
restraints which have held them.”  Minnesota agrarian leader Ignatius Donnelly claimed that the 
Populists hoped “to wipe the color line out of politics.”  These utterances represented genuine 
faith in the South as a political partner in the Populist Party.  Northerners made the comments to 
encourage Southerners to join a third party movement based on Alliance reforms.  
Midwesterners also wanted to ease worries in their home states where opponents described the 
Southern Alliance as nothing more than a Democratic tool to divide the Republican North.  In 
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the year before a national election, Northerners found it critical to reduce doubts and build a 
trans-regional base of support.46 
When Northerners conveyed their understanding of Southern Alliance assurances of 
racial harmony below the Mason-Dixon, they drew the ire of some white Southerners.  
Particularly vexing to these southern whites were Northern statements concerning segregation 
and biracial politics.  Responding to Donnelly’s comments that “the New Order of things would 
wipe out the color line in the South,” a white southern member of the Alliance asked a Georgia 
audience if they wanted to eat and sleep with African Americans.  During a June 1891 interview 
with Josephus Daniels, Peffer repeated his opposition to racial exclusion.  When Daniels asked if 
a biracial Populist Party would split the white southern Democratic vote and produce black 
domination, the Kansas senator responded that he cared little.  Peffer told Daniels that he 
cherished Populist principles above the Democratic Party.  The Kansan said that Populists 
opposed efforts by politicians to invoke racial and sectional biases because they prevented the 
enactment of reform.  Daniels contended that Democrats did not create the problems that plagued 
the nation, but he promised that the party would solve them once it gained control of the federal 
government.  As a supporter of the Alliance and friend to Leonidas Polk in their home state of 
North Carolina, Daniels held opinions shared by other white Southerners.  Given a choice 
between Alliance values found in a biracial People’s Party and the Democratic Party, many 
white Southerners chose the later.47 
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Sympathetic to the economic and political remedies of the agrarian movement, many 
white Southerners could not support a party that threatened Democratic domination in the region 
because it might result in the return of the Reconstruction era “negro domination.”  Besides 
increasing momentum for the establishment of the Populist Party in the South in 1891, some 
white Southerners became increasingly concerned with African-American activism.  One 
Alabama newspaper expressed reservations with the black wing of the Alliance.  The Anniston 
Weekly Times warned white Southerners of a looming threat that harkened back to 
Reconstruction.  The newspaper stated, 
Here is the old Loyal League back upon us again, with its yearning for the lands 
of the white man, with its ambition that the Federal flag shall float over every 
school house and over every ballot box.  Here is the force bill again with 
congressional troops and bayonets to decide elections for a free people.  Here is 
the old secret society going in and out with pass word.  This new Loyal League 
comes to us this time under the wing of the Farmers’ Alliance.48 
 
  
Further evidence emerged to shake confidence in the harmony between Colored and 
Southern alliances.  Encouraged by some Colored Alliance members Superintendent Richard 
Humphrey announced a region-wide cotton pickers’ strike for September 20.  The strike revealed 
economic differences between landholders and farm workers in the Colored and Southern 
alliances.  Many Colored Alliance members announced they would not support work protest.  
The opposition, which included Georgia Superintendent E. A. Richardson, said that the strike 
would hurt the biracial farm movement.  Richardson stated, “we were banded together for the 
purpose of educating ourselves and co-operating with the white people for the betterment of the 
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colored people…such a step as this would be fatal.”  Southern Alliance leaders denounced the 
strike since many property-holders could not afford to pay pickers the demanded one-dollar per 
hundred pounds plus boarding.  When the day of the proposed work stoppage arrived, Colored 
Alliance members mostly failed to participate.  African-American cotton pickers went on strike 
in South Carolina, eastern Texas and eastern Arkansas.  All ended with the firing of agricultural 
workers and their eviction from farms.  The Arkansas protest turned violent and resulted in 
fifteen deaths, including the lynching of black strikers.  In the aftermath, the Colored Alliance 
quickly dissolved as its members lost faith in the organization and because of hostility from 
whites.49  
The strike failed to gain a widespread biracial following largely because of class 
differences.  Roughly sixty-four percent of Colored Alliance members and two percent of 
Southern Alliance members were farm workers.  Most black opposition came from landowners, 
while Southern Alliance antagonism can be attributed partially to the two-thirds of members who 
owned their farms.  Polk announced his opposition to the strike because he claimed that 
property-owners could not afford to pay farm workers more.  Many African Americans 
supported the strike because it addressed their immediate economic needs.  Alliance remedies 
such as the subtreasury and cooperatives usually favored landowners and did little for farm 
workers.  Although the strike destroyed the Colored Alliance, biracial cooperation continued 
though largely through political organizing.  Walter Patillo of North Carolina and John T. Moore 
of Florida became two of several former Colored Alliance leaders who advocated for the 
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Populist Party.  Others such as Richardson allied with Democratic politicians like Georgia 
Governor William Northen.50  
Besides southern troubles, Midwesterners encountered setbacks in their efforts to effect 
Populist victories in Iowa and Kentucky during the fall of 1891.  Midwestern agrarians 
constantly visited Kentucky and Iowa where off-year elections offered an early opportunity to 
expand Populist victories outside of the Sunflower State.  When election day ended, Populist 
candidates polled three percent of the vote in Iowa and six percent in Kentucky.  Republicans 
and Democrats in both states realized the popularity of the Alliance and adapted some of its anti-
monopoly reforms.  Unlike Kansas, each state also had a competitive two-party system.  Despite 
the sizeable defeats, Populist national chairman Herman Taubeneck declared, “the ‘solid south’ 
is broken.”  Kansas Republicans seized on the losses to remind voters that the Alliance only 
represented a Democratic conspiracy.  They warned that Kentuckians failed to join the Populists 
and other Southerners would remain Democrats.51 
Events in Georgia further added to Midwestern difficulties in establishing a national third 
party.  Many Midwesterners viewed Georgia as fertile ground for the Populist Party since the 
state had a strong Alliance that produced national leaders for the agrarian movement, including 
Lon Livingston and J.H. Turner.  Populist leaders thought that Georgia could serve as a foothold 
for additional party growth in the South.  When the state Alliance met in August 1891 third party 
advocates hoped to win control of the body.  Lon Livingston won reelection as president and 
foiled Populist aspirations.  After flirting with Populists throughout much of the year, Livingston 
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clarified his position prior to the convention.  He announced his staunch loyalty to the 
Democratic Party and thereafter became a vocal critic of Populism.52 
Populist aspirations in Georgia did not die with the reelection of Livingston.  Despite the 
setbacks at the state convention, third party supporters founded a newspaper to represent their 
views.  In October, Tom Watson began publishing The People’s Party Paper.  A month later 
third party allies from the state won several victories at the annual meeting of the Southern 
Farmers’ Alliance in Indianapolis.  Foremost, Georgian Mell Branch sponsored a resolution that 
would forbid any U.S. congressmen who received Alliance support from caucusing with a party 
that did not support the Ocala platform.  The plan effectively forced Alliance-backed 
congressmen to abandon Democratic and Republican caucuses where the Speaker was chosen 
and the House of Representatives organized.  Notwithstanding vocal opposition from Livingston, 
the resolution passed.  Livingston also removed his name from consideration when it became 
apparent that he would lose his bid to oust Polk as National Alliance president.  Polk favored the 
Branch resolution and a national third party.  The election of many Populist allies to Alliance 
offices and the passage of the Branch proposition effectively made the Alliance a subsidiary of 
the Populist Party.53 
Tensions between agrarian supporters became increasingly hostile as 1892 began.  Since 
politics became the primary source of divisiveness, it was only appropriate that events in 
Washington D.C. set the tone for a tumultuous year.  Despite his opposition to a third party, 
Charles Macune hosted a meeting of southern congressmen.  While some forty southern 
Democrats received Alliance support in the 1890 election, only seventeen attended the meeting.  
In a further blow to the Branch resolution, sixteen of the congressmen pledged to reject the 
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Indianapolis instructions and join the Democratic caucus.  Democrats planned to elect Charles F. 
Crisp, a Georgian who opposed the subtreasury plan, as the Speaker of the House.  Tom Watson 
stood as the lone dissident from the Southerners present.  Watson exchanged bitter words with 
Livingston who had to be restrained before attacking his fellow Georgian.  When emotions 
settled somewhat the sixteen southern Democrats left Watson with eight Western and 
Midwestern Populists.  In Senator Peffer’s office the eight representatives held the first caucus of 
congressional Populists and elected Watson as its Speaker of the House.  Livingston and the 
other fifteen southern Democrats supported Crisp, who easily won election as Speaker.  In a final 
measurement all but one Southerner failed the application of the Alliance “yardstick.”54 
Further signs emerged to demonstrate the destructive role of politics within the national 
agrarian movement.  The National Economist, the official newspaper of National Alliance, 
praised the actions of the southern Democratic congressmen who elected Crisp.  The newspaper 
also praised the congressmen for opposing the Branch Resolution made at the national Southern 
Alliance meeting.  When Kansan Stephen McLallin arrived in Washington D.C. for a National 
Citizens’ Alliance meeting he criticized Livingston and other Alliancemen from the South.  
Livingston responded by stating that Kansans were foolish to believe southern Alliancemen 
would ever leave the Democratic Party.  Other Southerners elected by Alliance members 
supported Livingston, including Ben Tillman’s lieutenant, South Carolina Senator John Irby.  
When Peffer approached his senate colleague and expressed his hope that they could cooperate 
on legislation, the South Carolinian replied, “Well, sir, we Alliancemen in the South are all 
Democrats.”  Georgia Senator John B. Gordon also refused to work with Peffer.55 
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Such actions drew further criticism from politically vulnerable Kansas Populists.  
Representative John Otis noted that the congressmen had “cut loose from their Kansas brethren 
on everything.  With the exception of Watson, the Southern alliancemen have agreed to act with 
the Democrats in everything; in fact they declare they never had any other intention.”  Otis 
expressed the frustrations of agrarians in his state when he said “The Kansas men feel bad about 
it, and some who thought the Southern alliancemen would be with them in everything are really 
mad about it.  They declare openly that the Southerners have gone back on them.”  Based on his 
tours through the South during the previous summer Representative Jerry Simpson stated his 
surprise at southern inaction in Congress.  Simpson claimed that the Southerners forgot “the 
pledges they made the people and have forgotten the people too.”56 
Despite these frustrations Alliance members from the Midwest and South continued to 
cooperate in the promotion of a national Populist Party.  When various reform organizations met 
at St. Louis in February 1892 the Southern Alliance sent the most members of any association.  
Most Southerners present supported a third party.  Polk won election as chairman while Frances 
Willard won the vice chair position.  The assembly approved the Alliance Indianapolis platform 
and added several others to their calls for reform.  Delegates supported public ownership of 
railroads, referred female suffrage to state legislatures, while bypassing the extremely 
controversial issue of prohibition that created divisions among Westerners.  The convention also 
called for a national nominating convention for the Populist Party.  On July 4, 1892, 1,776 
delegates would assemble in Omaha, Nebraska.57  
Southern Democrats reacted assertively to the threat of a third party.  At St. Louis whole 
southern delegations refused to support the platform and the People’s Party.  Livingston again 
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damaged the hopes of Midwestern Populists when he told the Republican Topeka Daily Capital 
that “We don’t care what they do in Kansas and other western states.”  The congressman stated 
that it would be better for Kansans to have a third party since it would “overthrow the 
Republican party, and in that good work we wish them success; but in the South we want no 
third party.”  A Tennessee delegate made a similar comment, saying that he supported the 
endorsement of a third party at St. Louis because the South would remain Democratic and “the 
Republican party is the sufferer.”  These statements repeated Republican charges made since the 
founding of the Kansas People’s Party.  Third party opponents portrayed the South as a firmly 
Democratic region committed to the destruction of the Republican Party through the Alliance 
and Midwestern Populism.  As a major southern leader in the Alliance who toured Georgia with 
Midwestern Populists the summer before and as an astute politician who chose Democratic 
allegiance over the third party, Livingston surely realized the impact of his comments.  Now 
firmly supporting Democratic efforts to weaken Populism in the South and nationally, the 
Georgian knew where to hit the agrarian movement hardest.  The rhetoric of sectional 
reconciliation and Alliance brotherhood rang hollow as intense struggles ruptured the agrarian 
crusade in 1892.58 
Following these disagreements among national Alliance leaders in St. Louis and 
Washington D.C., conflict erupted throughout the ranks of the southern farmers’ revolt.  Starting 
in 1892, these struggles continued throughout the 1890s.  The Democratic state conventions of 
Texas and Tennessee required attendees to swear an oath not to support the Alliance or its 
principles.  South Carolina Democrats under Ben Tillman’s direction approved the Alliance 
platform but pledged support for the Democratic presidential nominee whether he endorsed 
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agrarian reforms or not.  Outside of the convention halls communities, churches, and families 
split over support for Democracy or Populism.  North Carolina congregations removed ministers 
who supported the opposite political party, including Thomas Dixon, Sr.  Alabama Populist 
congressman Milford W. Howard later remembered “My own father would not hear me speak 
and said he would rather make my coffin with his own hands and bury me than to have me desert 
the Democratic Party.”59 
Populist appeals to racial reconciliation also came under attack.  The third party endorsed 
Alliance statements supporting African American political, economic, and legal rights, while 
rejecting “social equality.”  Democrats including Livingston and Georgia Governor William 
Northen accused Populists of betraying white supremacy in their conduct of race relations.  The 
Atlanta Constitution wrote that “The old issue of sectionalism is confronting the South and 
White Supremacy is more important than all the financial reform in the world.”  Since Populists 
threatened to split the white southern vote, Democrats forecast a return of Reconstruction-era 
“Negro domination,” Republican rule, and the Lodge “Force” Bill.  Democrats made clear that 
Populism represented a betrayal of regional culture and identity.60 
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Despite these Democratic criticisms, Populists held out hope that they could win the 
South.  These hopes rested largely on fielding a presidential ticket that featured agrarian leaders 
from the South, Midwest, or West.  Front-runners included Leonidas Polk and Kansans William 
Peffer, John Willits, and John Davis.  After keeping his Populist sympathies unofficial for 
months, Polk endorsed the party in late May 1892.  He became the favorite for the Populist 
nomination based on his years of campaigning across the country in favor of sectional 
reconciliation and agrarian principles.61 
Populists from the West, Midwest, and Northeast wrote encouraging letters to Polk 
throughout the spring and summer.  Former Grand Army of the Republic Grand Commander 
Paul Van Dervoort of Nebraska and Colorado Governor Davis Waite also endorsed Polk because 
he was popular in the South and gave the party hope for “breaking the ‘Solid South.’”  The 
Union veteran, Van Dervoort wrote that “We have the opportunity of our lives to bind the North 
and South together and we both represent a clan that did the fighting and held malice the shortest 
time.”  Massachusetts reformer and journalist H.H. Boyce told Polk that a ticket of former 
veterans would be unstoppable.  Polk’s nomination seemed assured as the July 4 convention 
approached.62 
  Surprising many, Polk did not receive the nomination.  A month before the convention 
he died of complications from bladder cancer on June 11, 1892.  The North Carolinian suffered 
frequent bouts of sickness as he followed a rigorous travel schedule during the three proceeding 
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years.  This time Polk did not recover.  His death marked a major blow for Populism.  The major 
southern leader capable of uniting West, Midwest, and South was now gone.  In a final gesture to 
his work as a sectional reconciliationist, Kansans Peffer, John Grant Otis, and William Baker 
served as pallbearers at Polk’s funeral.  Like Polk, Peffer and Otis possessed Civil War veteran 
credentials.63 
Despite the bad news, Democrats provided Populists with renewed hope when they 
nominated Grover Cleveland for president.  Additionally, the national ticket rejected the 
controversial subtreasury plan.  The convention also refused to endorse increased silver coinage, 
a measure favored by many western and southern Democrats.  Since the Democratic Party 
blatantly rejected all Alliance reforms, southern agrarians reconsidered their political position.64  
 Meeting in Omaha, Nebraska on July 4, Populists continued much of the work started 
under the Alliance.  The Populist platform asserted previous reforms on increasing the amount of 
paper money in circulation and placing the responsibility with government rather than private 
banks.  Delegates also endorsed government ownership of railroads, telegraph, and telephone.  
Checking the power of monopolies and big businesses, the People’s Party proposed a graduated 
income tax, an end to alien ownership of land, protection of labor unions, and they denounced 
corporate use of private detectives to break strikes and intimidate Western cattle raisers.  In a 
move to counter the Lodge Bill and political partisanship, Populists proposed a secret ballot 
printed by the government to replace party tickets and ballot boxes.  The platform also called for 
the popular election of U.S. senators, the subtreasury system, and an eight-hour workday.  
Celebrating its claims to oppose sectionalism and partisanship, the Omaha preamble attacked 
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both political parties, while two whites and an African American stood on stage to wave an 
American flag.65 
Reaffirming its commitment to sectional reconciliation and hoping to maximize the 
possibility of victory, the People’s Party selected two Civil War veterans to its ticket.  James B. 
Weaver of Iowa won the presidential nomination by a wide margin.  Weaver was a Union 
veteran and a longtime third-party activist.  In 1880 he won three percent of the popular vote as 
the Greenback-Labor Party presidential candidate.  Because of his association with losing causes 
and his Union background some Populists did not want to select Weaver.  Few other choices 
existed for the third party.  Believing he could do more for the cause by serving in the Senate, 
William Peffer refused to be considered.  Chicago Republican Judge Walter Q. Gresham 
endorsed tariff and monetary reform, but he also declined the nomination.  Populists ruled out 
Ignatius Donnelly due to eccentricity and Leland Stanford because of his association with 
monopoly.66 
Seeking balance for the ticket James G. Field received the Vice Presidential nomination.  
Delegates chose Field largely due to his southern background.  A Virginia native, he lost a leg 
while serving under A.P. Hill as a major in the Confederacy.  Excluded from Alliance 
membership because of his practice of law, Field also farmed and maintained an allegiance to 
state agrarian reform causes.  Like Weaver, Field brought considerable flaws to the ticket.  
Popular locally, Field was unknown to most supporters of the national agrarian movement.  He 
also committed to Populism only three weeks before the Omaha convention.  The People’s Party 
ticket included a man stigmatized for being a constant losing third-party candidate and a man 
without firm connections to the national agrarian crusade.  Still, since the Civil War neither 
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major party had selected a Southerner for their presidential and vice presidential tickets.  The 
Populist ticket contained a Confederate veteran and a Union veteran.  Unlike Republicans and 
Democrats, the People’s Party nominated men who fought on opposing sides in the Civil War.  
Through the reconciled ticket, Populists hoped to break from the past and reform American 
political and economic systems.67 
 Internal and external divisions threatened Populist unity during the 1892 campaign.  
Prohibition and women’s suffrage formed two major issues that split Populists in the West.  
Since Populists cooperated with Democrats in western states, prohibition received no support 
from the third party.  Southerners also rejected prohibition and women’s suffrage.  Based largely 
on southern opposition, women’s suffrage was not included in the Omaha Platform.  In Rocky 
Mountain states and in Kansas women’s suffrage received widespread support.  Female suffrage 
received strong support among Kansans, but the Populist majority in the legislature split over the 
issue and eventually defeated the legislation with the help of Republicans.  Many Populists 
expressed great disappointment with their legislators.68 
Race became a more powerful weapon used by external critics of the People’s Party, 
particularly in the South.  Since the People’s Party threatened Democratic rule and because the 
third party included African Americans in its national and state conventions, Democrats charged 
white Populists with betraying their region and race.  As the Atlanta Constitution wrote, “The old 
issue of sectionalism is confronting the South and White Supremacy is more important than all 
the financial reform in the world.”  The Richmond Dispatch and the Raleigh News and Observer 
                                                
67 McMath, American Populism, 169-70; William DuBose Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion: Virginia Farm 
Politics, 1885-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), 83-85.  Campaign ribbons featured the candidates 
and a drawing of  a handshake.  The cuff surrounding one hand read, “Blue,” while the cuff around the other hand 
read “Gray.” James L. Roark, et al.  The American Promise: A History of the United States, 4th ed. (New York: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2009), 706. 
68 McMath, American Populism, 170-71. 
 255 
echoed similar claims that reminded readers that Democrats saved southern states from the inept 
rule of Reconstruction governments by reinstating white supremacy.69 
In the person of James B. Weaver, Democrats also found a target ripe for recalling hostile 
memories of the Civil War.  Through speakers and newspapers Democrats charged General 
Weaver with instituting total war in Pulaski, Tennessee.  During the war the Union commander 
supposedly ordered the execution of Confederate soldiers.  Democrats also charged that Northern 
soldiers harassed, stole, and imprisoned local residents.  After a month of such stories, Weaver 
arrived in Georgia to campaign with his wife, Field, and Lease.  He received a lackluster 
reception from crowds in some towns, while at other campaign stops he was booed.  At 
Columbus a fight almost occurred on stage.  Worse still, after Democratic prodding, a crowd hit 
Mrs. Weaver with an egg, shouted down General Weaver, and drove the Populist speakers from 
their hotel balcony with shouting and more eggs.  At Cordele, Vice Presidential nominee and 
Confederate veteran James Field faced a similar situation and sought refuge with the mayor.  The 
hostility was not solely reserved for Northerners.  Native Georgian and Populist Tom Watson 
faced a hostile crowd in Atlanta that required a police escort upon his exit.  Scheduled to appear 
at the same hall the next evening, Weaver cancelled his appearance and all others in the state.  
The Weavers and Mary Lease left the state and the Populist national campaign committee 
declared Georgia unsafe for speakers during the rest of the electoral campaign.70 
Throughout the rest of the 1892 campaign Georgia witnessed a revival of political 
violence that harkened back to the Reconstruction era.  Threats, fights, shootings, and murders 
accompanied the autumn.  Georgia was not alone.  In Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas similar 
activities accompanied the electoral season.  Bribery, ballot box stuffing, and intimidation 
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became widespread on election day.  As a result Populists suffered defeat across the South. 
Watson lost his reelection bid and no southern Populist won election to the U.S. Congress. 
Weaver received less than a third of the vote in all southern states, save Alabama where 
Populists narrowly lost the gubernatorial race.  In most states People’s Party candidates finished 
third.71 
Results from the West and the Plains gave the third party more hope.  Weaver won 
Kansas, Colorado, Nevada, and Idaho.  He also received a share of the electoral votes in North 
Dakota and Oregon.  No third party since the Civil War had won any electoral votes.  Weaver 
won twenty-two in 1892.  He also gained one million national votes.  Cooperation with 
Democrats produced People’s Party victories in the Colorado and Kansas gubernatorial elections.  
Throughout the West and the Plains the third party won state and local elections.72 
Despite these positive achievements, the People’s Party experienced disappointments that 
crippled efforts to win control of state and national governments during the rest of the 1890s.   
First, Weaver won less than five percent of the popular vote in states east of the Mississippi 
River and north of the Ohio River.  Cleveland won most of the votes in the demographically 
dense northeast, including the support of most industrial workers.  Results in the South created a 
second major Populist failure.  Although the third party and Alliance devoted much time to 
educating Southerners on agrarian reform policies, the outcome proved disheartening.  Many 
white Southerners proved unwilling to abandon the Democratic Party, the party of tradition and 
Redemption.  White Southerners also failed to effectively and consistently appeal to enough 
African-American voters.  Many black Southerners voted for Populists, but others avoided the 
                                                
71 Shaw, Wool-Hat Boys, 71-75; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 1971), 259-60; McMath, American Populism, 177-78; Argersinger, Populism and 
Politics, 113-14. 
72 McMath, American Populism, 177-78. 
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party because they associated candidates with past repression or a losing cause.  Fraud, 
intimidation, and violence also persuaded many Southerners on election day.  Despite its efforts, 
the People’s Party failed to break the “solid South.” 73 
Defeats in the northeast and especially the South caused a third impediment to the 
national agrarian reform effort.  Since the beginning of their challenges to Republican political 
control, Kansans and other farmers’ advocates in the Midwest and West denied accusations that 
the Alliance represented a southern Democratic conspiracy to weaken the national power of the 
Grand Old Party.  Kansans like William Peffer urged fellow Populists to have patience with their 
southern “brethren.”  The South would join with Kansas and other Northern states to form a 
national agrarian crusade that would break the grip of sectional agitators who served the interests 
of monopolies over those of “the people.”  Now the electoral results of 1892 left Northern 
Populists vulnerable to charges that they helped elect Democrats by taking votes from 
Republicans in state and national elections.74 
In Kansas, the heart of Populism, third party support began to decline as many expressed 
great disappointment with the South.  The momentum began prior to election day.  Mary Lease 
denounced Peffer’s attempts to downplay the significance of attacks on Weaver in the South.  In 
a widely published interview, Lease criticized Peffer and denounced the South.  Other Kansans 
said that the South turned its back on the farmers’ movement and they promised to return to the 
Republican Party.  D.G. Ollinger, a Populist congressional District chairman, suggested 
                                                
73 McMath, American Populism, 177-78.  Berton Shaw discusses the political violence committed by Populists 
against African Americans in Georgia.  Shaw also notes numerous Populists who previously supported racially 
oppressive laws.  See Shaw, Wool-Hat Boys, 46, 78-90.  For Georgia Populists who blamed African Americans for 
their 1892 defeats, see Gaither, Blacks and the Populist Movement, 144. 
74 While it is likely that no Populist ticket would have resulted in victory, some scholars contend that a Polk-Peffer 
ticket would have shown the true strength of Populism in 1892.  The Weaver-Field ticket lacked the enthusiasm and 
resonance earned by Polk and Peffer during their travels to the North and South respectively.  Weaver lacked a base 
of support outside of his native Midwest and he proved inept at acquiring such a following.  Nor did not Field prove 
capable of rallying Southern voters to the Populist cause.  McMath, American Populism, 169-70, 177-78. 
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Republican-Populist fusion nationally to “consolidate the north against the solid south.”  Before 
the election he returned to the Republican Party and called Populism “only a Democratic 
sideshow, the principal object of which is to beat the Republican party out of the presidency.”  
Ollinger warned that a vote for Weaver was a vote for Cleveland.  While he recognized that 
reform was still needed, Ollinger predicted that without southern support Weaver would not 
win.75  
Defections intensified as some Populists increasingly worked with Democrats to secure 
state and local elections in Kansas.  After Populists lost state House seats in the 1891 election, 
some third party leaders began to believe they could not win elections alone.  Since most of these 
Populists had a history of opposing the Republican Party and supporting the Union-Labor Party 
or Democrats, they turned to the latter group.  Many fusionists focused on local and state 
politics, rather than the national political movement, and they acted to influence local nominating 
conventions during the spring of 1892.  In parts of the state where Democrats had greater 
numbers they replaced Populists with Democratic-Populists.  Several committees went against 
convention votes and used other forms of deception to secure the nomination of fusionists.76 
William A. Harris represented an extreme example of the new Kansas Populism after 
1892.  Born in Virginia, Harris served in the Confederacy during the Civil War.  At the end of 
combat he migrated to Leavenworth County, Kansas where he became a successful cattle 
rancher.  Harris became popular among many Populists, including Topeka Advocate editor 
Stephen McLallin.  The Virginia native endorsed increased silver coinage but opposed many 
other Alliance reforms, such as the subtreasury plan.  Throughout his association with Populists 
                                                
75 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 118-19, 145 (quote). 
76 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 120, 126-31, 140. 
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Harris encouraged closer cooperation with Democrats, who predominated in his home county of 
Leavenworth.77 
Thanks to a population increase in the 1890 census, Kansas gained an additional seat in 
the House of Representatives.  At the state Populist Convention of 1892, Fred J. Close, a one-
armed Union veteran, nominated Harris for the position.  Close justified the selection with the 
reconciliationist language common to the national agrarian movement.  According to a witness, 
the Union veteran pointed to his empty sleeve and the American flag when he claimed that he 
sacrificed for his country in the past.  Close said he possessed no bitterness toward “the boys 
who wore the gray” and he claimed that Harris “would shoulder his musket now as quickly as 
any Federal soldier to defend the stars and stripes and to keep this one united country.”  Another 
Union veteran, a Captain Evans, spoke in favor of Harris citing a desire “to shake hands across 
the bloody chasm.”  Capping the proceedings several hundred Union veterans reportedly stood to 
salute Harris.  The witness at the convention claimed that the events marked the end of “the great 
rebellion,“ which “started in Kansas in ’56.”  While the nomination symbolically denoted the 
desire of Kansas Populists to reconcile with white Southerners and forgive the trespasses of 
former Confederates, many Populists did not like Harris.  Many of these third party advocates 
came from a Republican background, suggesting a willingness to oppose Democratic influence.  
Harris did little to gain their trust after winning the Populist nomination for Congress.  He 
claimed he was still “a good Democrat.”78 
A growing number of Kansas Populists found these political developments distasteful. 
Many Populists resisted fusion within the party.  Much of the opposition came from former 
Republicans who also formed the bulk of third party leadership in 1890.  William Peffer, John 
                                                
77 Clanton, Kansas Populism, 120; Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 94, 134. 
78 The witness was T. J. Smith from McPherson, Kansas.  His letter to the editor appeared in Topeka’s The Advocate 
on July 8, 1892.  See Clanton, Kansas Populism, 120.  Harris quote, Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 134. 
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Willits, Stephen McLallin, and Mary Lease actively denounced fusion as a political strategy that 
contradicted Populist principles.  Most Populists who fought fusion viewed the party and 
agrarian movement from a comprehensive and national perspective.  The group thought that only 
national reforms could solve the economic problems of the nation and they looked to the South 
as a natural and necessary partner.  Other Kansans withdrew from the People’s Party and formed 
a new political party.  When Populists nominated a Democratic lawyer and the Republicans 
nominated a banker in the Third Congressional District opponents formed the Abraham Lincoln 
Republican Party.  The group communicated its adherence to the principles of the early GOP and 
its reverence for a regional and national hero to represent their position.79 
 Other Kansas Populists chose to return to the Republican Party.  This pattern continued 
throughout the decade as leaders and rank and file members left the Populists.  The trend gained 
momentum around the 1892 election as the People’s Party failed to win in the South and as 
Democrats increased their presence in the state party.  Early Populist advocate and former 
national lecturer of the Southern Alliance Frank McGrath rejoined the Republican fold in 1892.   
After urging Populists at the state convention to support William Harris for Congress, Samuel 
Worthington had a change of heart.  Upset at Democratic victories in the South, Worthington 
moved back to the GOP.  He said he supported Harris “not because of any love for the ex-
Confederate soldier, but because I wanted to show the South that we were willing to lay down 
the bloody shirt and ready to shake hands over the bloody chasm, but recent developments in 
Georgia show that they are not willing to do the same.  It has been made perfectly clear to me 
that the South is still solid, and that there is no possible show for the people’s party in a single 
southern state.”  Worthington resolved to stop voting for Populists because “I would help to send 
                                                
79 Argersinger, Populism and Politics, 123, 126-27, 143. 
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Democrats to Congress, and help elect a Democratic president.  The Democratic party is a party 
of negation and we can never hope to accomplish anything through it.”  Several Populist 
newspapers also ceased production or transferred their loyalty to other parties.  The agrarian 
movement began to divide and alter its focus.80 
Disappointment with the South and national Populist aspirations reached a new low at the 
1892 convention of the Southern Alliance.  Held in Memphis just after the November elections, 
the meeting demonstrated serious internal disagreements within the farmers’ movement.  
President Henry L. Loucks used his address to blame the South for Populist failures in the 
election.  The South Dakotan questioned the loyalty of Southerners to the agrarian cause.  When 
Charles Macune announced his intention to run against Loucks for the presidency, further 
animosity emerged.  Henry Taubeneck of Illinois and other Populists accused Macune of 
campaigning against the People’s Party during the recent elections.  Macune denied the charges, 
but he eventually withdrew his candidacy when it became clear he would not win and resigned 
all of his positions in the order.  He also claimed that outside influences posed a threat to the 
cohesion of the Alliance.  Twenty-three delegates sponsored a resolution to cease criticism of 
Macune and the South.  All but three of the delegates came from southern states.  Loucks won 
the presidency and North Carolinian Marion Butler carried the Vice Presidency.  The Alliance 
continued to promote sectional reconciliation, but clearly unity ran thin.81 
Alliance unity continued to erode during the Memphis conference.  Macune opponents 
questioned the designation of The National Economist as the official Southern Alliance 
newspaper.  Critics charged that Macune worked secretly to support Democrats during the 
elections, received funding from the Democratic National Committee, and circulated Democratic 
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literature as official Alliance material.  Several southern Populists affirmed the accusations and 
materials bearing the signature of Macune’s associate, J.F. Tillman, proved the charges.  Kansas 
Populist John Otis demanded that Macune be replaced or “we of the West will have to withdraw 
from the national order, for we have had enough of the purchased allies of the Southern 
Democracy.”  With circulation already in decline, the Economist lost its official designation in 
February 1893 and the paper ceased publication by the summer.82 
Although Populism survived the 1892 election, the Southern Alliance did not.  A few 
state and some local Alliances continued to operate for several more years, but the energy, 
numbers, and national organization effectively died in 1892.  The agrarian movement lost its 
base in rural communities and now became a political party increasingly run by a new group of 
leaders who wanted to win elections rather than build cooperatives, wage boycotts, and educate 
farmers with the latest agricultural methods.  Many Alliance reforms and rhetoric continued into 
the third party, but a few important tools of mobilization did not.  While some Populists 
continued to speak the Alliance language of sectional reconciliation, its depth and frequency 
sharply declined.  With the death of Polk, the foremost Alliance spokesman for reconciliation, 
Populism failed to continue efforts to heal wounds from the Civil War and truly reconcile 
American farmers from their sectional pasts.  Texan, James “Cyclone” Davis, became the 
foremost national agrarian spokesman.  Following the trend of the farmers’ movement after 
1892, Davis emphasized economic issues far more than sectional reconciliation.83 
The election of 1892 proved extremely important to the future of the agrarian reform 
movement in two interrelated ways.  First, white Southerners in the Alliance divided over the 
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issue of joining a third party to achieve reforms.  The issue quickened the collapse of the 
Alliance and split the southern farmers’ movement.  White southern divisions caused the second 
major result of the 1892 election.  Because of southern failures many Northerners lost faith in the 
ability of the People’s Party to win local, state, and national elections.  Without the support of the 
South, Populists in states such as Kansas became ripe for attack from their Republican foes.  
Since 1890 Northern Populists assured voters that the South would join them in a national 
political effort to put aside the distrust of the Civil War era and improve the lives of the 
American producers.  After two years and efforts to further agrarian reform through a Southern 
Crusade, the political prospects of the farmers’ movement regressed.  Southern Democrats who 
won election with support from the Southern Alliance now criticized the farmer association and 
its major remedies.  Opponents now characterized Alliance members as radicals, anarchists, and 
socialists who threatened the nation.  Some southern Democrats even encouraged Northern 
Populists because they helped sap Republican strength.   
Division in the South negatively impacted affairs in the North.  Without victories in the 
South, Northerners appeared to stand alone.  The reconciliation and reform promised by a 
national coalition of farmers and other producers now seemed impossible through the People’s 
Party.  Populists could not win local and state elections based on claims that they represented a 
national movement of farmers and producers.  Many Northerners and Southerners called for 
continued patience with the South, but others lost faith.  Some Northerners returned to the 
Republican Party, while others pursued fusion with Democrats.  The momentum gained during 
the initial Alliance and Populist victories of 1890 stalled in 1892.  The national agrarian 
movement received a major blow with the elections of 1892 and it did not recover. 
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Without a proven national political following, many farmers’ advocates chose fusion as 
the path to electoral victory.  Although fusion gave Populism a greater chance to achieve limited 
goals, coalition with the major parties spawned defections among third party supporters.  Beyond 
losing early commitments to Populism, fusion also fractured the national unity of the People’s 
Party.  Political concerns on the local, state, and regional levels became more important than the 
national agrarian movement.  Simultaneously, fusion agreements alienated the third party from 
the predominant party in important states like Kansas and Georgia.  Opponents labeled Populists 
as traitors to the region.  Kansas Populists became Rebel sympathizers, while Georgia Populists 
were associated with ushering in a return of Reconstruction-era “Negro rule.”  When the third 
party ran national elections it became impossible to unite state parties.  Kansas Populists became 
increasingly allied with Democrats, while many southern Populists made agreements with 
Republicans in state elections.  
In an attempt to maintain national unity and attract more moderate voters, many Populists 
moderated their campaign platforms after 1892.  Following the Panic of 1893 Populists 
emphasized economic issues at the expense of sectional reconciliation.  The conservative 
reaction of Democratic President Grover Cleveland contributed to an increase in public calls for 
reform.  Seeking to distance themselves from the violent confrontations between laborers and 
employers at Homestead, Cripple Creek, and Pullman, Populists like Tom Watson and Marion 
Butler promoted silver coinage as a practical remedy that would help the middle and working 
classes.  In the South, the party also distanced itself from African Americans by endorsing 
political and legal equality, while strongly opposing social equality.  The shift yielded results in 
the South, but fraud prevented victories.  In the Midwest and West, Republicans benefited more 
than Populists from anti-Democratic opinion.  Overall, votes cast for Populists rose from one 
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million in 1892 to one and a half million in 1894.  More and more Populists called for silver 
coinage as an economic remedy capable of winning elections.  A growing number of 
Republicans and Democrats appeared willing to join the third party in a pro-silver coalition.  
Many Populists, however, proved unwilling to endorse silver at the expense of all other reforms.  
Silver and fusion became a topic of great debate within the third party and further contributed to 
the erosion of national unity.84  
The 1896 elections demonstrated the chaos and difficulties involved in uniting a fractured 
and localized People’s Party that increasingly pursued fusion.  When the party nominated 
Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan as its choice for president too, many 
Populists reacted in anger.  After four years of competing with, and sometimes physically 
fighting, Democrats, the third party asked Southerners to support a Democratic for president.  
Many Kansas Populists also recoiled, since they spent four years fighting Democratic influence 
in their state party.  Further conflicts erupted when Democrats refused to replace vice 
presidential candidate and Maine banker Arthur Sewall with the Populist nominee.  
Demonstrating their commitment to sectional reconciliation and hoping to inspire Southerners, 
Populists nominated Georgian Tom Watson for vice president.  When Democrats failed to drop 
Sewall, many Populists objected.  In Georgia, Texas, Alabama, and North Carolina Populists 
entered agreements with Republicans whereby they supported McKinley for president in 
exchange for support of congressional candidates.  Other Populists acquiesced, especially from 
the West.  As a result Watson failed to appear on many ballots throughout the country, including 
his home state of Georgia.   
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Compounding internal disagreements, the Republican Party utilized conservative 
memories of the Civil War to portray Populists and Bryan Democrats as radicals.  Republicans 
associated the Democratic platform with class warfare, social upheaval, and radicalism.  Ignoring 
their history of supporting “radical” issues, such as social and political rights for African 
Americans, Republicans branded themselves as the party of the capitalism, property-rights, 
patriotism, and social stability.  The party warned that the nation faced its gravest threat since the 
secession crisis of 1860-1861.85 
Through various activities the McKinley campaign specifically targeted Union veterans 
to communicate its message.  In one example, McKinley supporters warned veterans that 
increased silver coinage would devalue their pensions.  Mark Hanna, manager of the McKinley 
campaign, also sponsored flag days to honor his candidate and link the Republican with 
patriotism and the gold standard.  A Sound Money club in New York City held a flag day parade 
of 750,000, which featured Union veterans donning “Sound Money” buttons and carrying 
American flags.  The New-York Tribune reported, “many of those who marched yesterday have 
known what it is to march in war under the same flag that covered the city in its folds yesterday 
all day long.”  Hanna sent former Union generals to the Midwest, where Bryan received strong 
support.  On this tour, “Patriotic Heroes” visited ten states in trains decorated with banners that 
read “1896 is as vitally important as 1861.”  Reinforcing the point, buglers and a cannon 
supported the Union veterans as they made speeches to endorse McKinley, patriotism, and sound 
money.86 
                                                
85 Patrick J. Kelly, “The Election of 1896 and the Restructuring of Civil War Memory,” in The Memory of the Civil 
War in American Culture, ed. Alice Fahs and Joan Waugh. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 
181, 191, 207. 
86 Mary Rulkotter Dearing, Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A.R. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1952), 456-65; Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 528-29.  McKinley carried eight of the ten states toured by 
 267 
As a Union veteran, McKinley possessed a prestige that Bryan could not match.  
Responding to McKinley campaign, Bryan affirmed his loyalty to veterans and denounced 
bankers as the enemies of common people in 1861 and 1896.  Bryan echoed a similar message 
advanced by Leonidas Polk in earlier years by claiming that financiers let others fight the war, 
while they stood aside profited.  These same men, Bryan charged, now tried to “enslave seventy 
millions of people, whites and blacks, in this country.”  Without veteran credentials, however, 
Bryan proved incapable of countering McKinley’s use of Civil War memory.  A Harper’s 
Weekly cartoon demonstrated his impotency on the issue.  On one side of the cartoon stood a 
uniformed McKinley at guard and ready for combat against southern rebels.  Above him read, 
“In 1861 William McKinley was upholding his country’s honor, -- and he’s doing it yet!”  On 
the other side of the cartoon, a baby Bryan waved his shaker as he sat in a gown in his cradle.  
Above Bryan, the cartoonist wrote, “In 1861 this is what William J. Bryan was doing, -- and he’s 
doing it yet!”  Bryan’s baby-like protest of 1861 and 1896 stood juxtaposed by the intense 
bravery and patriotism of McKinley.87 
When Bryan lost the election, the Populist Party lay in shambles.  Democrats 
incorporated the class rhetoric and major reforms, while ignoring the existence of the third party.  
Fusion agreements produced short-lived victories that did not last through the next election.  
Although the third party remained popular in some locales, it was effectively dead after 1896.  
Many agrarian supporters shared Watson’s sentiment: “Our party, as a party does not exist any 
more.”  The Georgian concluded, “Fusion has well nigh killed it.  The sentiment is still there, but 
confidence is gone.”  Many Populists chose to return to the two major parties.  Because he 
                                                                                                                                                       
the “Patriotic Heroes.”  Hanna ordered and distributed large quantities of American flags to promote McKinley as 
the patriotic candidate. 
87 R. Hal Williams, Realigning America: McKinley, Bryan, and the Remarkable Election of 1896 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2010), 144. 
 268 
opposed the state party’s endorsement of Democratic-Populist fusion, William Peffer lost his 
senate seat to a Democratic Confederate veteran.  Peffer rejoined the Republican Party two years 
later and cited the “too much Democracy” as the main reason for the decline of the Populist 
Party.  The Populist death began in 1892 with losses in the South and fusion in Kansas.  Without 
the national cohesion generated by the Southern Alliance from 1889 to 1892, the farmers’ 
movement staggered until 1896.  Traditional affiliations to regional identity and the necessity of 
focusing on local politics combined to kill the agrarian crusade.88 
Although the agrarian movement failed during the 1890s, much of its rhetoric and 
reforms gained popularity in subsequent decades.  Anti-trust laws, government regulation of 
public utilities, the direct election of U.S. senators, the private ballot, women’s suffrage, 
prohibition, the income tax, and federal loans for farmers became federal laws by 1930.  
Criticism of banks and big business carried great influence during the Great Depression.  An 
expanded federal government did more to protect the working and middle classes from an 
economic downturn by the 1930s.  Sectionalism played virtually no role in these developments.  
The later achievements provided little solace for many of the Civil War generation who did not 
live to see their implementation.  Instead, the failures of the 1890s left many in the agrarian 
movement bitter and ready to retreat back to regional and state affiliations.89 
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